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ABSTRACT
The International Monetary Fund, Power Politics, and the Changing Political
Economy of the Twenty First Century.

By
Eduardo M. Flores
Dr. Jonathan Strand, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada Las Vegas
The governance of the global economy is in a constant state of change. Since the
creation of the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund has had to pursue
a series of reforms to meet the changing demands of the international monetary system.
At times, the Fund’s institutional design has been adjusted to reflect the rise and decline
in economic fortunes of member states. Other times the Fund has been resistant to
change. However, the original design has proved to be durable and has overcome a
number of historical challenges. Currently, two realities are challenging the institutional
design of the Fund leading to seriously consideration to reform the governance of the
Fund. The first factor involves emerging market economies and developing countries
which are demanding equitable representation commensurate with their new found
economic strength. The second factor is the ongoing legitimacy problem. For the Fund
this has been a problem the Fund has never fully been able to overcome and this problem
originates in the governance of the Fund. Two factors contribute to this situation:
informal governance and formal Articles of Agreement. The argument made in this thesis
is that power politics explicitly or implicitly define the institutional design of the Fund.
Reforms will become a reality but not at the expense of the major shareholders and non-
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economic factors (i.e., politics) will continue to have a role in the governance of the
Fund.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many observers claim recent shifts in the global economy may require rethinking
the architecture of global economic governance (Stone 2011; Woods 2010). A myriad of
changes have raised doubts about the effectiveness of extant international organizations.
The Great Recession that began in the United States has highlighted the fragility of
developed economies because of increased linkages between national economies
resulting from financial globalization. Other changes, such as the rise of the BRICS and
other emerging markets, increased regionalism and multilateralism, and the absence of a
singular and clear economic doctrine to govern and regulate the global economy in the
post-Washington Consensus era have raised questions about the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the current global financial architecture. Today’s global economy
involves complex interconnected financial markets and rapid flows of capital often
resulting in economic crises extending from one economy to another (Copelovitch 2010).
The causes and consequences of the Great Recession will long be debated. The United
States experienced a severe, complicated subprime mortgage crisis that impacted Europe
and East Asia (Shirai 2009). In Germany, the IKB Deutsche Industriebank experienced
financial losses related to the American subprime crisis and ultimately was rescued by
domestic public and private banks (Shirai 2009). In 2008, the Asian Development Bank
reported 965 billion dollars in total worldwide write downs by financial institutions,
Europe accounted for 271 billion of this due to active investment in US capital markets
(Shirai 2009).
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Prior to the Great Recession, the International Monetary Fund was facing its own
crisis. Large shares of its outstanding loans were paid back in early 2000s. While the IMF
relies on the capital contributions of its members for loans, the day-to-day operating costs
of the Fund are largely paid for by fees and interested from loans (Mohammed 2003). In
other words, the IMF was losing customers and facing a cash-flow problem. Numerous
observers pointed out that the Fund was at risk of losing its legitimacy (Griesgraber 2009;
Seabrooke 2007; Torres 2007). Demand for IMF assistance due to the Great Recession
mostly came from middle-income and wealthy economies. The Fund, along with the
G20, took center stage in the policy responses of governments to the recession.
In the face of volatile situations, the IMF has often been the international lender
of last resort seeking to manage crises and maintain global financial stability
(Copelovitch 2010). Put differently, the Fund is among the world’s most powerful
multilateral institutions. The general research question asked in this thesis is: how has the
IMF’s internal governance responded to changes in the distribution of resources and
power in the world political economy? This question is fundamentally important to
international relations because it addresses issues of global governance, global economic
networks, anarchy, and cooperation in an increasingly interdependent global economy
(Stone 2011). Furthermore, this research question is important to the new financial
architecture because international organizations promote legitimacy and credibility for
effective multilateral cooperation. Both powerful and weak states can benefit from
international organization membership (Stone 2011).
Why does it matter how the IMF’s internal governance has responded to changes
in the world political economy and power politics? It matters because the current wave of
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globalization is unprecedented (Ranis, Vreeland, and Kosack 2006). Prominent scholars
argue the OECD countries are no longer able to maintain positions of privilege in the
hierarchy of the world economy. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets are
deserving of louder voices in the international financial architecture. Some see it as
inventible that rising powers will supplant those of the old order in terms of both formal
and informal internal policies of international organizations (Stone 2011). Others point to
ideas associated with power transition theory. A rising challenger state will be
dissatisfied with the existing global order (hierarchy) and prestige (Schweller 2011).
Rising economic powers seek greater political influence. Applied to the IMF, such
concerns focus on IMF quota calculations with some observers claiming quotas do not
accurately reflect the economic power of many states. The IMF’s internal governance
procedures determine the order of the hierarchy pyramid for international economic
governance, and which states determine the financial rules. Also, power transition has the
potential to create violent international conflict and is costly for all parties involved
(Rapkin and Thompson 2003; 2013). At some point, the ascending state will seek to be a
status quo power or revisionist power (Schweller 2011).
The IMF can respond to the challenges of a changing world political economy by
reforming its internal governance to meet the challenges of a changing financial
architecture and the power politics associated with international organizations. In the face
of these challenges, international regimes facilitate mutually beneficial agreements.
Scholars argue these regimes produce lower transaction cost, provide legal frameworks
for legal liability, improve information sharing and otherwise facilitate cooperation
(Keohane 1982).
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CHAPTER OVERVIEW
In order to understand the concept of the institutional design and governance of
the Fund and be able to answer the question of the thesis it is important to understand the
history of the Fund. Therefore, chapter two will proceed with a historical analysis of the
Bretton Woods monetary system with a focus on the history of the Fund. In 1944 the
Bretton Woods Conference established the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank. Ostensibly, the IMF was created to help avoid the economic turmoil of the 1930s
and facilitate international economic cooperation in the post the World War II era.
Establishing rules to avoid “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies was an important goal of the
Fund (Gilpin 2001). Central to this goal was the establishment of the Bretton Woods
Monetary System. Important subjects examined in chapter two will include the role of the
Fund in the Latin American debt crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis. The last section of
this chapter will examine how financial globalization is changing the international
economic order.
Chapter three will focus on the internal governance and institutional design of the
Fund. The chapter will highlight the complicated mechanisms of the Fund that make up
the decision-making processes and the exercise of power within the Fund. Chapter three
will begin by analyzing the Articles of Agreement that give the Fund its decision-making
authority and will move into areas such as conditionality and Fund surveillance. Formal
and informal governance will also be examined with an emphasis on loan conditionality
requirements. The informal rules allow the Fund to be autonomous from its shareholders;
these rules will be analyzed to explain how they influence the institutional design of the
Fund and address how these respond to the changing world political economy.
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Since the Fund’s creation, the most important features of IMF governance are
votes, quotas, selected representation, formal rules, and informal procedures. Votes are
assigned based on economic strength measured by IMF quotas. The quotas largely are
based on the relative economic size of member countries’ economies. The variables used
for quota calculations are shares of world output of products and services (GDP),
purchasing power parity based on GDP, trade, international reserves, variability of
exports and imports. In theory, voting rights are supposed to match the economic
influence of a country and the financial contribution it makes to the IMF, but this is not
the case for many emerging and low-income economies.
Chapter four will focus on significant cases of discord/reform regarding Fund
governance to the end of the Cold War. Namely, this chapter will explore China’s entry
in the Fund and Russia assuming the preliminary Soviet seat at the end of the Cold War.
China and Russia mark significant turning points in the governance of the Fund. Both
countries helped the Fund become a universal institution, created changes in the
institutional design of the Fund, and created adjustments of power within the Fund. The
China case will review the Republic of China (ROC) and international institutions and
then examine the discord between the ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
regarding Fund negotiations for the PRC’s representation in the Fund.
The second case will focus on Russia joining during the early 1990s. By Russia
gaining membership another 14 countries gained membership into the Fund (Boughton
2012; Stone 2002). Russia’s membership was not without discord. Internal Fund
documents were analyzed to examine the level of discord among Fund members and the
power politics of Fund governance and quota allocation.
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Chapter five will focus on the Fund’s governance post-Cold War by analyzing
three cases: Japan’s ongoing influence in the Fund since the 1980s; European overrepresentation; and the BRICS emerging economies. Undoubtedly, Japan has been a
major player in the Fund. Japan has served as financier to the Fund when many countries
were reluctant to contribute to new financial facilities to assist debt stricken countries
with balance of payment problems. The issue of European over-representation has been a
concern that has caused much discord. This chapter will examine the power and effects of
European over-representation on the institutional design of the Fund. Additionally, the
chapter will examine the role of the BRICS in the institutional design and possible
challenges for the Fund. The BRICS have not accepted unequal representation in the
Fund with quite voice. Moreover, the BRICS and other emerging economies have begun
to publically denounce the Fund for failure to reform its internal governance to give an
equitable voice to emerging economies.
Chapter six will focus on internal governance and reform of the Fund. Review of
cases from prior chapters will be examined and show why there is pressure from the
international community for the Fund to reform its governance model. Data analysis will
be conducted for major countries before and after recent quota reforms. This analysis
reveals if the Fund has truly embarked on internal governance reform that reflects current
economic realities. A section will focus on possible quota reforms and consideration of
other governance reforms beyond quotas.
The thesis research design will focus on qualitative methods for country specific
cases and institutional design cases. The cases selected are those that have presented
significant challenges to the institutional design of the Fund and challenges to the
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financial stability of the global economy. The cases selected have overtime created
changes in the balance of power in the institutional design of the Fund and overtime have
created and will continue to create challenges for international relations. For example,
China’s admittance into the Fund has facilitated Chinese economic growth. Stone (2011)
argue rising powers will supplant those of the old order in terms of both in the formal and
informal internal policies of international organizations. Others point to ideas associated
with power transition theory. A rising challenger state will be dissatisfied with the
existing global order (hierarchy) and prestige (Schweller 2011). Rising economic powers
seek great political influence. In these cases, data will be used to measure gross domestic
product (GDP), foreign exchange reserves, international trade, GDP per capita, openness
of economic variability, and international reserves against the world totals of the different
variables. This approach will be useful in analyzing the quota and voting share of
member states and answer the thesis research question. The specific question of member
state over- and under-representation will be answered by comparing members’ relative
weights in the world economy to their voting weights in the Fund.
This topic is important to the changing international monetary system because
without a legitimate international framework to oversee international trade and
cooperation dire consequence can result from international discord. Groups such as the
foreign policy establishment, policymakers, and others should be concerned with the
institutional design of an international organization that will acquiesce or prevent the
benefits and consequence of unprecedented globalization. Some observers argue
globalization is a benefit to rich and poor countries alike. Conversely, others argue
globalization only benefits wealthy countries at the expense of poor countries.
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Ultimately, the international political economy is changing and a Fund that can promote
economic cooperation will be essential to the future changing international financial
architecture.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The International Monetary Fund is one of the two intergovernmental
organizations that resulted from the Bretton Woods Conference. This chapter will
concentrate on the history of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and lead into the
discussion in the following chapter of the institutional design and governance of the
Fund. The first section will detail the factors that contributed to the Bretton Woods
Conference. The second section will focus on the history of the Fund leading up to the
period of the recent Great Recession.
The factors that contributed to the success of the Conference were United States
leadership and the collapse of the international monetary system due to World War I, the
Great Depression, and the beginning of World War II. Lastly, another factor contributing
to the Bretton Woods Conference success was the careful planning preceding the
Conference, especially the blueprint for the International Monetary Fund (Garritsen De
Vries 1986).
World War I had dire consequences for the international monetary system. During
this period the gold standard was destroyed and became ineffective for sound monetary
policy (Garritsen De Vries 1986). In the 1920s, several large industrial states attempted to
reestablish the gold standard for exchange rate policies, but the exchange rates did not
account for divergent macro-economic policies that fostered unequal balance of payments
and high domestic unemployment rates (Garritsen De Vries 1986).
The Great Depression intensified the dire economic consequences of the latter
period. Commodity prices and world trade plummeted to unprecedented levels. To
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mitigate the currency devaluations of the 1930s and the Great depression, states applied
restrictions to capital flows and protectionist policies became the standard. These factors
aggravated the decline in world trade (Garritsen De Vries 1986; Joyce 2013). Large
industrial and developing states suffered from deflationary pressures. States imposed
their own parochial solutions by imposing competitive exchange rates; effectively states
attempted to export their unemployment rates creating beggar-thy-neighbor policies
(Garritsen de Vries 1986). No universal polices to prevent financial contagion existed.
The gold standard was no longer effective, international monetary chaos was prevalent,
and the outbreak of World War II worsened matters (Garritsen De Vries 1986).
The Bretton Woods System
In academic circles, the success of the Bretton Woods system is often debated.
Prominent scholars argue the Bretton Woods Conference was one of the most successful
economic achievements of the twentieth century (Eichengreen 2008; Garritsen De Vries
1986). The Conference consisted of representatives from 44 states who convened at
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 (Eichengreen 2008; Joyce 2013). The explicit
goal of these governments was to prevent the economic and financial chaos of the past. It
delivered a degree of exchange rate stability (Eichengreen 2008). During the Bretton
Woods era, 1944 to 1973, living standards improved in Western Europe, North America,
Australia, and developing countries experienced high rates of economic growth, along
with unprecedented growth in international trade (Eichengreen 2008; Joyce 2013).
The success of the Bretton Woods System was not by capricious circumstances.
Careful planning was essential to the creation of the IMF and other international
organizations like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
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Bank). Charters were constructed for the creation of a new international monetary system
(Garritsen de Vries 1986). Historically, international organizations have facilitated
cooperation based on agreements of mutual benefit. Some scholars claim this has reduced
the potential for violent conflict among states (Keohane 1982). During this period, the
United States assumed a leadership role. The “White Plan,” was sponsored by Henry
Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the US Treasury (Garritsen De Vries 1986;
Steil 2013). John Maynard Keynes, from the British delegation, represented the British
view for a new international monetary system.
The Keynes Plan was designed in 1943, it concentrated on an international
currency union, a new International Clearing Bank (ICB), and bank money (Bancor)
would be used in the ICB (Steil 2013). This plan was to be defined in terms of gold and
national currencies where the value of the Bancor would be fixed in terms of gold.
Member states would obtain Bancor in exchange for gold, but were prohibited from
obtaining gold in exchange for Bancor (Bordo and Eichengreen 1993; Garritsen de Vries
1986). All countries adhering to the plan would be subject to fixed exchange rates, and a
governing board vote would be required for amending the fixed rate (Garritsen de Vries
1986). At this point, countries would be permitted to change their exchange rate and
apply trade and exchange rate policy fluctuations in order to generate full employment,
which was a major goal for the British (Eichengreen 2008). Countries would be allowed
to carry debt balances in the form of overdrafts rather than loans with the ICB and the
Keynes’ system would finance balance of payment deficit (Eichengreen 2008; Garritsen
De Vries 1986; Steil 2013). Central banks would manage the Keynes Plan. Countries
would be permitted to settle debt imbalances with each other using the Bancor system
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(Joyce 2013). For Keynes, a monetary system that revolved around money was
inconsistent with the self-regulating forces of supply and demand in the economy (Steil
2013).
The Keynes Plan was very shrewd, it would allow the United Kingdom to attempt
to re-establish and preserve its hegemonic position in the global order (Steil 2013). The
Keynes Plan would shift the global economy from the gold standard and dependency on
the US dollar. It was more liberal in conditionality requirements, would give debtor states
more autonomy, and limit the freedoms of creditor states. The plan imposed strict
regulations governing the balance of creditors and debtors. Inherently, this condition was
intended to limit the US position in global foreign affairs because the U.S. would result
as the global economic and military leader after World War II (Steil 2013). Also, Keynes’
vision of a monetary institution revolved around Anglo-American ideals and advocated
for a small selective group of finance ministers to approve the Bretton Woods system
(Steil 2013).
According to IMF historians, the White Plan was most conducive for establishing
perimeters for a new international monetary system (Garritsen De Vries 1986; Joyce
2013). Originally, White’s plan intended the Fund to act as a bank, the first draft of the
plan was called the United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund. Eventually it took
on the name the International Monetary Fund and became a geopolitical international
institution (Steil 2013). The White Plan called for a contributory institution, with
members making subscriptions in gold and national currencies. Member states would be
permitted to draw loans based on their respective subscriptions; the total amount of
drawing rights permitted in the beginning was a total of five billion US dollars
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(Eichengreen 2008; Joyce 2013). The latter would help prevent inflationary consequences
created by a new source of international liquidity (Joyce 2013). The White Plan was
concentrated on establishing a cooperative post war monetary system. The plan was
predicated on peaceful international relations. Henry Dexter White foresaw three
potential problems for the United States if an international monetary system was not
established. First, there was a clear need to prevent a collapse of foreign exchange, credit
and monetary systems. Second, White wanted to see stability in monetary relations to
help reestablish foreign trade. Lastly, White worried about the capital needed for
reconstruction efforts after the war (Steil 2013).
The White Plan emphasized pegged exchange rates, an economic system
unrestrained by unnecessary economic regulations, and an international organization with
veto power for important monetary issues (Eichengreen 2008). White, like Keynes, also
had a hidden motive for the new economic doctrine. White was determined to elevate the
dollar as the only currency capable of being a replacement for gold as the anchor in the
new system. The goal was to prevent other states from manipulating gold prices in order
to manipulate U.S. monetary policy (Steil 2013).
Based on the Bretton Woods agreement gold, central banks, and the US dollar
were essential to the success of the new international monetary system. Central banks
maintained fixed values for their currencies based on the value of gold or US dollars. The
United States would assist a member state by standing ready to sell or purchase gold to
other member states at 35 US dollars per ounce of gold (Joyce 2013). The practice of
purchasing gold only extended to official foreign creditors of the U.S. (Eichengreen
2008). The dollar was used as an intervention currency in lieu of gold. According to
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Eichengreen, the Bretton Woods system indirectly became a gold-dollar based system. In
1971, the gold standard ended and the Bretton Woods system became a dollar-based
system (Eichengreen 2008).
The Fund was designed to promote and monitor the new international monetary
system and facilitate international cooperation. The IMF blueprint was based on a series
of compromises agreed to by Keynes and White. Ultimately, the White Plan was more
influential and congruent with the hegemonic position of the United States (Joyce 2013;
Steil 2013). The Keynes Plan presented strong intellectual challenges to the White Plan.
However, the British did not have much leverage over the U.S. as Britain was in need of
financial assistance during the war and postwar reconstruction efforts would require
financing. There was no other country willing and able to provide such support other than
the U.S. (Steil 2013).
The Bretton Woods blueprint encouraged international trade and a response to the
“impossible trinity” that was the status quo monetary system responsible for limiting
independent policy-making (Joyce 2013). The impossible trinity involves three factors:
fixed exchange rates, unregulated capital flows, and/or control of the domestic money
supply. For example, the gold standard dictated that countries purchase or sell gold at
fixed standards. Therefore, the values of currency reserves were universal for all
countries (Joyce 2013). The Bretton Woods system was significantly different than the
Gold Standard. Countries were allowed to implement capital controls and monetary
policy to regulate economic cycles (Joyce 2013). The Bretton Woods system resulted in
adjustable pegged exchange rates, conditionality for exchange rates, and the formation of
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the IMF (Eichengreen 2008). Within the system all currencies except the dollar could be
adjusted.
The Bretton Woods system was consolidated in the international monetary system
in December of 1958 when European countries agreed to the conditions of Article VIII of
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. The Article allowed convertibility of national
currencies for current account transactions (Eichengreen 2008; Steil 2013; Joyce 2013).
By 1961, two-thirds of the IMF’s membership had adopted Article VIII. The Bretton
Woods system was effective in promoting economic stability through the 1960s.
Although, the Bretton Woods system provided stability and created the IMF, the
foundation of the Bretton Woods system was unsustainable.
In due time after the Bretton Woods system was created, major shareholders
realized the system based on the gold standard and the US dollar as reserve currency was
not sustainable. The Bretton Woods system served as a gold-dollar standard system from
1959-1967. The U.S. pegged the dollar to gold, and other countries pegged their
currencies to the dollar (Bordo 1995). During the 1950s and 1960s European states
agreed to Article VIII, convertibility of national currencies for current account
transactions, as long as the U.S. was willing to exchange these reserves for gold (Steil
2013; Joyce 2013).
The trilemma of international economics resurfaced during the Bretton Woods
era. The impossible trinity is an inevitable limitation placed on policymakers and
international organization bureaucrats. It was impossible to have free capital movements,
fixed exchange rates, and autonomous monetary policy work together at the same time,
there has to be a trade- off (Bordo and Eichengreen 1993; Joyce 2013). Countries like
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Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia in 1997 in part suffered currency crisis because they
failed to acknowledge the constraints of the impossible trinity (Fisher 2001).
The U.S. received criticism for the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
Contributing to the problem were the flaws of the gold exchange standard, the adjustable
peg system, and the acceleration of world inflation due to an increase in the growth of
money supply. In reality, the problem was how to achieve adjustment in a world with
capital controls, fixed exchange rates, and domestic policy autonomy (Bordo and
Eichengreen 1993). In 1960, economist Robert Triffin published his thesis called “Gold
and the Dollar Crisis” (Williamson 2009). Triffin argued the Bretton Woods system was
doomed to fail because the internal mechanisms were flawed with internal economic
contradictions. The gold supply was small and volatile because commodities were linked
to market forces. International liquidity was only sustainable if the U.S. ran a payment
deficit in order to continue supplying dollars to foreign central banks (Steil 2013;
Williamson 2009).
During this period, an abundant supply of US dollars became the norm, foreign
central banks retained more dollars exceeding the value of U.S. gold holdings.
Ultimately, this reduced confidence in the U.S. dollar (Strand 2014; Joyce 2013). The
Triffin Dilemma suggests the global economy would lack adequate liquidity and
undermining the confidence of the US dollar, which would create a financial crisis, as the
amount of gold within the U.S. would be worth less than the value of dollars outside the
U.S. (Williamson 2009). Steil documents during a Congressional testimony in 1959,
Robert Triffin simply put it best, “there were absurdities associated with the use of
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national currencies as international reserves, it constituted a built in de-stabilizer in the
world monetary system” (Steil 2013, 333).
One factor undermining the Bretton Woods system was the discord from the
European Union. Several EU members were not satisfied with the dollar as reserve
currency. Another factor was that increased capital mobility was testing the legitimacy of
the fixed exchange rate system (Bordo 1995). Third, global leaders were pressing the
U.S. for a resolution to the monetary problem. In 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon
removed the U.S. from the gold-dollar link. Bordo (1995) argues that during this period
the Fund was a weak institutional power, U.S. power was threatened, economic
governance was ineffective, G-10 governors were in discord, and the breakdown of
Bretton Woods signified the end of an era of U.S. financial dominance.
Historical Analysis of the International Monetary Fund
The IMF started with 44 governments in attendance at the Bretton Woods
Conference. The IMF was first established in 1945 with 29 member countries signing the
Articles of Agreement. While it was designed to help manage the Bretton Woods System,
it never fully assumed this task and instead early in its history it served as a lender of last
resort for members facing balance of payments problems. Although, the Fund was
originally created to facilitate international exchange among industrial countries, it never
truly performed that role (Vreeland 2007). Some argue the Fund was looking for a new
role to play when it first began to assist developing countries (Vreeland 2007). In the
1970s the Fund began to become more involved with developing countries and also took
on a larger role as an economic policy advisor and continued as a lender of last resort
(Strand 2014). By the 1980s Fund membership was effectively bifurcated into the

17

wealthy governments who made the rules and borrowing countries who had to live by the
rules. By rules, it is meant the policy conditions placed on loans made by the Fund.
Highlighting this role polarization in the Fund is the simple observation that from the late
1970s until the Great Recession no wealthy economy utilized IMF lending facilities. The
IMF charter advocated for collective action amongst countries in order to achieve
benefits such as increased employment and real income, facilitate balanced growth of
international trade, improve standards of living, and improve the domestic resources of
member states (Woods 2006). In theory, the Fund was established to be an apolitical
international organization created to maintain a stable international financial system,
provide loans to member states so to offset short-term payment imbalances, and defend
member state exchange rates (Gould 2006). In reality, the Fund’s internal governance and
policy outputs where inherently political (Rapkin and Strand 1997).
The Fund’s blueprint consists of 31 Articles of Agreement (Joyce 2013; IMF
2013). The Articles address a broad range of areas, from quotas and subscriptions to
operations and transactions of the Fund, to emergency provisions (Joyce 2013; IMF
2013). Quotas are designed to reflect the relative size of economies, the larger the
country’s economy the larger its quota. The subscriptions determine the amount of capital
a member country must contribute to the Fund when joining the Fund and during capital
increases. The Articles have been subject to revision as to reflect the ever-changing
nature of the international monetary system. Since 1945, the Articles have been subject to
six amendments, the most recent effective March 3, 2011 (IMF 2013). Article one
highlights the purpose of the Fund. IMF Article of Agreement I:
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1.

To promote international monetary cooperation through a
permanent institution which provides the machinery for
consultation and collaboration on international monetary
problems.

2.

To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and
to the development of productive resources of all members as
primary objectives of economic policy.

3.

To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive
exchange rate depreciation.

4.

To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions between members
and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which
hamper the growth of world trade.

5.

To give confidence to members by making the general resources
of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate
safeguards, thus, providing them with opportunity to correct
mal-adjustments in their balance of payments without resorting
to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
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6.

In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of
members (IMF 2013).

Historically, since 1946, the Fund has experienced a number of changes such as
the post Bretton Woods System, the Latin American debt crisis, the Asian financial crisis,
the Fund’s role with developing countries, poverty alleviation initiatives, and the Great
Recession. This malleable Article set the groundwork for the Fund’s ability to reinvent
itself to address the constant changing international monetary system. Equally as
important, the Article paved the groundwork for the collection of subscriptions, quota
allocation, loan facility disbursement, and the ability for the Fund to serve as lender of
last resort.
The historic role of the Fund in low-income countries evolved over time.
According to Boughton and Lombardi (2009), the evolution of the Fund was forced by
five interrelated factors. First, membership in the Fund increased from 40 countries in
1946 to over 180 member states by the 1990s. With the addition of the former Soviet
countries the Fund obtained an almost universal membership (Boughton 2012).
Second, changes in the world economy require changes to the Fund. Whereby, less
developed countries began to take advantage of financial globalization. Third, changes in
economic theory as the era of protectionism was being replaced by neoliberal market
reforms. Fourth, there have been changes in IMF leadership. Lastly, changes in
international factors such as an increased influence from civil society in world politics
have impacted the Fund (Boughton and Lombardi 2009, 51). The Fund has extended an
olive branch to civil society organizations as a method of acquiring important information
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and sources of policy inputs (Strand 2014). The Fund’s membership of low-income
countries grew from 11 percent in 1946 to 40 percent by the 1960. In terms of developing
countries that borrow from the Fund, by 1972, over 50 percent of Fund members obtained
financial assistance from the Fund. By 2006, more than 80 percent of low income
countries obtained Fund assistance, and more than 80 percent of all indebted countries
were low income countries (Boughton and Lombardi 2009).
During the early 1960s the Fund established the Compensatory Financing Facility
(CFF) dedicated to providing loans for countries dependent on commodity exports. Since
the commodity markets for agricultural and mineral products were beyond the control of
domestic structural policies, the Fund did not require domestic programs for economic
policy adjustments as a condition to borrowing (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The
philosophy behind the CFF was that member countries did not have control over
temporary external shocks, and the shocks were not created by inefficient state
macroeconomic policies. The CFF was designed for low-income countries; however,
other countries were also allowed to use the CFF. This program was the first step in a
series of borrowing programs developed for poor countries, and the first step in
implementing policy modifications at the Fund regarding low-income countries
(Boughton and Lombardi 2009). Beginning in 1963 lending to low-income countries
totaled 243 million US dollars and by 1967 lending totaled 723 million US dollars
(Boughton and Lombardi 2009).
Phillips (1983) argues the Fund changed radically in the 1970s by implementing
three significant changes. The changes allowed the Fund to influence domestic policies of
borrowing member states. The first change was the amending of the Articles to give the
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Fund more administrative power over the global economy, this was implemented in 1978.
The second change was the creation of the oil facilities and the expansion of Stand-ByArrangements. Lastly, there was an increase in the quota system. The implication of the
latter was to empower the Fund to have more influence over domestic macroeconomic
reforms of borrowing countries and to continue support for the world capitalist system
(Phillips 1983).
During the 1970s, the Fund continued to promote loan facility programs for lowincome countries. The Oil Facility program was a direct derivative from the CFF. The
rise in oil prices and the shortage of oil created dire international economic problems not
seen since the 1930s (Garritsen De Vries 1986). In 1973, six members of OPEC increased
the price for crude oil. This action created a disruption in the world economy. The same
theory was applied to fuel importing countries that were affected by the sharp increase in
oil prices. As a result, these countries experienced difficulty in meeting external debt
obligations (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The essence of this program was to provide
an interest rate subsidy for loans. The subsidy was five percentage points below the
prevailing market rate. Twenty-five member states qualified for this loan program on an
automatic basis (Boughton 2012; Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The Managing
Director, Hendricks Witteveen, traveled to the Middle East to personally lobby member
states for contributions to establish the oil facility. On August 22, 1974 the oil facility
was established (Garritsen De Vries 1986).
In 1976, the Trust Fund was created to provide long-term loans (10 year) at low
interest rates of 0.5 percent and without policy adjustment requirements for low-income
countries (Bordo and James 1999; Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The Trust Fund was
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financed by selling Fund gold assets and provided balance of payments assistance (IMF
2013). From 1977 to 1980, the Trust Fund provided 3.3 billion in loans to 55 low-income
countries (LICs) (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). The latter loan programs did little to
elevate the poverty stricken condition of these member states and resulted in the Fund
experimenting with loan conditionality programs.
The Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was established in 1974. This facility required
borrowing countries to develop structural and investment reforms aimed at establishing
long-term growth rates and had an emphasis on structural adjustments (Bordo and James
1999; Boughton and Lombardi 2009; IMF 2013). Countries that utilized the EFF had
experienced serious long term payment imbalances and limits to private capital (Garritsen
De Vries 1986). Conditionality was based on stand-by arrangements. This loan program
was available to all member states and payable over a ten-year period with a seven-year
grace period (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). In 1986, the Structural Adjustment Facility
(SAF) was created with a concessionary interest rate of 0.5 percent with repayment
options over a 5-10 year period (Bordo and James 1999). The SAF and the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) were modeled on the EFF, and conditionality was
standardized for future loans (Bordo and James 1999; Boughton and Lombardi 2009).
These two loan facilities paved the way for later collaborative bilateral efforts by the IMF
and the World Bank to examine methods for debt reduction and poverty reduction
programs.
Accordingly, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was
established in 1996. The Fund’s role was to provide grants to member countries to relieve
poverty conditions and to manage debt burdens. The initiative was financed with
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contributions of member states and gold sales by the Fund (IMF 2013). This initiative
provided 30 HIPCs with over two billion US dollars for debt relief. The initiative was a
joint program between the Fund and the World Bank (Boughton and Lombardi 2009;
IMF 2013). The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) replaced the HIPC providing
total debt relief with conditionality requirements for domestic structural reforms. The
debt relief is provided by the Fund, the World Bank, and other development banks.
Country bureaucrats were required to prepare a Policy Framework Paper (PFP)
establishing policies for poverty reduction, balancing international payments, sustainable
strategies for economic growth, and stabilizing government finances (Boughton and
Lombardi 2009; IMF 2013). Without this condition, IMF and World Bank loans would
be denied to potential borrowers. Many of the country PFP’s were prepared in
Washington with U.S. Treasury assistance, facilitating criticism of the Fund by low
income countries.
In 1999, the Fund created the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to
supplant the ESAF and its PFP requirement (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). This policy
authorized structural adjustment recommendations to be developed domestically with
participation by local groups (Boughton and Lombardi 2009). East Asian countries and
Latin American countries participated in these loan facilities that often imposed strict
conditionality requirements during times of financial turbulence. Much debate has been
generated about the role and success of the Fund in the Asian Financial Crisis and Latin
American debt crisis.
For academics, international observers, and foreign government officials
conditionality has been associated with the “Washington Consensus.” John Williamson
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defines the Washington Consensus as a group of American policy makers, think tanks,
the Washington technocrat establishment, the executive branch, the International
Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions that have a strong American
influence on policy outcomes. The Washington Consensus is primarily focused on 10
policy reforms concerned with macroeconomic prudence on outward economic openness
orientation, domestic liberalization, and economic growth (Williamson 1990). The policy
instruments that make up the Washington Consensus include: fiscal deficit discipline,
public expenditure priorities, tax reform, interest rates, exchange rate policies, trade
policy, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights
(Williamson 1990). These proposed economic reforms were being urged in Latin
America by Washington elites. The Latin America debt crisis consolidated the
Washington Consensus as an idea, but these reforms also materialized in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere (Williamson 1993).
Latin America and Fund Conditionality
The Latin American debt crisis compelled the Fund to loosen its conditionality
requirements in order to better serve as of lender of last resort. During the early 1980s,
Latin America was plagued with nearly half a trillion dollars in debt (Pastor 1989).
Beginning in the 1960s Latin American experienced an economic growth surge of the,
between 1979 and 1981, less than a third of Latin American countries obtained loans
from the Fund. Through the 1970s Latina America’s access to private international
finance was on the rise. Due to the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the glut of
American dollars private commercial banks turned to Latin America for maximizing their
profits (Pastor 1989). For example, US commercial bank profits decreased due to a
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decrease in real interest rates. By charging Latin American countries extra fees US banks
were able to increase their profits (Pastor 1989). There was an abundance of capital
available for borrowing. From 1977-1981, credit increased by 28 percent a year (FrenchDavis 1987). From 1966 to 1970, Fund facility program borrowing by developing states
fell by two-thirds. From 1979 to 1981, Fund programs fell to one-third of their normal
utilization by borrowing member states as private capital was more accessible. The latter
aggravated the Latin American debt crisis which facilitated excessive public spending
(Wiesner 1985) Domestic macro-economic polices contributed to the crisis as economies
became more vulnerable to exogenous factors (Wiesner 1985).
Additionally, factors like volatility of terms for international trade placed
macroeconomic restraints on countries with a high concentration on specific export
products. Many Latin American countries that were categorized as small economies
suffered more severe consequences (Goldstein and Turner 1996). A second factor
contributing to the debt crisis was low levels of import diversification. A third factor was
the volatility in interest rates and the effects the rates had on private capital. Interest rates
affect the cost of borrowing and the flow of capital investment. For example, in 1981,
many Latin American countries experienced an average investment flow of six percent.
From 1983-1990 the average was estimated at below one percent (Goldstein and Turner
1996).
Member states, however, did not have to seek policy advice or financial assistance
from the Fund anymore (Pastor 1989). The latter posed potential challenges for the Fund.
This created an institutional power problem for the Fund and many Fund officials
complained that Latin America was underutilizing Fund resources. In order to acquire
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more market share the Fund eased conditionality requirements, implemented new Fund
facilities, published empirical research to prove that Fund conditionality did not
negatively impact domestic economic growth, and recognized that some Fund conditions
created useful domestic political cleavages for borrowing countries (Pastor 1989; Phillips
1983).
The debt crisis of the early 1980s positioned the Fund to retake its prior position
as lender of last resort. During this time, the boom-bust cycle of economics came to
fruition. Foreign trade inflows decreased, nominal interest rates increased up to 13
percent, and there was a shortage of foreign capital (French-Davis 1987). Many countries
experienced financial macro-economic hardships and could not sustain payments of the
accumulated debt. Chile’s debt level exceeded 90 percent of its GDP and the rest of Latin
America averaged 50 percent debt level to GDP (French-Davis 1987).
Latin American countries were forced to seek help from the Fund. The Fund did
not fully understand the difficult macroeconomic, regional financial environment, and
pursued a strategy to bring Latin American countries under its direct or indirect
supervision (Pastor 1989). By 1982, the Fund expanded lending to these countries
experiencing capital liquidity problems. This was a major extension of the Fund’s capital
market program (Meltzer 1998). By 1983, 75 percent of Latin American member states
were participating in some type of conditionality Fund program, Stand-by-Arrangements
or the Extended Fund Facility (Pastor 1989). Due to the Fund loans and high interest
charged to Latin countries by international commercial banks the Latin American
countries essentially became permanently indebted to the Fund (Meltzer 1998). The Fund
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and the private banks entered into agreements, the Baker Plan, that would facilitate bank
payments and stricter conditionality.
The Baker Plan was established in 1985 to assist debtor countries in obtaining
macroeconomic adjustment policies to support economic growth and reduce inflation.
The Brady Plan increased official lending to 15 middle income countries (Sachs 1989).
These countries were provided loans in return for reforms in structural adjustments and
more lending by multilateral banks (Boughton 2012). As a result of the Baker Plan,
multilateral banks provided 15 US billion for 1986-1988 to Latin American countries.
The Fund served as catalyst for private sector lending.
The Baker Plan did not produce the anticipated results. From the beginning the
Plan was flawed due to deficient operational understanding regarding issues such as
surveillance, enforcement, and conditionality which were not defined clearly from the
beginning of its implementation. The Brady Plan much like the Baker Plan focused on
debt solution on a case-by-case basis and debt reduction assistance must be linked to
economic reforms under the supervision of the Fund or World Bank (Sachs 1989).
The Brady Plan was established in 1989 as a debt forgiveness program whereby
commercial banks to established a debt reduction program by reducing the interest or
principal on outstanding loans. In return commercial banks would be guaranteed a
remaining portion of the debt by the Fund and the World Bank. Put differently, the Fund
and the World Bank would serve as cosigners for the remaining balance (Sachs 1989).
Four countries became the first to experience debt relief under the Brady plan: Costa
Rica, Mexico, Philippines, and Venezuela. The Brady Plan focused on debt reduction for
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a country to obtain positive credit ratings and for the debt to be repaid there must be a
debt reduction (Sachs 1989).
It would take over a decade for Latin American countries to recover from the
financial crisis and banks to recover their losses during this era. As a result, the Fund took
steps to raise resources to facilitate debt reduction and financial institutions took a loss of
the debt owed which ended the crisis after a decade of negotiations (FDIC 1997).
Economic liberalization approaches the Latin American countries implemented consisted
of reducing state spending and rejecting economic policies that were based on arbitrary
decisions by poorly trained bureaucrats. Other reforms included widespread deregulations
of trade and investment, privatization, and the reduction of public spending (Naim 1994).
The IMF and the Asian Financial Crisis
In 1997 the Asia region suffered the most severe financial crisis not seen since the
1982 debt crisis. The countries most affected by the AFC were Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and South Korea, but countries such as Brazil and Russia were also affected.
The East Asian Tigers generated unprecedented economic growth in the region, with
gross domestic product increased by five to seven percent per year (Eichengreen 2008;
Fisher 2001; Katz 1999). Poverty alleviation increased as 350 million people no longer
lived in poverty. Per capita incomes were increased by tenfold in Korea, fivefold in
Thailand, and fourfold in Malaysia (Fisher 1998). For East Asian countries, price
inflation was reasonable, saving rates were high, governments recorded budget surpluses,
and account balances were positive (Katz 1999).
The flight of private foreign capital was the main culprit associated with the AFC.
Liquidity was a major problem for the East Asian economies. Due to an increase in
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capital mobility, developing countries were exposed to external pressure to allow capital
inflows for investment. They opened their markets to the global economy. Debt was
concentrated in short term liabilities and low reserve assets in central banks created a
classic bank run (Bosworth 1998). Across the region the factors that contributed to the
crisis included: governments encouraged short term lending when liberalizing capital
accounts, government policies regarding fixed exchange rates, and the close relationship
between business elites and government elites created the moral hazard syndrome
(Thirkell-White 2005). Economic policy performance can be examined by utilizing the
veto-player model of comparative institutional behavior by applying how the bureaucratic
system can affect economic performance (St. Marie, Hansen, and Tuman 2007). The
veto-player model is rooted in the policy rigidity approach. The greater the number of
veto holders the greater likelihood for policy solutions for financial problems. This
approach is influenced by internal cohesiveness, autonomy, and control of financial
matters (St. Marie, Hansen, and Tuman 2007).
Goldstein (1998) argues the AFC was aggravated by the easy expansion of credit
in the private sector. The loans obtained by easy credit were invested in real estate and
equities. Many of the real estate bank loans accounted for 25-40 percent of the total bank
loans in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Hong Kong (Goldstein 1998).
The credit boom outpaced the real GDP growth of the region. This type of growth proved
vulnerable to external shocks, shifts in investor sentiment, and proved unsustainable.
Fisher (1998) narrows the crisis origins to three factors. First, there was a failure to
contain the effects of the Thailand crisis. Second, many governments maintained a
pegged exchange rate regime. Third, there was a lack of financial oversight.
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The economic and structural framework of many Asian economies lacked
experience with laws, protocols, administrative experiences, and regulatory institutions to
deal with disruptive inflow of foreign capital (Katz 1999). However, other factors also
contributed to the AFC such as weak financial institutions, fragile capital markets,
vulnerable structural framework, and external economic influences (Katz 1999). The
Fund, the U.S., Japan, and European countries encouraged East Asian countries to
liberalize capital accounts for short and medium term capital transactions with long term
transactions on the horizon (Katz 1999; Fisher 1998).
During the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998, the Fund was compelled
to create new solutions that differed from past solutions. The AFC was quite different
from the Latin American debt crisis (Katz 1999). During this period the Fund responded
with programs that were limited in size, include questionable conditions, and proved
ineffective in addressing all AFC challenges (Blustein 2001; Dervis et al 2011). Until this
point, the Fund did not have an understanding of the domestic and international policy
consequences of short-term capital flows (Dervis at al 2011; Fisher 2001; Katz 1999).
Additionally, the Fund did not understand the effects of financial contagion on other
economies created by an increased integration of emerging economies with global capital
markets (Dervis et al 2011; Katz 1999).
For Fund technocrats the main problem with the AFC was concentrated on
domestic institutions although international capital markets played a role in the crisis.
However, the solution was to fix the institutions in order to restore confidence to the
market (Thirkell-White 2005). Banks across the region were poorly regulated and
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underdeveloped. When it became apparent that governments were unwilling to rescue the
domestic corporate sector the crisis began (Thirkell-White 2005).
During 1997, Thailand’s economic activity, exchange rate, and currency (the
Baht) declined significantly. This was after a decade of economic growth of an average
yearly rate of 9 percent (Blustein 2001). In Thailand, exports of electronic components
took a downturn; a strong US dollar rebound hurt the Baht. In 1996, real estate
investments declined and stocks plummeted 35 percent (Blustein 2001). As the Baht
depreciated in value the Thai central bank depleted its currency reserves in an
unsuccessful attempt to preserve the Baht-dollar par value (Katz 1999). During August of
1997 until 1998 the Fund issued Thailand a series of financial facilities. The facilities
experienced a number of changes because the Fund did not properly understand or
monitor the economic situation. The financial facility consisted of US 4 billion to be
distributed over a 34-month period. The total package accounted for 17.2 US billion in
multilateral organizations financial assistance, but also bilateral loans. For example,
Japan was willing to assist the region: Tokyo matched the Fund’s loan with a 4 billion
dollar loan. Other Asian countries, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank worked
collectively to raise 6 billion dollars (Blustein 2001; Dervis et al 2011; Katz 1999).
Economic actors did not respond well to the financial assistance by the Fund because the
financial package fell short of the 23.4 US billion owed by the Thai central bank (Dervis
et al 2011). In November 1997, the Fund facility was amended to address the economic
realities within the Thai economy. In December 1997, an additional 810 million dollars
was distributed (Dervis et al 2011). The Fund had similar responses to other Asian
countries.
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In the case of Indonesia, the Fund considered the economy to be resilient to
external shocks. Indonesia was not like Thailand in regards to currency reserves.
Indonesia possessed 20 billion in hard currency reserves (Blustein 2001). The Fund
attempted reassure international observers that Indonesia was resistant to external shocks
to no avail. By 1997, 15 percent of Indonesian men were unemployed. In 1998, economic
output decreased by 14 percent and the official currency, the Rupiah, would plummet to
15,000 per one US dollar from 2,400 in 1997 (Blustein 2001). Problems that contributed
to the financial meltdown were Indonesian corruption and incompetent banking practices.
For example, some borrowers continued to receive loans after defaulting on previous
loans and obtaining a business license required a partnership agreement with the
president’s relatives (Blustein 2001) Also, the Fund’s lack of a clearly detailed plan for
the Indonesian economy stands out as problematic. As a result, the Fund would blame the
Suharto government for the failed economic recovery.
In October of 1997, the Fund approved a 40 US billion dollar financial package
with the caveat of releasing a major portion of the loan at the end of the three-year stand
by-arrangement (Dervis et al 2011). The Fund provided ten billion with three billion
dollars disbursed upfront, the remaining balance was provided by multilateral partners. In
1998, two additional economic facilities were ratified and dispersed, one in April and the
other in June (Katz 1999).
The Fund’s financial package failed to create much optimism for the domestic
economy. After the first Fund disbursement, sixteen banks exited the market place,
uncertainty increased regarding bank deposits, and the political will of the presidential
administration to enforce conditionality was unknown (Dervis et al 2011). The latter
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resulted in political, economic, and social constraints. President Suharto would resign
amid violent protest that claimed 1,000 lives (Blustein 2001). The second Fund
disbursement in 1998 did not alleviate previous concerns. The conditions attached to the
financial package did not solve the root cause of the crisis and failed to address banking
and corporate debt restructuring (Dervis et al 2011).
South Korea was also impacted by the AFC. During the 1990s, Korea witnessed
impressive economic growth, moderate inflation, and had a small fiscal surplus (Joyce
2013). Much of the economic activity was due to the conglomerates (Chaebol) that were
financed by domestic banks and government policies to encourage domestic
industrialization. Due to relationships established between business groups, influential
families, and government bureaucrats banking policies were poorly regulated (ThirkellWhite 2005). The Chaebol system was based on patronage and was deeply rooted in
South Korean society. The South Korean business conglomerates collaborated with
government policymakers for the creation of regulatory processes. External influences
also contributed to the crisis. For example, The Fund and U.S. business interests
encouraged South Korean officials to liberalize foreign participation in manufacturing
and banking sectors (Katz 1999). This permitted short term borrowing abroad, a banking
environment with unsound investments, and structural deficiencies (Katz 1999). A
reduction in exports in the mid-1990s created a growing current account deficit and weak
corporate performance earnings. Eventually, this situation evolved into the beginning of
the South Korean financial crisis. In November 1997, foreign investors universally
refused to provide loans for the private domestic sector. The Bank of Korea depleted
currency reserves as it tried to repay foreign loans (Dervis et al 2011).
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The Fund’s response was to curtail the power of the conglomerates, but in the
face of poor market conditions and declining profitability banks continued to provide
loans to the conglomerates (Thirkell-White 2005). The Fund attempted to implement
conditionality based on Anglo-American norms. In response to dire economic
circumstances in December of 1997, South Korea sent the Fund a Letter of Intent
detailing its policy reforms. Policy reforms included monetary policy adjustment to
prevent a breakdown of liquidity. Trade policy reforms accelerated measures to open the
economy up to imports, eliminate trade subsidies, and follow WTO trade regulations
(IMF 1997). Other areas of reform included capital market openness, financial sector
restructuring, adjustment to exchange rate policy, labor market reforms, and transparency
in data publication (IMF 1997).
In December of 1997, the Executive Board approved a disbursement from the
recently established Supplemental Reserve Facility to South Korea in excess of 21 US
billion. This facility was put into place on December 17, 1997 to provide financial
assistance to Fund members experiencing exceptional balance of payment difficulties.
This facility was an additional form of resources under the Stand-By or Extended
Arrangement with access to large loans at penalty rates to countries in crisis. Also, the
facility was available in two or more tranches and required repayment 12-18 months after
the first tranche disbursement (Fisher 1999; IMF 1997).
Malaysia along with other East Asian economies showed signs of financial
distress and an asset price bubbles by early 1997. Bankers responded by restricting
lending for property purchases. This triggered a fall of the Malaysian stock market
(Thirkell-White 2005). In June of 1997, the trade deficit was became a major economic
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problem. The Malaysian Central Bank raised interest rates to support the value of the
national currency, the Ringgit (Thirkell-White 2005). Unlike many East Asian countries
Malaysia did not receive as much bank and private capital inflows. Portfolio inflows for
every year in the 1990s were very short and at times negative (Radelet and Sachs 1998).
Additionally, current account deficits and exchange reserves were also low. From 1990 to
1995, balance of trade for imports was averaged negative 70 percent. However, inflows
of foreign direct investment averaged 6.6 percent of GDP and private sector borrowing
averaged 3.6 percent of GDP (Radelet and Sachs 1998). Malaysia was part of the AFC
due to financial contagion and international intervention. In 1999, Malaysia’s Prime
Minister broke with the Fund’s economic orthodoxy, rejected an IMF bailout, and
implemented capital controls on foreign capital (The Wall Street Journal 1999).
Due to the AFC, the Fund established three new programs: the Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP), the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC), and, a new facility the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) (Dervis et al 2011; Fisher
1999). These programs were created to increase transparency, data dissemination, and
improve regulatory structures. The FSAP was a joint venture between the IMF and the
World Bank to promote the dependability of domestic economic structures of member
countries (Dervis et al 2011). ROSC improved compliance for auditing, bank supervision,
corporate governance, creditor rights, insolvency, monetary and financial policy
transparency, payment systems, and securities regulation (Dervis et al 2011). The CCL
was established to provide financial payouts to members with strong macroeconomic
structures who were subject to financial contagion. A line of credit would be disbursed to
countries as a method of insurance against financial contagion (Fisher 1999). The
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conditionality of the facility was unattractive to many member states, and the facility was
discontinued in 2003 (Dervis et al 2011). In essence the Fund operated as the
international lender of last resort during the AFC.
The history of the Fund in Asia in the 1990s can be characterized by a lack of
understanding about international capital flows and financial contagion. More
importantly, the Fund exhibited a lack of understanding the macroeconomic structure of
East Asian economies. Fund programs failed because of inadequate funding for big
economic problems and a lack of easy access to additional financial payouts (Dervis et al
2011; Radlet and Sachs 1998). Prominent scholars argued that Fund’s institutional culture
of over self-confidence may have aggravated the AFC (Katz 1999). At no point were
domestic economist consulted about the idiosyncrasies of the Asian economies. Fund
staff preferred structural reforms in lieu of short-term quick fix solutions to diminish the
intense financial crisis (Katz 1999). Many of the countries affected by the AFC
categorized the Fund as illegitimate and opted to obtain loans from other multilateral
organizations at higher loan rates (Woods 2010).
This created a serious legitimacy crisis for the Fund. Member states like Korea,
Russia, Brazil, and Argentina who once paid high fees for Fund loans began to seek
assistance elsewhere. Consequently, the Fund estimated a budget shortfall losing an
estimated 400 million per year by 2010. One consequence was the layoff of 300-400
Fund staffers (Woods 2010). Another highlight of the legitimacy crisis was the Malaysian
resistance to Fund policies. Prime Minister Mahathir hesitated in seeking Fund assistance
during the AFC. A second key feature was the rejection of Fund approaches by
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introducing capital controls. Lastly, the Prime Minister publically promoted alternative
policies as part of a political attack on the Fund (Thirkell-White 2005).
The relationship the Fund established over decades was eroded as a result of the
AFC. Some Asian countries became antagonistic toward the Fund and the hostility was
associated with conditionality regarding macroeconomic and structural reforms
negotiated in Fund financial packages (Henning and Khan 2011). The end result was a
stigma associated with Fund lending.
The IMF and Globalization
The Fund has not been immune to the positive and negative influences of
globalization. Today, because of financial globalization, the Fund has become more
salient than ever. International markets have expanded over territorial boundaries;
economic integration has become more complex and private international capital flows to
developing countries have increased at an unprecedented level (Copelovitch 2010). For
example, in 1970, international capital flows were estimated at net zero. By 2005, capital
flows had increased to 491 US billion. In 1986, daily foreign exchange trading was 850
US billion; daily trading grew to 3.2 US trillion by 2007 (Copelovitch 2010). Today,
scholars argue that the Great Recession demonstrates reforming the rules and institutions
of global financial governance is needed more than ever. In particular, the Fund has faced
an ongoing legitimacy crisis. Emerging economies are dissatisfied with the current
governance model, voting shares are not commensurate with a members’ economic
strength, and the rise of multilateralism has created more options for assistance.
A number of factors compelled the Fund to initiate reforms. The Fund was in
need of self-sustaining income. Low-income countries and middle-income countries were
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distancing themselves from the Fund because they felt conditionality was oppressive and
even counter-productive. The legitimacy problem was negatively affecting the confidence
of member states and causing an identity problem for the Fund (Truman 2006; Woods
2010). The U.S. ceased to be the largest creditor (Woods 2010). A rising China and other
emerging economies were changing the structure of the world economy, the international
financial architecture of the Bretton Woods era had changed. As a result, many argue the
Fund failed to fulfill its role to safeguard the international economy (Truman 2006).
Emerging economies continue to lobby international partners for the creation of regional
funds. Additionally, the BRICS financial strength and their role in the new financial
architecture commanded new positions in the institutional design of the Fund (Lombardi
and Woods 2008). Shortly after the Great Recession, the BRICS coalesced around the
Fund to help with financial capital. Although, financial assistance was done with much
reluctance the Fund was able to positions itself as the de-facto lender of last resort
(Copelovitch 2013).
In response of the global economic crisis, the Fund has increased its lending
power, used international economic relationships to offer policy solutions, and has
introduced reforms to respond to countries’ needs (IMF 2013). Many of these reforms
were encouraged by other multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. In response
to the crisis, the G20 committed almost one trillion US dollars to the Fund’s coffers. The
outcome was an unprecedented level of loans in excess of 158 billion US (Woods 2010).
The G20 has committed itself to a leadership role addressing the global financial system.
Copelovitch (2013) argues the G20 will have to do much work to prove itself as a serious
forum for international economic cooperation. However, the expansion of the G7 to the
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G20 signals a move toward multipolar governance mandates. During the financial chaos
caused by the financial crises of the 1990s, global leaders looked to foster a new
international financial architecture. The G7 group was not sufficiently capable of such a
task and it required the expansion of the G7 to the G20 (Wade 2011).
Conclusion
Overall, it appears the Fund has evolved in an attempt to meet the economic
conditions of the day. However, much debate has been generated by the Fund’s successes
and failures. Overall, the Fund has had five major changes in its history. The first change
was the cooperation and reconstruction of a new international monetary system after
World War II. The second major change was the establishment of a currency exchange
mechanism that would provide the needed liquidity in the market. The third major change
when Eastern Europe expanded the Fund to a nearly universal organization. The Fund
entry negotiations with the Russian Federation paved the way for other Eastern Bloc
countries to join the Fund. The fourth change was encouraged by the severity of the AFC.
This period was one of great institutional concern due to the legitimacy problem. Lastly,
current financial globalization and crisis are creating international cleavages among the
industrialized countries and emerging markets. Beginning with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system and the increase of world capital markets the Fund emerged as a lender of
last resort (Jensen 2004). The role of the Fund became complicated with the end of the
fixed exchange rate system and the beginning of the floating exchange rate after 1971
(Jensen 2004). Member states began to acquire current account deficits, the Fund was
unsure if the account deficits were due to short-term fluctuations or macroeconomic state
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policies. As a result, the Fund transitioned itself from the management of fixed exchange
rates to country surveillance and macroeconomic consulting (Jensen 2004).
During the Bretton Woods era the Fund was an institution created to regulate the
fixed exchange rate arrangements between countries, to provide short term loans for
balance of payment problems, and encourage economic cooperation (Eichengreen 2008).
When the Bretton Woods system collapsed floating exchange rates became the standard
practice and more countries began to have current account deficit problems (Eichengreen
2008; Jensen 2004). The Fund turned to surveillance activities to monitor countries
economic activity as a tool for resolving the account deficit problems. The latter
indirectly shifted the Fund’s focus to global macroeconomic consultant (Eichengreen
2008). Since the creation of the Fund, it has maintained its position as one of the most
powerful international organizations. Today the Fund continues to initiate reforms
designed to strengthen its powerful position in the world. The next chapter will focus on
the institutional design of the Fund.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FUND, INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND GOVERNANCE
Chapter three will examine the institutional design and governance of the Fund.
The Fund’s institutional design is complicated and includes mechanisms such as
conditionality, decision making rules, managing director responsibilities, policy outputs,
a weighted voting system, and quota rules (Lombardi and Woods 2008; Strand 2014).
Understanding internal governance is important to understanding how the Fund operates.
Internal governance concerns how member states obtain voting shares, the complex
nature of the IMF, and even the future of the international financial architecture. The
chapter will focus on the institutional design of the Fund that includes informal and
formal procedures, governance structure of the Fund, country representation and voting
shares, conditionality, surveillance mechanisms and a theoretical approach to the
institutional design. Particularly important to this chapter is the consideration of formal
and informal governance section. Stone (2002) has coined the term “informal
governance.” International organizations function according to two types of rules: formal
rules and informal rules. Formal rules consist of consensual procedures and informal
rules allow for special privilege for powerful states.
The first section of the chapter will analyze the formal rules of the Fund.
Specifically, Articles III, IV, XII, and VX and how they contribute to the institutional
design, governance, and decision making process of the Fund. The second section will
move into the informal rules and practices of the Fund and examine the implications for
governance, power politics, and the decision making process. Variations in loan
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conditionality are then examined to assess the influence of power politics in the
governance of the Fund.
IMF Articles of Agreement
The mandate of the Fund and its institutional design originate in the Articles of
Agreement. The Articles were created to facilitate the cooperation of the international
monetary system, promote exchange rate stability, and create a multilateral payment
system for account transactions (Joyce 2013). The Fund has a total of 31 Articles. The
Articles have been amended and approved by the Board of Governors to address the everchanging problems in the international financial architecture.
The Articles of Agreement concentrate on a broad range of member state
commitments. Issues addressed in the Articles range from the Fund’s purpose to relations
with other international organizations to quotas. The Articles are important and contribute
to the formal and informal practices of the institutional design of the Fund. This section
will emphasize the Articles that are fundamental to the formal decision making process.
The articles important to the institutional design include Article III “Quotas and
Subscriptions”, Article IV “Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements”, Article XII
“Organization and Management”, and Article XV “Special Drawing Rights” (IMF 2013).
Scholars argue the Fund’s Articles represent a distribution of power by political elites
that hide the true nature of the Fund and its most powerful member, the U.S. This nature
is rooted in a member-controlled organization that utilized three components to conceal
its true purpose of being a tool of American hegemonic power (Stone 2008, 592). The
Articles represent a system of representation of member states, its official lending
criteria, and its weighted voting apparatus (Stone 2008).
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Quota and Subscriptions
According to Buira (2000), three factors are important to the decision making
process: the distribution of voting powers, decision-making rules, and the management
structure within the IMF. In theory each Article details a specific function of the Fund. In
practical terms the Articles overlap and work in conjunction with each other. For
example, Article III pertains to quotas and subscriptions. Specifically, each member is
assigned a quota expressed in Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The Board of Governors is
responsible for approving quota adjustments, each member must pay its corresponding
subscription in full to the Fund, and other stipulations relating to the quotas and
subscriptions. The Fund is structured around the quota system. The quota system is very
important because it determines the members’ financial commitments to the IMF and
influences members’ access to Fund financing. Each member state is assigned a quota
based on its relative position in the world economy.
According to the Articles of Agreement, the Fund is mandated to review
members’ quota at least every five years by examining economic positions of member
states and the financial viability of the IMF and are specifically outlined in Article XV
(Rapkin and Strand 2006; Strand 2014). The five-year review process is called a General
Quota Review. Additionally, quotas are important because they determine how much
money member states can borrow from the Fund and their access to Special Drawing
Rights. In reality, members’ global economic strength, quotas, basic votes, and political
considerations determine the voting rights of governments.
Fund Surveillance and Conditionality
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Article of IV, “Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements” is important to
the information sharing process, conditionality, surveillance, and the quality of
information provided by members (Lombardi and Woods 2008). More importantly, this
Article influences the disbursement of loan facilities for member states. The Fund has the
right to oversee the international monetary system and the compliance of each member to
ensure all sections of the Articles are followed. The Fund has a unique position because it
has access to 188 member states and their country information. Article VIII, “General
Obligations of Members” compels members to provide the Fund with information
necessary for Fund duties. Information that is shared on a regular basis include exchange
rate policies, international balance of payments deficits/surpluses, trade in goods and
services, gold transactions, capital transactions, and other macroeconomic data. This
information is facilitated by section three of Article IV. This section specifically grants
the Fund an exclusive right to oversee the compliance of member states.
The Fund maintains surveillance operations on two levels, multilateral and
bilateral (Lombardi and Woods 2008). Multilateral surveillance is used to collect and
distribute new information to member states and market participants. Two reports
produced by multilateral surveillance are the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the
Global Financial Stability Report (GSFR) (Lombardi and Woods 2008). Additionally, the
Fund has implemented discussions regarding international financial markets by
promoting the world economy and market developments. In the early 2000s, the Fund
launched surveillance on development financing and regional economic effects
(Lombardi and Woods 2008).
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Bilateral surveillance puts Fund technocrats in direct contact with member state
government officials. These meetings are held to educate country officials on the
universally agreed standards of international finance, market reforms, and other
macroeconomic policies conducive to a strong international monetary system (Lombardi
and Woods 2008). Countries agree to participate in country reports per Article IV. These
reports are prepared by the Fund staff and contain outlook projections, economic policies,
and staff appraisals of the country’s economic performance.
Much debate has been generated about the effectiveness of bilateral consultations.
There is a general consensus that Fund consultations are well prepared, academically
valuable, and concentrated with technical expertise. However, criticism has been
generated due to a lack of country specific analysis supporting exchange rate policies and
a lack of knowledge understanding country constraints and implementation challenges
(Lombardi and Woods 2008). The Fund’s impact and success on policy reforms were
based on the receiving country’s economic strength. Large and advancing emerging
economies were not as receptive to Fund advice. Smaller emerging economy and lowincome economy government officials were more receptive to Fund consultations
(Lombardi and Woods 2008)
Conditionality along with other Fund practices has been the subject of much
criticism. As described above, Fund technocrats are responsible for structuring loan
programs and conditionality requirements attached to the loan programs. Historically, the
Fund has implemented one country fits all programs that have little to no sensitivity for
domestic economic and political constraints (Stone 2008). Conditionality has been
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viewed by some as to enrich major shareholder states and highly unjust (Steinwand and
Stone 2007).
The conditionality is imposed on debt relief seeking member states closely
associated with neo-liberal economic reform policies and access to Fund bailout packages
(Soederberg 2003; Strand 2014). Conditionality requirements include: domestic market
reforms, easy access for foreign direct investment, reductions in public sector spending,
and structural reforms such as privatization, deregulation, and tax reform (Strand 2014;
Stone 2008). In theory the Fund applies the same lending requirements for all member
states based on the “Doctrine of Economic Neutrality and Financial Programming”
(Thacker 1999). In reality, conditionality is different for member states. Broome (2010)
argues the Fund became more flexible regarding loan conditionality during the 2008
financial crisis. For example, Iceland borrowed a program loan by agreeing to two main
conditions: a dramatic tightening of monetary policy and starting a bank restructuring
program. Broome also argues Belarus did not get the same treatment as Iceland.
It is legitimate to argue that Fund conditionality has been influenced and
encouraged by the Washington Consensus model. The Washington Consensus is a set of
ten policy reforms suggested for Latin America in the late 1980s. The emphasis was on
macroeconomic stability based on sound fiscal and monetary policies. (Williamson
1993). These policy reforms allow the market a bigger role through privatization, trade,
liberalization, and domestic market regulations (Williamson 1993). Fund economists are
influenced by neo-liberal economic ideas associated with US foreign policy (Strand
2014). The Fund has two guiding principles associated with the approval of loans. First,
trade liberalization is viewed as leading to increased economic growth. Second,
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international financial openness compels debtor states to implement market-based
solutions to economic and political problems (Soederberg 2003). In short, Washington
Consensus ideas are grounded in neo-classical economic assumptions.
Decision-Making Bodies
Article XII outlines the Fund’s institutional design and internal governance
model. The Fund uses a weighted voting system, selective representation, special voting
majorities, and a set of formal and informal rules and practices (Steinwand and Stone
2007; Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). This section addresses the Fund’s
decision-making bodies, voting powers, and the inner workings of the Fund on a formal
basis.
Board of Governors
The Board of Governors formally holds power of the Fund’s operations (Strand
2014). Each of the 188 member countries has a representative on the Board, one seat per
member state. The Board holds a meeting one or two times a year. The Executive Board
may call a meeting of the Board of Governors for special circumstances. When this
occurs, 15 member states or members who accumulate one-quarter of the voting power
can request a meeting. All decisions made by the Board are binding on member states.
The Board uses a weighted voting system and a variety of qualified majority rules to
reach policy decisions (Strand 2014). Day-to-day operations usually are assigned to the
smaller Executive Board. Logistically, it is easier to find consensus in a 24-member
board than in a 188 member Governing Board (Woods and Lombardi 2006).
The Executive Board
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The Executive Board is a powerful body within the Fund. The Executive Board
consists of 24 seats and a system of selective representation determines the seats that
many members occupy. The Executive Board is chaired by a Managing Director who
delegates over the meetings (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). The largest five
vote holders occupy appointed seats in the Executive Board. These governments include
the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Germany and these members appoint their
own executive director (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). The other type of seat
is reserved for members in voting groups that select a delegate to represent their
constituency (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). Currently, 3 out of the 19 seats
reserved for constituencies are occupied by a single country: China, Saudi Arabia, and
the Russian Federation (Strand 2014; Woods and Lombardi 2006). The remaining 180
countries fall into 16 different voting groups that elect a director to represent them. For
example, the director from the Netherlands represents 12 countries. Currently 25
European Union member states have a lot of influence for chair selections on the
Executive Board. In the past, the EU selected ten of the 24 executive directors. During
the early 2000s, the ten executive directors chosen by the EU consisted of six Executive
Directors from the EU. Also, out of the alternate Executive Directors selected eight held
European citizenship (Truman 2006). As a result, the European community has
disproportionate influence on the Executive Board. Today, nine of the Executive
Directors are from the European Union and seven senior officials are from the European
Union (IMF 2013).
Fund Technocrats
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Staff recruitment is a very important aspect of the Fund’s operations with
implications for management operations and international policy outcomes. Historically,
the Fund has focused on employing technocrats. These individuals are highly skilled in
scientific knowledge, specialize in academic training, particularly in economics and
engineering, and theorize that most problems are solved with scientific and technical
solutions (Momani 2005). For example, in the late 1990s, 32 percent of Economic
Program recruits were from the top twenty economic departments in the United States.
An additional 19 percent were from other lower ranked economic departments in the
Unites States (Momani 2005). According to Buira (2002) many developing country
nationals went from American universities directly to the Fund but lack real world policy
experience. Rank and file staffers come from 127 of the 183 member countries. However,
in 1996, 26 of 31 management and senior staffers came from industrialized countries
(Buira 2000). In 2005, 38 percent of newly hired staff was recruited from the Economist
Program (Momani 2007b).
There is a heavy emphasis on Anglo-American neoclassical economic training
among the Fund staffers. As a result, reform and conditionality programs tend to be based
on macroeconomic standards and quantitative targets that are universally applied to
member states and that reflect the idiosyncrasies of Fund staffers (Momani 2007b;
Soederberg 2003). Many universally applied loan facilities failed to improve macroeconomic conditions in countries. For instance, international observers argue the Fund
failed to properly diagnose the problems of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1990s. The Fund
was not able to manage a moderate adjustment problem arising in private capital markets
and this turned into major financial chaos for the region (Radelet and Sachs 1998). Fund
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staffers prepare policy reports and structural reform blueprints for member states. Also,
economists negotiate loan conditions with debtor states (Momani 2005; Soederberg 2003)
Voting Power
Section Five of Article XII legitimizes the decision making process of the Fund
by allocating voting weight to member states. It should be noted that quotas are the main
factor determining voting rights (Buira 2000). A small number of votes, called basic
votes, are assigned to all members regardless of monetary contributions (Strand 2014).
1 The basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results
from the equal distribution among all the members of 5.502 percent of the
aggregate sum of the total voting power of all the members, provided that
there shall be no fractional basic votes.
2 The quota-based votes of each member shall be the number of votes that
results from the allocation of one vote for each part of its quota equivalent
to one hundred thousand special drawing rights (IMF Factsheet, website
2013).

Voting power within the Fund is a fundamental part of its institutional design and
the topic of much controversy. Votes are based on two factors. First, votes are assigned
based on economic strength measured by Fund quotas. The quota clause originates in
Article III. The quota system is complicated. Quotas largely are based on the relative
economic size of member countries’ economies. The larger the quota the larger the voting
share. In the past, factors used for quota calculations have been, (1) GDP at current
market prices, (2) current payments as an indicator to economic openness and the
possibility of requiring loan assistance, (3) official international reserves, (4) current
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receipts, and (5) variability at currents receipts (Truman 2006). When an increase in total
quotas is approved an adjustment may be implemented to bring the actual quota in line
with the calculated quota (Truman 2006). In 2008, Fund members agreed to streamline
the quota system. Today, the formula consists of measures of national product, economic
openness, international reserves, and vulnerability of exogenous shocks (Strand 2014).
Each variable has a weight designated in the calculation formula. National product is the
most influential variable is a combination of GDP at market exchange rates (60 percent)
and GDP at purchasing power parity (40 percent) (Strand 2014). The remain factors are
economic openness accounting for 30 percent, economic variability accounts for 15
percent, and currency reserves account for five percent (IMF 2013; Strand 2014). As
mentioned before, every five years the Fund conducts a quota review called the General
Quota Review. Not every review results in a quota increase. In the past, only eight of
thirteen GQR's have increased the size of the Fund (Truman 2006). Currently, the Fund is
in the process of approving the 14th GQR which will give emerging economies a larger
voice in the decision making process. Not all member state's domestic legislatures have
approved the 14th GQR's. In September of 2013, Fund Managing Director, Christine
Lagarde, addressed the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in an attempt to make the Fund's
case for the U.S. Congress to approve the 2010 quota reform package (Yukhananov
2013). As of October 2013, U.S. policymakers have not approved the 2010 quota reform
package.
In theory, voting rights are supposed to match the economic influence of a
country and the financial contribution it makes to the Fund, but this is not the case for
many emerging and low-income economies. This weighted voting system is a political
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process (Strand 2014). Actual quotas are different than calculated quotas, many times
quota decisions are reached by negotiations. Many member states have voting shares not
justified by the quota calculation formula measuring the relative weight of their
economies. Some states are over represented while others are under-represented (Rapkin
and Strand 2005; Strand 2014; Stone 2008). To illustrate the point, Rapkin and Strand
(2005) conducted a study examining the claim that developing countries are underrepresented in the Fund. The results concluded that upper-middle income countries have
quotas commensurate with their economic standing in the global economy. OPEC
countries, low-income, and lower middle-income countries are over-represented in their
quota shares. For example, Indonesia, had a current quota of 0.980, but the calculated
quota based on Fund variables was only 0.753. Another assessment of quotas, the Quota
Formula Review Group, estimated that Indonesia’s calculated quota was 0.645 (Rapkin
and Strand 2005). Clearly, Indonesia is over-represented in quota shares. According to
Rapkin and Strand, major shareholders have attempted to provide low-income and
middle-income countries a more important role in the Fund’s governance structure. The
transfer of quota shares from one country to another is a zero sum game and the politics
of quota distribution has led to higher disparities between actual and calculated quotas
(Rapkin and Strand 2005).
The institutional design regarding the distribution of votes has been a major
problem for the legitimacy of the organization. Many member states argue that they lack
a strong presence and voting power within the institutional design of the Fund (Truman
2006). Case in point, in 2004 European Union members were responsible for directly
controlling 23 percent of the votes in the Fund (Truman 2006). In May 2004, ten newly
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admitted European member states controlled 2.1 percent. Through coalition building with
non-European states the EU added 12.5 percent to its voting weight; resulting in almost
45 percent of the Fund’s voting power (Truman 2006). As stated above, the reallocation
of voting shares is a zero sum game. In the case of Japan becoming the second largest
economy, many European member states resisted Japan obtaining a larger share of voting
power when it moved from fifth to second place in the 1990s (Rapkin, et al.1997).
All members of the IMF are assigned an equal share of basic votes. With the 2008
Fund reforms, basic votes were assessed at 5.502 percent of total votes (IMF 2013).
There is some debate about the influence of basic votes. Some scholars argue the basic
votes were intended to reflect a sense of equality among member states (Woods 2006). At
the creation of the Fund, basic votes accounted for 11.3 percent of all votes (Rapkin and
Strand 2005; Strand 2014). Since then, as membership in the Fund has increased the
share of quota share votes has increased and this has diminished the effect of basic votes
because the number of basic votes stayed about the same. The share of basic votes
diminished to 2.1 percent prior to recent reforms (Strand 2014). This has affected the
balance of power for small states. Japan has a total vote share of 157,022. St. Lucia has a
total vote share of 890. Overall, the importance of basic votes is relative to the country’s
economic strength. St. Lucia cannot utilize basic votes as a counter-weight to the actual
voting share of large states. Basic votes represent a higher proportion of voting power for
small states (Buira 2000). Without basic votes smaller states do not have much power
attached to their votes. The proportion of basic votes has decreased over the years. In
1956 over 14 percent of votes were basic votes, by 1999 percentages of basic votes
decreased to 2.1 percent (Leech 2002). The current pending reforms will account for
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basic votes at 5.502 percent of the total ratio. Today, the total votes are calculated at
2,519.736. 5.502 percent of 2,519.736 will sum 138,635. With 188 members each
member will have 737 basic votes.
Decision-Making
Decision-making procedures for the IMF are complicated. All members must
adhere to legally binding decisions. However, these decisions do not require consensus.
Special majorities and a weighted voting system are essential to the IMF. Most issues
require a simple weighted majority while other more important issues require an 85
percent weighted majority (Truman 2006). The U.S. has the power to block some
decision-making votes due to it possessing 17 percent of all votes (Stone 2011; Strand
2014). Special majorities during the voting process are needed for political, economic, or
other major issues confronting major states or the Fund, over 50 categories require
special majorities (Strand 2014).
Special Drawing Rights
The Bretton Woods era, 1945 to 1971, was weakened by the Triffin Dilemma
(Steil 2013). Although, it did provide stability this was a time of economic uncertainty
and turbulence, dependence on bilateral trade and inconvertible currencies was taking its
toll on the Bretton Woods system. For example, in 1946, European import costs rose
dramatically because of inflation. Between 1945-1949, a recession decreased the demand
of US imports (Steil 2013). In 1949, Britain devalued the sterling by 30 percent. In the
first half of 1950 the U.S. had a current account surplus of three billion. As a result,
European allies began to express opposition to the international monetary system known
as the gold exchange system (Steil 2013). Many foreign governments blamed the U.S. for
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exporting inflation. Particularly, France led the opposition to the gold exchange system.
During this time the Triffin Dilemma was becoming a reality. In the 1960s, foreign
central banks exceeded the holding of U.S. dollars. The U.S. did not have sufficient
reserves of gold to exchange for dollars (Joyce 2013). Eichengreen (2008) argues the
appropriate solution to the Triffin Dilemma was to establish other forms of international
liquidity reserves for the dollar so to prevent a future Triffin Dilemma. During the 1960s
there was much debate about the winners and losers of a new reserve currency. The G10
took the lead in establishing committees and policy reviews for the new reserve asset. As
a result, in 1968, the Fund’s Board of Governors approved the first amendment to the
Articles of Agreement, which created Special Drawing Rights (Eichengreen 2008; Steil
2013).
Article XV details the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocated to members of
the Fund. The system was created to serve as an interest bearing international reserve
asset under the direction of the Fund (IMF 2013). SDRs are not official currencies or a
claim to the Fund, but Fund members may utilize SDRs as useable currency (IMF 2013).
In other words, SDRs cannot be used to purchase tangible goods, but member states can
exchange them amongst themselves on a voluntary basis as a unit of account. SDRs serve
to increase the official reserves of a country and once added to the official reserves the
member state may exchange the SDRs for hard currency (International monetary Fund
Data 2013). Beginning January 1, 1970 three billion SDRs were used to support the fixed
exchange rate system (Williamson 2009). The use of gold and the U.S. dollar supported
the exchange rate for SDRs. As the international monetary system has changed, so too
has the role of SDRs. Today, SDRs are defined as a basket of currencies consisting of the
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U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Euro, and pound sterling. In 2011, a new SDR valuation and
interest rate took effect. Currencies were assigned the following weight: U.S. dollar 41.9
percent, Euro 37.04 percent, Pound sterling 11.3 percent and the Japanese yen 9.4 percent
(IMF 2013).
Member states may allocate SDRs in proportion to their Fund quotas. There is no
interest charge or other fees associated with SDR allocation (IMF 2013). The SDR
allocation serves as an international reserve asset that may serve as unconditional
liquidity. Otherwise, distressed member states would be compelled to turn to expensive
domestic or external debt to accumulate domestic reserves (IMF 2013). The allocation of
SDRs is distributed to meet the goals of the Fund. SDR allocations have assisted in
preventing economic stagnation, deflation, excess demand, and inflation. Based on the
dates of SDR allocation, it appears that the distribution of general SDRs has been
correlated to periods of financial uncertainty. The first allocation was distributed in 19701972 for a total amount of 9.3 billion (IMF 2013). The second allocation was distributed
in 1978-1981 for a total amount of 12.1 billion. Finally, the third allocation was in 20082009 during the financial crisis for a total amount of 161.2 billion. A special one-time
SDR allocation of 21.5 billion was enacted on September 9, 2009. The total SDR
allocation since 1970 has been equivalent to 318 US billion dollars (IMF 2013).
Formal and Informal Governance
The balance of power between powerful and less powerful states has been a
contentious issue since the beginning of the International Monetary Fund. Issues that
concern the balance of power range from which countries sit on the Executive Board, to
conditionality requirements to various decision-making protocols. For example,
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transparency, the selection of the managing director, and the variations for loan
requirements have generated debate about the Fund’s decision-making process. This
section will focus on the informal rules and how they influence the governance model of
the Fund. This section will use the variations of loan conditionality to draw attention to
the influence of informal rules and practices.
Copelovitch (2010) argues the Fund has been the de facto lender of last resort in
the international monetary system. For example, between 1984 and 2003, the Fund
disbursed more than 400 US billion to countries facing balance of payment and financial
crises. As a result, some loans received more conditionality requirements than others.
Many conditionality requirements have reflected the preferences of the G-5 countries.
Thacker’s (1999) seminal work on the Fund points to a strong correlation between
politics and Fund lending. Stone’s (2006; 2008) contribution focuses on the formal and
informal practices that distribute benefits and loans within the Fund. Some like Gould
(2006) argue private creditors have unprecedented power over the Fund conditionality.
The formal and informal procedures establish equilibrium and cooperation
between powerful and weak states (Stone 2011). Regarding the institutional design of the
Fund, major shareholder states have an interest in promoting polices such as trade
openness and market orientated economic reforms (Stone 2011). Transparency is not a
major consideration in the institutional design of the Fund. The Executive Board
meetings, which approve funding for member states, are highly confidential in practice
(Thacker 1999). The recent increase in transparency was due to criticism from emerging
and low-income states (Gould 2006; Strand 2014). Another controversial example is the
selection process for the Managing Director post. The European Union selects the
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Managing Director of the Executive Board (Woods 2006). In return the U.S. appoints the
president of the World Bank (Buira 2000; Strand 2014). The selection process is by
informal conventions, but these informal conventions play an important role in the
selection of the Fund’s Managing Director. Article XII offers little guidance over the
selection of a Managing Director (Kahler 2001). The institutional design is created to
avoid criticism of the major shareholders actions by not explicitly documenting the
internal mechanisms of power manipulation of international institutions (Stone 2011).
The Fund’s institutional design has been highly criticized for being a tool of US
hegemonic power (Copelovitch 2010; Gould 2006). Stone (2008) argue the Fund utilizes
the “informal governance” model for its institutional design. The model has four factors.
The first factor is voluntary participation by strong and weak states to provide legitimacy
for the international organization. The second factor is conditional delegation. The third
factor concerns the conflicting short-term interests and mutual long-term interests
between states. The fourth factor concerns the formal and informal governance of
international organizations.
The Fund utilizes these four pillars of institutional design because international
organizations must have some legitimacy in order to encourage participation, facilitate
collective action, coordinate expectations, and define rules (Stone 2008). Necessary to the
success of international organizations is that non-powerful states must share in the
distribution of benefits. The allocation of voting rights must be attractive enough for
weak states to resist exiting the system (Stone 2008). Ironically, the allocation of voting
rights does not define the distribution of decision-making power, because strong states
can use informal influence to influence decisions. When powerful states choose not to
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interfere, the formal rules and standard procedures distribute power for all states in the
organization (Stone 2008).
As a result, the Fund’s institutional design employs a two-track model called
conditional delegation (Stone 2008). There are two methods of operation. The first is the
ordinary times method. The second method is the short-term strategic interest method.
During ordinary times there is no compelling interest for major shareholders, particularly
the United States, to be involved with conditionality programs and decision-making rules
(Stone 2008). The major shareholders have sufficient confidence in the technocratic
ability of the Fund to allow the Fund to be autonomous in day-to-day operations.
Conversely, short-term strategic interests, between system leaders and other countries,
override any autonomy the Fund has established. The short-term strategic method is
utilized when the core interests of the U.S. are affected. The process functions smoothly
because other major shareholders concur that the United States acquires temporary
control of the organization (Stone 2008).
Informal practices and informal participation are necessary conditions required
for the continuation of unequal power distribution and institutional design of the Fund
(Stone 2008). For the case of the U.S. and its voting power within the Fund, the U.S.
holds 17 percent of the voting power by acting as a minority shareholder analogous to the
manner minority shareholders behave in publically held corporations. Minority
shareholders control public corporations by informal participation. For the U.S. the two
informal practices of the Fund that facilitate informal participation are voting unanimity
and the centralization of information (Stone 2008).
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Informal participation allows influential shareholders to manipulate the
management proposals and set the formal agenda of the Managing Director (Stone 2008).
This method is manipulative because the Managing Director has formal unprecedented
proposal power and the Executive Board often votes in a unanimous or non-unanimous
manner. It should be noted that the Managing Director leads the board meeting with an
informal procedure called the “sense of the meeting” (Stone 2008). During the voting
process amendments to country-lending items are not permitted because they are prenegotiated with government bureaucrats. For the Fund, the U.S. has an organizational
advantage over other countries. The advantages consist of the diplomatic core service,
private financial institutions, information gathering, issuing the international reserve
currency, and the advantages of the Fund located in Washington, D.C. (Stone 2008).
These factors influence informal participation.
Centralized information increases the advantages of informal participation (Stone
2008). Formal rules do not allow Executive Directors to participate in the negotiating
process for loan programs. Information sharing regarding loan conditionality,
confidential documents, and other information regarding member state loans is prohibited
from Fund staffers to Executive Directors. As a result, Executive Directors cannot easily
influence conditionality (Stone 2008). This does not mean that other factors do not
influence decisions made by the Executive Directors. Stakeholders that influence the
Board of Governors, Executive Directors, and Managing Director are the G7, G20, and
G24 (IMF 2013). In early 2000s, the Fund claimed to be inclusive of civil society
organizations by publishing a policy and procedure guide book for effective civil society
organization participation (Strand 2014). The Fund promoted civil society organization
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engagement as a symbol of transparency and participates in public consultations via
policy forums (IMF 2013).
Many members of the G20 hold seats on the Board of Governors and Executive
Board of the Fund (Lombardi 2010). However, variation in loan conditionality begs the
question, who or what informally influences loan conditionality? Fund approval for loans
require a simple majority of Executive Board votes, the Board tries to avoid formal
approvals on Fund lending decisions at all cost (Copelovitch 2010). Copelovitch argues
this informal method of approving loans facilitates the interest of advanced industrialized
countries on the Executive Board, the size and terms of the loans reflect the interest of the
G5 countries. Controlling Fund lending decisions requires that the G5 countries secure
three additional votes from Executive Directors from three wealthy countries. This type
of cooperation is likely to occur because the interests of the G5, G7, and G10 countries
often coincide with each other (Copelovitch 2010).
A number of loan practices conducted by the Fund have raised criticisms
regarding the legitimacy of loan conditionality and the application of political motives for
loan approval. Three factors account for the latter. The first factor deals with borrowers
who fail to comply with loan conditions, but continue to have easy access and receive
additional loans. The second factor is that a country’s representative on the Executive
Board is originally from the home government; representing the political interest of their
domestic government. The third is the weighted voting system and decision making
processed is inherently political and evolving special majorities help the major
shareholders maintain influence. For example, the U.S. alone has veto power over many
decisions (Thacker 1999). Thacker argues the Fund utilizes five economic requirements
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for loans made to member states. First, the balance of payment position of a country is
the starting baseline for determining the participation level of Fund programs. Put
differently, if a country does not have a payment deficit problem it will not qualify for
loan disbursement. Conversely, a balance of payment problem will facilitate Fund
program participation. Second, many loans are distributed to member states regardless of
the country’s overall debt position. Third, the per capita income of a country is not
considered as a contributing factor for future economic growth. Fourth, poor credit
ratings are not heavily weighted in the loan approval process. Lastly, policymakers have
different interpretations about how the international political economy operates.
According to Thacker, (1999) neo-Marxist advocate that capitalist in the core country
dictate Fund policy at the expense of the periphery countries. The periphery countries
will be more likely to access loans from the Fund in order to expand global capitalism.
Political economists concerned with the influence of domestic politics on international
policy argue that multinational corporations and other lobbies pressure U.S. government
policymakers to protect their interests on the Executive Board (Thacker 1999).
IMF scholars have produced political influence models to hypothesize why
macroeconomic variables have little influence when loan conditionality is applied to
relief seeking member states. These models include the political proximity model,
political movement model, and the neutrality model (Thacker 1999). The political
proximity model follows that the U.S. is more likely to influence the Fund to approve
loans to countries aligned to the U.S. Conversely, the U.S. will influence the Fund to
deny loans to anti U.S. countries like Vietnam (Thacker 1999). This model does not value
the macroeconomic conditions of borrowing countries, but places more emphasis on the
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foreign policy like-mindedness of borrowing countries. The latter can be measured by
examining United Nations General Assembly voting records (Thacker 1999).
United Nations and Fund Votes
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has a 15-member board, five
permanent members and ten elected seats that serve a two-year term. The elected seats
are highly competitive and yield handsome returns for the seat holder. Countries elected
to the Security Council on average obtain a 54 percent increase in U.S. foreign aid and a
seven percent increase in U.N. development aid (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). The
USNC mandate requires a majority of nine votes for important international security
issues. Major shareholders seek to obtain unanimous votes because it reduces the cost of
international campaigns, provides legitimacy for international causes, increases public
support, and voting unanimity serves as insurance for countries who vote against the
major shareholder (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). UNSC members who vote
against the U.S. are punished severely. Vreeland (2007) argues that Stone has
successfully analyzed the connection between U.S. foreign aid and Fund punishment for
non-compliance with conditions attached to Fund loans. For example, Russia was thought
to be of strategic importance to the U.S. after the Cold War, as a result Russia received
little to no punishment for non-compliance (Vreeland 2007).
The evidence for rewarding friends and punishing enemies has been researched
by Dreher and Vreeland (2011, 10). They hypothesize that “elected UNSC members that
vote with the United States are more likely to participate in IMF programs, and they
receive larger IMF loans; elected UNSC members that vote against the United States are
less likely to participate in IMF programs, and they receive smaller loans” (Dreher and
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Vreeland 2011). Two dependent variables are used for empirical testing. The first
variable is the dichotomous indicator of participation in IMF programs. The second
variable is the size of the Fund loan. The data covers the time period from 1954-2004 and
122 out of 159 participating countries. The data set includes 1,656 country year
observations under Fund programs out of a possible 4,694 general observations (Dreher
and Vreeland 2011).
The researchers produce four models. Model one explains United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) voting by UNSC members and their Fund participation for all
Fund programs. Model two, UNSC voting practices and Fund participation for
concessional Fund programs. Model three, UNSC voting practices and the size of the
loan commitment in all Fund programs. Model four, UNSC voting and the size of the
loan commitment for concessional loans (Dreher and Vreeland 2011).
Model one is representative of all Fund programs. For the authors the data best
reflects the hypothesis when the U.S. votes “yes.” Therefore, when a UNSC member
votes “yes” Fund participation is highest for these members. Conversely, when the U.S.
votes “no” Fund participation is highest for countries that vote against the U.S. and low
participation rates for countries that vote “no”. In general, countries that vote “yes” on the
UNSC usually have a higher rate of participation in Fund programs. Model one does not
show a clear pattern of behavior. However, when the U.S. votes “no” countries on the
UNSC who also vote “no” have a higher rate of Fund participation. Conversely, when the
U.S. votes “yes” and other countries vote “no” these countries voting “no” have a lower
Fund participation rate (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). For this purpose, participation
applies to countries who obtain loans. Model one is focused on all Fund facilities, there is
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no distinction between oil facilities or heavily or indebted countries (Dreher and Vreeland
2011).
Model two focuses on concessional Fund programs only. The concessional Fund
programs are obtained by less powerful states and usually requires strict conditionality
requirements for long-term reforms (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). The concessional loans
are attached with concessional interest rates. Usually they are favored by poorer states.
The second model provides a straightforward picture. Countries who vote “yes” or “no”
matter as long as they vote in line with the U.S. These less powerful states are more
likely to obtain Fund financing. For Dreher and Vreeland this descriptive evidence is
highly favorable to their hypotheses.
Models three and four both focus on the size of loan commitments. These models
account for all fund programs including concessional lending. The results that emerge
from these models support the author’s hypotheses. When a country votes “yes” or “no”
as aligned with the U.S., these countries get the highest commitments in Fund lending.
When a country votes in contrary to the U.S., these countries receive the lowest
commitments from the Fund (Dreher and Vreeland 2011). Prior research does indicate
that countries holding a UNSC seat are more likely to obtain Fund loans this may not be
true for all UNSC seat holders. The latter depends if countries on the UNSC follow the
voting pattern of the Fund’s largest shareholder, the U.S. (Dreher and Vreeland 2011).
In 1992, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took center stage at the United Nations.
During this time Yemen voted against the U.S.-Iraq resolution in the UNSC, this is
estimated to have cost Yemen 70 million in U.S. aid and Yemen failed to qualify for a
Fund loan for six years (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). Zimbabwe entered into a
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Fund arrangement in 1992. During this time, Zimbabwe served on the UNSC, it failed to
support one resolution against Iraq and Zimbabwe was threatened with strict
conditionality for continued Fund loans. As a result, Zimbabwe supported 11 Security
Council resolutions against Iraq (Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). In the case of
Romania on the UNSC, Romania supported every US-supported resolution against Iraq.
It then rescinded a generous loan package of 380.5 million SDRs, of which 318.1 million
SDR was disbursed. Ecuador entered a Fund arrangement in 1991 and received 20
million SDRs. Ecuador abstained on two resolutions and voted on 12 supporting the U.S.
(Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland 2009). Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland estimate that UNSC
temporary members received programs with 20 percent fewer conditions. UNSC
members received 17 conditions while those not on the UNSC received 21 conditions.
The main contribution these scholars find is that permanent members of the UNSC care
about how countries vote in the UNSC and some developing countries are willing and
able to acquiesce to the permanent members. This previous empirical research supports
Steinwand and Stone’s (2007) as well as and Thacker’s (1999) argument of the “Doctrine
of Economic Neutrality and Financial Programming Model” are seldom utilized as
baseline measurements for loan decisions. Non-economic variables are closely associated
with lending and conditionality. Many loans distributed by the Fund for the period of
1952-1984 would not be justified on purely economic foundations (Thacker 1999, 47).
The political movement model states the absolute political alignment of a country
to the U.S. is important, equally as important is the movement away or toward the U.S.
on international political issues (Thacker 1999). For example, when Hungary,
Yugoslavia, and Romania became more ideologically connected to the U.S. they obtained
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favorable Fund loans. During the Cold War, Zaire and the Philippines obtained loans by
the Fund while never meeting the macroeconomic criteria for Fund assistance (Steinwand
and Stone 2007). On the other hand, Poland and Czechoslovakia did not obtain Fund
loans during the period when they were closely aligned to the Soviet Union (Thacker
1999).
The neutrality model emphasizes political realignment by forcing major
shareholder to compete for political realignment by the developing country toward the
position of the major lender (Thacker 1999). The borrower has a set ideology and will
only move to a new equilibrium point that will generate sufficient aid to offset the
domestic political cost incurred by an ideology shift. Political movements toward the
U.S. increase the possibility of favorable loan conditionality (Thacker 1999).
Due to the recent reforms, Fund conditionality requirements have become more
transparent. The evidence concludes that Fund programs vary in degree of
macroeconomic adjustments and structural reforms required (Steinwand and Stone 2007).
Some borrowing countries must comply with macroeconomic performance goals. Other
borrowing countries must comply with lower levels of economic freedom and more
conditions. Yet other countries are only offered assistance based on strategic international
benefits to major shareholders (Steinwand and Stone 2007).
Theoretical Approach to The Institutional Design
As described above, several factors contribute to the institutional design of the
Fund. For example, loan conditionality, informal governance practices, and decision
making rules are factors that have shaped the role of the Fund since its creation. It is
important to examine what theoretical models have influenced the Fund’s institutional
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design, international behavior and decision making processes. Copelovitch (2010) argues
that when it comes to loan conditionality and variation the Fund utilizes the principalagent paradigm focusing on “common agency” framework. Common agency states that
the G5 countries have de facto control over the Executive Board and the preference
heterogeneity of the G5 will determine the variations and conditions of the loan.
Steinwand and Stone (2007) argue recent research is moving from economic forecasting
models to theoretically guided political economy models that utilize domestic politics and
international strategic factors.
In order to be able to assign a theoretical model to international organizations, the
purposes they serve must be examined (Steinwand and Stone 2007). Three major theories
have dominated the debate: functionalism, structuralism, and public choice.
Functionalism has been associated with collective action and cooperation as
preconditions to resolving problems and political and economic failures (Steinwand and
Stone 2007). The transaction cost, and enforcement variables derived from this
perspective are used in the Fund’s institutional design.
Public choice advocates argue the goal of international officials is to increase their
power, international organization skills, and prevent domestic political damage to the
elected officials in their home countries. Much of this perspective is based around
individual of decision-making at the staff level, private actors, lenders, and borrowing
states (Gould 2006; Steinwand and Stone 2007). These international organizations are
blamed for the failures of neoliberal market reforms imposed on emerging and lowincome economies (Steinwand and Stone 2007).
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The structural view emphasizes that states have different national interests and
power capabilities. International conflict is natural for international politics. States have
different interests that run contradictory to each other. Many times this conflict is
between rich states that are strong and poor states that are weak. The structural view
emphasizes that international organizations are created by powerful states to serve their
interests. On many occasions, weaker states suffer the negative consequences of being
associated with international organizations. The case of European over-representation
over the BRICS can be viewed as a negative consequence of Fund membership. The
international relations paradigm that best fits the institutional design of the Fund can be
viewed as the structural paradigm that is derived from neorealism. Stone and Steinwand
(2007) acknowledge the structural model has its flaws because of the potential
interpretation as Marxist or realist. However, the utilization of power can be
demonstrated in the United Nations Security Council voting records and loan
conditionality. Also, Leech (2002) refers to the Coleman method of power analysis to
explain the importance of power in voting systems. Furthermore, it is fundamental to
acknowledge the relative power of each member and the absolute power the member has
within the voting system (Strand and Rapkin 2005). In the case of the Fund, empirical
research has attempted to explain which states benefit and which states are held to
different standards for the distribution of Fund loans, conditionality, and Fund
surveillance (Steinwand and Stone 2007).
Conclusion
The internal governance policies and institutional design of the Fund have
facilitated the Fund’s role in global governance. The Fund has become the most powerful
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international institution (Copelovitch 2013). Consequently, the nature of its internal
governance has fostered harsh criticism. On many occasions the Fund has lost legitimacy
among emerging and low-income economies. These critics argue the Fund is a tool of
American hegemonic power (Copelovitch 2010; Woods 2006). Additionally, the scope
and timing of Fund’s assistance is not always effective. Much of the current IMF
literature points to three main conclusions. First, borrowing countries with foreign policy
preferences that aligned to major shareholders obtain more Fund loans. Second, domestic
political factors have a role in determining participation in Fund programs. Third, the
Fund and borrowers have different motives for Fund participation, though these motives
are hard to establish empirically (Steinwand and Stone 2007). Other scholars argue that
functionalist and public choice theories still apply to the institutional design of the Fund.
Based on the Fund’s original intent, shrewd architects, and Articles of Agreement the
Fund’s institutional design was organized around the structuralism paradigm to promote a
zero-sum environment and reflected the international power politics of a self-help
international system.
The institutional design of the Fund is inherently political. Borro and Lee (2005)
conclude the Fund to be a bureaucratic and political organization. Three factors explain
Fund lending. First, loan approval and the size of the loan depend on the borrowing
country’s quota share, the larger the share, the larger the loan. Second, how many
nationals does the borrowing country have on the Fund payroll? This will influence the
probability of acquiring a loan. Lastly, a borrowing country’s political and economic
connections to the U.S. and major Europe countries will influence loan conditionality.
Finally, quota shares are inherently political. The reallocation of quota shares in the Fund
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has created much discord between members. Two example of discord are China’s entry
into the Fund and Russia assuming the preliminary Soviet seat at the end of the Cold
War. The next chapter will explore the national strategies of China and Russia in
assuming an equitable role in the Fund. These two turning points shifted the balance of
power within the Fund and marked significant changes in the future of the international
financial architecture that was unforeseen by the Fund.
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CHAPTER 4
CHINA AND RUSSA BALANCE OF POWER ADJUSTMENTS
Chapter four focuses on significant cases of discord and reform regarding Fund
governance to the end of the Cold War. Namely, this chapter will explore China’s entry
to the Fund and Russia assuming the Soviet seat at the end of the Cold War. Both cases
marked significant turning points in the International Monetary Fund. For example, the
Fund achieved nearly universal membership and experienced changes in its institutional
design. More generally there were adjustments in the balance of power within the Fund.
The first case study will deal with the People’s Republic of China (Mainland
China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The first section will highlight a brief
historical account of the ROC and international organizations. The second section will
highlight the beginning of the PRC’s rise. Section three will examine the discord between
the ROC and PRC regarding Fund negotiations for the PRC’s representation.
The second case study will concentrate on Russia assuming the Soviet seat during
the early 1990s. By Russia assuming the Soviet seat in the Fund a door was opened for
another 14 countries to gain membership (Boughton 2012; Stone 2002). This
accomplishment shifted the institutional design of the Fund and presented challenges and
successes for the Fund. For example Stone (2002) and Sachs (1993) argue that Poland
was a successful case of a transitional economy, while Russia was a clear failure. The
first section will account for the parties that opposed the Soviet Union’s membership in
the Fund. The second section will analyze internal documents to account for discord
amongst Executive Directors, Fund staff, and the power politics of Fund membership.
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China, Taiwan and International Organizations
Beginning in 1945, the China’s Nationalist Party established its sovereignty
utilizing the name the Republic of China (ROC). For example, in October of 1947,
Taiwan signed the agreement to enter the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Taiwan was one of 23 original contracting parties to the GATT (Feng 1988).
Also, the ROC was one of the founding members of the United Nations. In 1949, the
ROC was defeated by forces that became the communist People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and was forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan.
Beginning in 1949, the ROC on Taiwan initiated reforms to achieve
unprecedented economic growth. However, it faced two major challenges, the sudden
increase in population and rising military expenses (Lin and Myers 1994). Inflation was
high and per capita GNP was measured at 50 US dollars. As a result of a decade of
structural reforms, between 1952 and 1960 the GNP growth rate was 7.5 percent.
Between 1960 and 1970, GNP grew at an average rate of 9.6 percent and between 1970
to 1980 GNP grew at 7.8 percent (Lin and Meyers 1994). Taiwanese policymakers
understood that to develop, international cooperation was essential to the future of
economic growth. Taiwan liberalized export policies and increased access to international
markets. Also, rapid growth was accompanied by international responsibility and Taiwan
was willing to establish a foreign policy doctrine for integration and cooperation in the
global economy (Lin and Meyers 1994).
From 1951 to 1960 Taiwan continued to hold a United Nations seat (Feng 1998;
Hickey 1997). The ROC and its allies successfully blocked the PRC from occupying the
UN seat on the premise that the PRC was not a peaceful state (Hickey 1997). In 1965,
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nine communist and neutral countries asked the General Assembly to seat the PRC as the
representative for mainland China. These countries consisted of Albania, Algeria,
Burundi, Cambodia, the Congo, Cuba, Ghanna, Mali, and Romania. In November of
1965, the U.S. and eight other countries opposed the resolution by communist countries.
The U.S. and its allies submitted a resolution that a two-thirds voting majority was
needed to expel Taiwan from the UN (Besser 1965). Taiwan’s allies consisted of
Australia, Brazil, Columbia, Gabon, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. In 1970,
the PRC was gaining more support from the international community for the UN seat
Canada and several African countries supported the PRC for a UN seat (Bundy 1970). In
October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted 76 to 35 in favor of seating
the PRC. There were 17 abstentions. This historic vote ended the 22 year battle over who
would represent China at the UN (Shannon 1971). During this same time period, the
Secretary General of the United Nations issued a text cable, Resolution 2758 (XXVI), to
the Fund informing the Executive Board that all rights and privileges were restored to the
People’s Republic of China and recognizing its government representatives as the only
legitimate representatives of China in the United Nations and expelled the ROC’s
representatives from the United Nations (IMF 1973a).
The World Bank representation issue for China was not as confrontational as at
the United Nations. Beginning in 1960, Taiwan’s relative quota and subscription size
declined. As a result, Taiwan lost the right to appoint a Director to the Executive Board
of the World Bank (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). In 1974 the PRC informed the
United Nations that Taiwan should be expelled from all international institutions
associated with the UN; and specifically, the World Bank. In response the World Bank
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sent official correspondence to Beijing inquiring about future membership,
representation, and the negotiating process. The PRC declined to answer the
correspondence (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999; Lynch 1974). In 1980, the PRC and
World Bank negotiations concentrated on the issue of Taiwan needing to be expelled
from the World Bank (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). Taiwan did not intensely oppose
the World Bank decision. The World Bank would have to stop all forms of assistance to
the ROC. On May 15, 1980 the Executive Board of the World Bank approved the
People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of China in the World Bank
(Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999; Rowen 1980).
The International Monetary Fund and Taiwan experienced an efficient
institutional relationship. Based on internal documents, the Fund granted Taiwan active
support regarding technical assistance. The Fund also praised Taiwanese officials for
steps adopted to establish a par value policy and continued reforms for eliminating trade
restrictions (IMF 1974). In 1970, the Fund dispatched staffers from the Central Banking
Service department to assist the ROC in modernizing its Central Banking Law. Two
banking issues were addressed. The first issue involved assistance with revising
legislation that would modernize the exchange system. The second issue related to the
preparation of a policy and procedure manual for the Taiwanese Central Bank. The
mission lasted three weeks and took place the first week of March (IMF 1974). During
this time, Taiwan was receiving support from the U.S. In 1972, the U.S. urged Japan to
support the Taiwanese government in continuing its membership in the Fund and World
Bank even if Japan was forced to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to
establish normal relations with China (Harrison 1972). Additionally, in November of
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1978, the Fund continued to send staffers to Taiwan on technical missions. Staffers
assisted Taiwanese officials regarding exchange control and exchange market matters
(IMF 1973a).
The PRC’s Rise and Discord at the Fund
The PRC’s rise in the international political arena has been a fascinating subject
for many scholars, policymakers, and international organization bureaucrats. Beginning
in the early 1970s, China began slowly but systematically engage international
institutions. Beginning in the 1960s China established economic contacts with Japan.
China began to benefit from participation in the global economy with the U.S., Western
Europe, and Japan (Hudson 1997). This led to a series of domestic macroeconomic and
structural adjustments. At this point, China began to shift its ideological position toward
international organizations. By 1980, the PRC had more than a fifth of the world’s
population, its GNP was the eighth largest, and it gained admission into the United
Nations, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Jacobson and Oksenberg
1990).
The membership process with the Fund was not without disagreement. Two issues
concerned the People’s Republic of China. The first issue was over who would represent
China in international institutions. The second issue was over the actual quota allocation
for a new member state (Boughton 2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). Developments
within the Fund intensified the discord regarding Taiwan among member states. For
example, in August of 1950, Chau Enlai Minister of Foreign Affairs for the PRC sent a
cable to the Managing Director requesting the ROC not be allowed to participate in the
1950 Paris meeting and the PRC be recognized as the only legitimate voice of China
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(IMF 1973a). This was followed by the Czechoslovakian delegation submitting a draft
resolution supporting the PRC and requesting the expulsion of Taiwan by the September
6, 1950 meeting in Paris (Assetto 1988).
Consequently, the Czechoslovakian resolution led to a number of Governors to
voice their opposition to the resolution. For example, directors for the ROC, the U.S., and
the Philippines voted against the resolution. Czechoslovakia, India, and Yugoslavia voted
for the resolution. The resolution was voted down by a show of hands (IMF 1973a). In
1951, the membership of the Fund voted to indefinitely postpone the issue. The vote was
43 to 3 in favor of tabling the issue (Assetto 1988). Czechoslovakia pressed the PRC
issue until it was expelled from the Fund in 1954 for not following membership rules.
The period of PRC non-involvement with the Fund would last until 1971(Jacobsen and
Okensberg 1999). The ROC, de facto, held the Fund seat for China.
The major opening for the PRC came with admission into the United Nations in
1971. The PRC utilized this opportunity to monitor global economic affairs (IMF 1973a;
Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). Ironically, in 1971 a week before the UN voted to expel
Taiwan, the ROC withdrew 59.9 million in hard currency from the Fund. Many
international observers viewed this action as a protective measure (Rowen 1971). As a
result of the landmark decision, China began to be receptive toward membership in the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and GATT (Boughton 2001; Hudson 1997;
Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999).
On September 24, 1972, Taiwan expressed concerns over a possible expulsion
from the Fund and the World Bank. Taiwanese officials worried about the possible
financial consequences from expulsion from the two financial institutions. They worried
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about the ROC’s borrowing ability, international confidence in the Taiwanese economy,
and the future disbursement of 100 million dollars in development loans from the World
Bank (New York Times 1972).
On September 24, 1973, the PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chi Peng-Fei,
issued a formal letter to the Fund managing director. Chi Peng-Fei specifically argued
that China was a founding member of the Fund, that for 20 years the seat was illegally
held by Taiwan, and that the seat should be returned to the PRC. The Fund responded by
assuring the PRC that the matter would be examined by the Executive Directors of the
Fund. Due to the legal complications an immediate response would not be issued (IMF
1973b; Rowen 1973). Fund documents reveal that Chi Peng-Fei utilized the UN General
Assembly Resolution 2758 as legitimacy for his claim. Fund document EBM/73/317
states the following.
On October 25, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly adopted at its 26th
Session Resolution 2758 (XXVI), in which it was explicitly resolved to
restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the
representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of
China to the United Nations, and expel forthwith the representatives of
Chiang Kai-Shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the
United Nations and all the organizations related to it. (IMF 1973b).
During this time frame, the Fund invited the PRC to the United Nations to
discuss the possibility of the PRC assuming the obligations and rights
associated with Fund membership. A November 2, 1973 meeting,
however, failed to resolve the issue of representation (Boughton 2001).
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In 1976 the Fund was faced with a decision to establish a Trust Fund facility for
developing countries. The Trust Fund would be financed by selling 25 million ounces of
the Fund’s gold stock from 1976 to 1980 (Boughton 2001). This decision would force the
PRC to move on its decision to seek membership because the gold sales raised the
contentious issue of who would claim property rights and financial benefits from the
sales (Hudson 1997; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). On September 30, 1976 the
President of the People’s Bank of China transmitted a cable to the Fund affirming the
1973 request for the expulsion of Taiwan. More importantly, the cable was to
communicate that all rights, assets, and interests in the Fund belonged to the PRC. The
state bank of China had the lawful right to deal with quotas, assets, and interests within
the Fund (IMF 1976a). Ultimately, the official communication was to oppose the
Taiwanese claims for the gold, property, rights, and obligations in the Fund (Jacobsen
and Okensberg 1990). It should be noted that in previous correspondences to the Fund,
the PRC failed to make clear its full intentions of joining the Fund (IMF 1977).
The Fund responded to the PRC’s September 30, 1976 correspondence regarding
the gold sales. It was communicated to the PRC that the Trust Fund and restitution of
gold were not governed by the provisions of the Articles of Agreement. Any decision
about the restitution of gold would be based on principle and not an arbitrary exercise of
discretion (IMF 1976b). Additionally, the Executive Board recognized the ROC as the
government of China and dismissed the claim by the PRC. The PRC did not meet a prima
facie legal standard to deprive the ROC of the gold. The PRC had not expressed interest
to be the representative of China in the Fund and there was little justification to withhold
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gold to another member state based on an expectation that another government would be
recognized in the future (IMF 1976b).
In 1977 the Fund attempted to find a solution that would be beneficial to all
parties involved in the gold restitution dispute. The Fund continued to argue the PRC did
not have a claim to the gold. However, the gold dispute would be postponed in order to
give the PRC an opportunity to formally express its intention to join the Fund. If by April
1, 1977 the PRC did not respond with an explicit claim to join the Fund and assume the
rights and obligations granted to member states by the Articles of Agreement then the
first arrangement for the restitution of the gold to the ROC would be completed (IMF
1977; Rowen 1977). During the late 1970s, Romania and Yugoslavia, the only nonmarket
economies in the Fund, encouraged China to enter the Fund (Jacobsen and Okensberg
1999).
In 1979, the ROC delegation accepted its fate and worked to make the transition
process amicable for all parties. Negotiations for the gold tranche that the ROC had not
repaid resumed. Ultimately, the solution was for the ROC to repay its debt to the Fund
and repurchase the gold (Boughton 2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). On April 14,
1980 the Executive Board decided to return 470,708 ounces of gold and two purchases of
SDR 77,632,715 and SDR 30,002,772 to Taiwan (IMF 1980a). Cooper (1981) argues
Taiwan’s financial position was strong and not hurt by the expulsion from the Fund.
Consequently, Taiwan walked away with an 81 million dollar bonus.
The second problematic issue regarded voting power. If China agreed to enter the
Fund it would only receive 1.68 percent of all the votes in the Fund as China would
inherit the voting share of Taiwan (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). This was
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unacceptable for China. The PRC’s goal in joining the Fund was to promote its long-term
foreign policy goals and the small quota did not reflect China’s economic weight in the
global economy (Boughton 2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999).
The Fund conducted several years of research planning for China’s entry. The
Fund created a China desk, used CIA intelligence data and World Bank data to create an
entrance policy for China. Also, Fund staffers were sent to China for entrance
negotiations (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). Negotiation focused on the issue of
Taiwan, voting power, the fate of the gold deposited by China, and the rights and
obligations of Fund members under the Articles (Hudson 1997).
In 1980 the PRC was admitted into the International Monetary Fund with little
opposition. As a result, China became eligible for development loans, gained legitimacy
as a member of the international community, gained access to exercise all rights and
obligations, and became eligible for Special Drawing Rights (IMF 1980b; The New York
Times 1980, D1).
In 1944 the original quota for China was SDR of 550 million. On August 5, 1980,
China used the influence of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Quota for China to request an
increase in quota shares to commensurate its economic power, an additional 650 million
SDR, totaling 1.2 million SDR (IMF 1980c). Chairman Jacques de Groote of the Ad Hoc
committee on China’s Request for an Increase in Quota delivered a special report to the
Executive Board recommending the quota increase and an additional increase totaling 1.8
SDR. The report utilized a condition that China submit full payment no later than
September 26, 1980 (IMF 1980c). In November of 1980 the Board of Governors honored
a seventh quota retroactive adjustment and the quota was set to SDR 1.8 billion (IMF
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1980c; Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). In 1983, the Eighth General Quota Review set the
quota at SDR 2.39 billion that translated into 18,250 votes and 2.82 percent of the total
votes, ninth largest in the Fund (Hudson 1997; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). As a
result of China’s growing economic power and voting weight the Executive Board was
expanded from 21 to 22 seats to provide China a single constituent seat (Boughton 2001;
Jacobsen and Okensberg 1999). Eventually the Executive Board would be expanded to
24 seats to accommodate Saudi Arabia and Russia as the latter assumed a seat at the
Fund.
Russia’s Road to the Fund
In 1944 at the beginning of the Bretton Woods conference the Soviet Union was
undecided about participation in the Fund. Participation in the Fund would have required
the Soviet Union to meet conditionality requirements. The Soviet Union negotiated for
four goals at the Bretton Woods conference: special consideration for state-trading
nations and countries badly damaged by WW II, the size of quotas, status of deposits and
gold reserves, and the type of information needed to be provided to the Fund (Assetto
1988). For the Soviets, the disclosure of information was the most sensitive issue at hand.
Ultimately, the USSR would only commit to seven out of 12 requirements outlined in the
Article VII (Assetto 1988). It is assumed by most that disclosure of economic data by the
Soviet Union would have exposed its economic weaknesses to the international
community (Boughton 2012). As a result, from 1945 to 1985 the Soviet Union was not
given serious consideration for Fund membership.
In 1985 the Mikhail Gorbachev regime began to consider economic reforms
(Boughton 2001). The Soviets witnessed the economic successes that Hungary and
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Poland experienced during the 1980s (Boughton 2001; Boughton 2012; Stone 2002). As
a result, Soviet bureaucrats informally approached the Fund to inquire about the
possibilities of obtaining membership. Unfortunately, they were not successful because
the U.S. was still in opposition to the Soviets joining the Fund. Not until November of
1988 did a Soviet working group visit Washington on an information gathering session.
In 1989 Fund economists met with a mid-level Soviet delegation in Moscow to discuss
and exchange information (Boughton 2012). During the information session officials
never mentioned the possibility of the Soviet Union joining the Fund (Boughton 2012).
During 1986 to 1989 the Soviet economy was near collapse and foreign debt
skyrocketed from 30.7 billion to 53.8 billion (Gould-Davies and Woods 1999). The
looming financial crisis did not influence the parties opposing Fund admission. Boughton
(2012) argues that Soviet efforts to join the Fund were futile until the Soviets overcame
opposition from the U.S. government. For example, in 1986 U.S. Congressman Jack F.
Kemp formally opposed the Soviet Union from joining the Fund. He urged Treasury
Secretary James A. Baker III to reject a bid from the Soviet Union on the basis that the
Soviet Union had a record of aggression abroad and oppression at home (Rowen 1986a).
On November 22, 1986 Treasury Secretary Baker responded in a letter to Kemp stating
that the Reagan Administration would oppose any such move by the Soviet Union.
Additionally, the U.S. would work within the Executive Boards of the IMF and the
World Bank to prevent the Soviet Union from joining the two financial institutions
(Rowen 1986b). In 1989 the U.S. continued to oppose Soviet efforts to join the Bretton
Woods institutions. Treasury Secretary James Baker continued to oppose the Soviet
Union, this time claiming the Soviet economic system was completely incompatible with
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capitalism. Furthermore, Soviet membership could become disruptive and could pose a
challenge for the market orientated IMF (Toth 1989).
U.S. opposition to the Soviet Union would continue until mid-1990. On July 4,
1990 the Bush administration received official correspondence from the Soviet Union
requesting high level talks with members of the G7 countries regarding the transition to a
market economy (Boughton 2012). Gorbachev was seeking support for his efforts to
reverse the 71 years of economic isolation (Mcnamus 1989). At this time, the Fund
organized a multi-jurisdictional group to study the Soviet economy. The study concluded
with a number of ideas for reforms for the Soviet economy. 1990 was a pivotal year for
the Soviet Union as 12 to 15 Soviet officials were designated “special invitees” and
assigned Fund office space. For the duration of their time they were allowed to attend
Fund sessions, but were not allowed access to Interim Committee meetings. The Bush
Administration was not opposed to the special “invitees” designation (Rowen 1990).
Gould-Davies and Woods (1999) argue the Fund took the opportunity to create a
new role for itself in providing assistance for economies in transition. Since the demise of
the Bretton Woods system the Fund no longer managed an exchange rate system.
Beginning with the Latin America era of the 1980s the Fund increasingly served as lender
of last resort and looked to expand its activities to the Soviet Bloc.
Russia’s Special Association with the Fund
As a result of a Fund study, in early 1991 the Special Association doctrine was
placed on the agenda for Executive Board meeting discussions (IMF 1991c). Fund
internal documents outlined the preconditions the Soviet Union needed to meet for the
Special Association status to move forward. The preconditions discussed areas of advice
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and technical assistance. More importantly the Fund formally informed the Soviet
authorities that access to economic data on the Soviet economy was an important factor
for approval of future membership (IMF 1991c). The Fund explained the Special
Associate status as important to the Soviet Union because it would allow the Fund to
work with the central government and at the request of individual Soviet republics to
provide assistance (Chicago Tribune 1991).
On October 8, 1991 the Fund and President Mikhail Gorbachev signed an
agreement establishing a special association between the USSR and the Fund (IMF
1991b). The special association consisted of cooperation between both parties where the
Fund would provide reviews of the Soviet economy, technical assistance, educational
courses, and Fund documents. It also allowed Soviet attendance at Fund meetings and
gave favorable treatment to the republics of the Russian Federation. Under this agreement
the Soviet Union would be mandated to provide financial information to the Fund and
allow the Fund to establish a resident office in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Fund
officials would have the privileges and immunities specified in Article IX of the Articles
of Agreement. The Special Association would be terminated upon full membership or
three months after a receipt of a written notice (IMF 1991b). On December, 27, 1991 the
Fund received an official correspondence by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
requesting that the status of the Special Association be continued by the Russian
Federation and the titled “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” should be deleted by the
Fund. During the Executive Board meeting a number of concerns were raised about the
legal implications for the Russian Federation and the Fund. In particular, paragraph six
that provided a framework for the Fund to have access to the republics of the USSR The
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Executive Directors concluded that the Board would consider the submitted request (IMF
1991d).
The Soviet Union’s membership application process was perplexing to many
international observers, academics, and policymakers. During the July 1991 meeting of
the G7 countries, President Gorbachev failed to disclose to the G7 that the Soviet Union
had already applied for full membership with the Fund (Bradshers 1991). On July 23,
1991 a press release was issued informing member states that the matter would be under
consideration. The Soviet approach to full membership caused criticism by U.S. Treasury
Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, who stated “we were completely surprised by their move,
Soviet membership in the institution is not going to happen” (Bradshers 1991).
On January 17, 1992 the Executive Board convened to approve two proposals for
the Russian Federation. The first was to established the “Committee of the Whole on
membership; and Former Republics of the U.S.S.R,” to study the criteria and the impact
of Fund membership. The second was an interim arrangement that would allow the Fund
to continue cooperation with the former Soviet Republics (IMF 1992b). The meeting was
not without debate as many directors supported both proposals. However, during the
meeting Executive Directors representing less developed countries like Brazil and
Argentina brought forward and argued the quota calculation formula was of immediate
urgency for the current members because the allocation of quotas to the new members
would affect the current representation on the Executive Board (IMF 1992b). Woods
(2006) has documented the major opposition by developing countries toward Russia’s
admittance into the Fund. Developing countries argued that existing resources should not
be transferred to Soviet Bloc at the expense of less developed countries.
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In February of 1992 the Fund’s treasury department proposed quota calculations
for the former Soviet Union republics (Momani 2007a). This was a difficult task because
Soviet economic data could not be considered as valid. The difficulty arose from not
being able to accurately measure the economic weight of each independent republic.
Ultimately, the Fund staff recommended the same variables to be used for the Eighth
General Review to determine the quota allocation. As a result, under the Eighth General
Review data the IMF treasury staff proposed the former Soviet Union Republics as a
whole should obtain 3.66 percent of Fund quotas. The Ninth General Review data
proposed the quota allocation should be 3.19 percent (Momani 2007a). When the quotas
were to be allocated to each republic, the Russian Federation would obtain 2.34 percent
of quota allocations as it made up 61 to 66 percent of the Soviet economy (Momani
2007a). The G7 Executive Directors were not satisfied by the 2.34 quota allocation for
Russia. They recommended the staff to reconsider the quota allocation and reexamine the
four quantitative factors: depreciated exchange rates, inter-republic trade, openness ratio,
and the deprecation component of GDP used in calculating the former Soviet Union’s
quota allocation (Momani 2007a).
Reconsidering the variables used for quota allocation caused internal discord
between the IMF Treasury staff and G7 Executive Directors. Treasury staff refused to
change the formula for intra-republic trade and depreciation rates of GDP because the
inconsistent data made it difficult to systematically apply the figures to quota calculations
(Momani 2007a). After the Treasury staff adhered to the request of the Board, the quota
allocation numbers still resulted in less then a three percent quota for Russia (Momani
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2007a). As a result of Executive Director pressure the Fund treasury staff produced a
quota allocation that satisfied the G7 Executive Directors.
On March 24, 1992 H.R. Bill 4547 “Freedom For Russia and Emerging Eurasia
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992” was introduced in Congress. On
April 1, 1992 the White House released a press release supporting the Freedom Support
Act of 1992. The White House argued with the collapse of the Soviet Union the U.S. was
in a position to assist Russia and Eurasia with democracy and open markets. The
Freedom Support Act of 1992 provided a framework for the enhanced cooperation
between the Soviet Republics and the U.S. As a result, business opportunities were
created (IMF 1992c). On April 9, 1992 the Bush administration began a public relations
campaign to gain public and Congressional support for the bill. The bill would be funded
by a complex combination of credits, loans, and cash programs totaling three to four
billion dollars. Congressional support was lukewarm for the bill. For instance, Senators
Christopher Dodd and Jesse Helms publically criticized the White House for attempting
to garner support for the bill (Friedman 1992).
During the March 31, 1992 Executive Board meeting, the Managing Director
praised the Russian Federation for implementing macroeconomic reforms and proceeded
to comment on the quota calculation for Russia. The issue of quota calculations generated
much debate. The main issue was the 22.5 percent adjustment that considered intrarepublic trade being applied to Russia. Executive Directors believed the quota calculation
was a net adjustment that excluded inter-republic trade and included variables like the
existing exchange rate and GDP figures. In a prior staff paper circulated to Executive
Directors there was an implication that intra-republic trade was being calculated into the
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formula. Some Directors argued the methodology for the quota calculation required
clarification because an adjustment of 22.5 percent was being applied to Russia (IMF
1991a). Hiroo Fukui, Executive Director representing Japan supported the view the 22.5
percent adjustment was not based solely on intra-republic trade, the adjustment accounted
for the exchange rate and GDP, but also included political factors (Momani 2007a; IMF
1991a). The Executive Director Renato Filosa, who represented Greece, Italy, Malta,
Poland, and Portugal, argued there was no need to recalculate the quota figures and the
recommendation under the Ninth General Review should stand. Executive Director
Posthumus who represented Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Romania, Cyprus, and Israel did
not oppose an increase in quota as long as it was applied fairly to other members. In the
end, the Eight Quota Review for SDR 2,876 and the Ninth Quota Review for SDR 4,313
was provisionally approved (IMF 1992a).
During this meeting, a Russian Federation delegation was present and claimed
that it would be difficult for the Russian parliament to ratify the membership conditions if
the Russian Federation did not obtain at least a three percent quota (IMF 1992a; Momani
2007a). Furthermore, the Russian Federation was under the impression that the three
percent quota was a symbol of support for difficult economic reforms implemented. The
Russian delegation understood the quota calculation was based on an established Bretton
Woods formula and political considerations may be taken into the quota allocation (IMF
1992a). In March of 1992 the Executive Board took a vote and approved the quota
allocation for Russia. On the day of the Executive Board vote, the Fund issued a press
release acknowledging the three percent quota allocation for Russia. However, the Board
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of Governors had not approved the quota prior to the press release. The press release was
an uncommon move by the Fund (Momani 2007a).
While the Soviet Union never became a member of the Fund, the 15 republics
under it guidance applied for full membership as well as former allies of the USSR
(Boughton 2012). The three Baltic countries applied first: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The U.S did not oppose the membership of the three Baltic countries as long as they
complied with Fund criteria. However, an official speaking on the condition of
anonymity stated the U.S. favored a special relationship for the Soviet Union in lieu of
full membership with the Fund (New York Times 1991). On June 1, 1992 the Russia
Federation became a member of the International Monetary Fund with a quota allocation
of SDR 2,789 million and quota share of 3.0048 (IMF 1992a). At this time, the Fund’s
membership totaled 165 countries and the Executive Board was expanded from 22 to 24
seats to accommodate Russia and Saudi Arabia.
Conclusion
The Fund’s institutional design has changed over time in order to confront the
challenges of a changing international economy. However, changes tend to generate
cases of discord among member states and internal practices within the Fund. It is
fundamental to the institutional design of the Fund that quota shares be reallocated when
admitting new members and that states be concerned with preserving their power in the
Fund. Essentially the Fund quota system means membership is a zero-sum-game.
For China, admission to the Fund meant it was a step closer to the World Bank
and other international financial institutions. China could now be seen as a global player
in international politics and have access to the Fund’s data, technical assistance, and
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training facilities (Boughton 2001). More importantly, it helped paved the way for
China’s unprecedented economic growth and raised prospects of major changes in the
institutional design of the Fund
Russia’s road to the Fund was influenced by the Soviet Union and the global
Group of Seven Countries (G7) (Momani 2007a). As a result, Russia obtained a seat on
the powerful Executive Board. Executive Board seats are reserved for the most powerful
world economies, but Russia was not a powerful economy. Momani (2007a) argues the
executive seat for Russia was offered as a consolation prize for a lack of a Marshall Plan
style post-Soviet collapse solution. Today, the Executive Board consists of 24 Executive
Directors. Based on these two case studies, Fund technocrats have attempted to apply
economic and technical variables free of political factors in determining the quota
allocation for potential member states. However, political influence has been the
predominate factor deciding the final quota allocation and the position of the members in
the Fund’s hierarchy. Both case studies account for the influence of power politics, the
universal membership of the Fund, changes in the institutional design, and an evolving
financial architecture for the future.
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CHAPTER 5
JAPAN, EUROPE, AND THE BRICS
Since the end of the Cold War, the Fund has experienced challenges to and
changes in its institutional design. The decade of the 1990s witnessed impressive
economic growth. World economic output in the 1990s was measured at 1.5 percent per
capita higher than in the 1980s (Boughton 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan
embarked on a mission to become a major stakeholder in the Bretton Woods system.
Although Japan experienced a stagnant economy for much of the 1990s it was
determined improve its position in the Fund. As the international monetary system
experienced major changes, so too did the emerging economies. As a result, the BRICS
experienced economic contractions and, eventually, impressive economic growth. As
BRICS moved up in the global financial hierarchy they started to expect representation in
the governance of the Fund commensurate with their economic strength. At the same
time, European over-representation became an obstacle to a realignment of quota and
voting shares.
This chapter will focus on cases of discord and reform regarding Fund
governance. The three areas of concern will be Japan’s role in the Fund beginning with
the 1980s, European over-representation, and the changing role of the BRICS within the
Fund. The next section will examine Japan’s strategic role for obtaining the number two
position at the Fund and more generally, the important role it has in the Fund. The next
section will focus on European over-representation on the Executive Board and in voting
shares. The section will examine the possibility of a consolidated European Union seat
and the implications for Fund governance and institutional design. The following section
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will focus on the BRICS and how they are attempting to influence the governance model
of the Fund. Also, the challenges and benefits do the BRICS create for the Fund.
Japan’s Ascension in the Fund
Beginning in the 1980s, Japan sought a larger role in the International Monetary
Fund; one that would be commensurate with Japan’s global economic position. Due to
these efforts Japan increased its role in the decision making processes of the Fund
(Rapkin and Strand 1996; Wan 2001). Japan overcame its institutional disadvantage in
the Fund by negotiating with major economic powers to increase its financial
contributions in order to obtain a larger quota share that would translate into more
influence over the decision making process (Holroyd and Momani 2012;Wan 2001).
Japan was admitted into the International Monetary Fund in 1952. For Japan
membership meant greater acceptance by the international community and access to
policy advice. By the 1960s, Japan implemented an international strategy of passivity in
lieu of power politics. Japan was a rule taker instead of a rule maker (Wan 2001). In
1957, Japan obtained a credit facility of 125 million and in 1967 another for 350 million
from the Fund. By 1964, Japan hosted the Fund’s annual meeting; this was a symbol of
Japan’s growing influence in the Fund. However, Japan continued to maintain a low
profile in the Fund (Wan 2001). By 1970, Japan was the fifth largest vote holder in the
Fund with a 4.25 percent voting share. Originally, Japan was allotted a Fund quota of 250
million, the ninth largest shareholder with 2.86 percent of the voting power. By the mid
1960s, Japan ranked seventh in the Fund hierarchy with a 3.44 percent voting share (Wan
2001). In 1970, Japan was given its own seat on the prestigious Executive Board,
replacing India (Holroyd and Momani 2012).
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Beginning in the early 1980s, Japan was making major financial contributions to
the Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (Wan 2001). As a result, Japan
began to compete with other member states for benefits, voting weight, and agenda
setting influence. Japanese officials were not as focused on influencing policy formation.
The main Japanese goal was to accumulate a greater voting share (Wan 2001). By the
1980s, Japan was a major economy. Japan’s per capita GDP was only 31 percent below
that of the U.S. (Hamada, Kashyap, and Weinstein 2011). In 1980, Japanese GDP was
estimated at 1.1 US trillion dollars (World Bank 2013).
Japan occupied a stakeholder position in the Fund. As the Executive Director
representing France acknowledged, Japan’s impressive economic performance and
macroeconomic adjustment deserved high praise. However, growing Japanese influence
presented a problem (Boughton 2001). During this period, the Fund was in dire need of
more capital as its loan commitments exceeded the capital reserves on hand. West
Germany, Japan, Britain, Switzerland, and Saudi Arabia considered assisting the Fund
(Farnsworth 1983). Ultimately, the Fund entered into four promissory note arrangements.
The four entities providing capital to the Fund were the Bank of International Settlements
for an amount of SDR 2,505 and the Bank of Japan for an amount of SDR 375 million.
Also, the National Bank of Belgium and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency contributed
to assist the Fund (IMF 1984a; IMF 1984b). Consequently, the Executive Board
approved a new loan facility on April 24, 1984.
During 1986, the global economy was tumultuous and many member states still
experienced balance of payment problems. At this time, the Fund became worried about
its liquidity position. In November 1986 Japan extended a loan offer to the Fund in the
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amount of SDR three billion (IMF 1986b). On December 1986, the Fund issued a press
release explaining the details of the borrowing agreement. The Fund agreed to borrow
SDR three billion from Japan with a total of six years to draw the funds (IMF 1986a).
The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was established to provide
temporary financing for countries with balance of payment difficulties. Managing
Director Michel Camdessus proposed the new facility and in June of 1987 the facility
was endorsed by the G7 economic summit in Venice (Pearson and Lachia 1987; Wan
2001). In March of 1988, the proposed borrowing agreement conditions were created
where the Fund would borrow from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The amount would
be up to SDR 2.2 billion with an option of an increase to SDR 2.5 billion. On April 4,
1988 the agreement was approved by the Fund (IMF 1988c). Overall, Japan was the
largest contributor to the original Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility and continued
to contribute to the enlargement of the facility in 1994. Japan committed 447 SDR
million in grants and 2,200 SDR million in loans prior to 1994 (Wan 2001).
As a result of these large financial contributions, by the late 1980s Japan began to
bargain for a larger percentage of voting shares in the Fund. Japan was determined not to
engage in more burden sharing without added representation and voice on the Executive
Board and within management (Rapkin et al. 1997). Japanese Finance Ministry officials
indicated that Japan would attempt to seek a quota boost of at least eight percent from the
then current 4.7 percent quota (The Wall Street Journal 1988). Japanese officials
publically and privately disclosed they were unhappy with Japan’s position in the Fund
and Japan was seeking to occupy the second placed position in the Fund’s hierarchy
(Atlas 1989). These officials made a compelling argument as to why quota shares should
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reflect relative world economic weight. Japanese officials argued that Japan surpassed the
U.S. as the world’s largest provider of foreign aid and that Japan was providing program
assistance for middle income countries (Farnsworth 1989). On March 21, 1988 at an
Executive Board meeting the Executive Director for Japan expressed that Japan was
committed to assisting international financial institutions and the Fund would remain a
priority for Japan. Japanese officials noted that a growing discontent in Japan toward its
quota share could become a potential obstacle for future financial contributions (IMF
1988a; 1988b). In sum, Japan was disappointed its voting share in the Fund was not
commensurate with its number two position in the world economy.
The U.S. opposed Japan’s quota increase by arguing that no increase in Fund
capital was needed and that the U.S. Congress would not approve additional financial
contributions by the U.S. Also, four billion dollars of unpaid overdue loan payments had
not been paid by the Fund’s poorest members. The U.S. position on this issue created an
additional obstacle for Japan. Eventually, the U.S. accepted Japan’s request for an
increased voting share (Rapkin et al. 1997). As a result, the Interim Committee agreed to
increase the quota share. Japan would move up in position and this would cause other
member states to lose their respective positions in the Fund’s hierarchy (IMF Ninth
General Review of Quotas Data). British Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, publically
acknowledged Japan should be the second largest shareholder. This realignment,
however, bruised some European egos (Atlas 1989). Britain and France opposed Japan’s
increase in voting share since they would be ranked below Japan (Rapkin et al. 1997).
Due to France having a larger economy than the United Kingdom, France would not
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accept a lower ranking position than the United Kingdom. As a result, France and Britain
settled for 5.48 percent of the total voting share (Rapkin et al. 1997).
While France and Britain disagreed about rank ordering, the West German
Finance Minister utilized an Olympic analogy to describe the future ranking order. The
U.S. would be unopposed and granted the gold medal. Germany would not be opposed to
sharing the silver medal with Japan, if Japan deemed it appropriate, and two bronze
medals would be awarded to France and Britain (Atlas 1989). The Ninth General Review
of Quotas increased Japan’s share in the Fund from 4.7 percent to 6.1 percent of the total
Fund shares. Japan would increase it voting share to the number two position, sharing
second place with Germany. For Japan this was a step up from position when it was
number five (Rapkin et al. 1997; Wan 2001). While Japan had a voting share of 4.7
percent, Japan was responsible for 4,223 billion SDRs. At this time, Japan’s total GDP
was 3.0 trillion, trade accounted for 19.0 percent of total GDP, total reserves were 93.7
billion, and its national product in PPP terms was 25,208 per capita (World Bank 2013).
Holroyd and Momani (2012) argue that political and economic influence in the Fund is a
zero-sum game. When one member gets a larger quota it is at the expense of other
members and that no mutual benefits to quota realignment exist.
During the 1990s, Japan continued to support the Fund. During the extension of
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Japan contributed SDR 2,150 million. In
1994 Japan was given one of three Deputy Managing Director positions (Holroyd and
Momani 2012). In the mid-1990s Japan experienced an economic slowdown. In 1997
Japanese officials implemented policy reforms to restructure the banking system with
added regulations and oversight (Holroyd and Momani 2012).
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During this time, Japan was number two at the Fund and expressed its criticism
and support for the U.S. when appropriate (Wan 2001). For example, during the Asian
Financial Crisis Japan had a vested interest in assuring the regional economy would not
collapse because of investment and external payments owed to Japanese firms and the
fear of potential financial contagion to other Asian economies (Lincoln 2004; Wan 2001).
Japan was disappointed with the response from the Fund and the U.S. during the Asian
Financial Crisis. Asian countries requested assistance from the Fund in shoring up
liquidity problems. The Fund argued the Asian crisis was a result of structural
deficiencies and demanded intrusive conditionality requirements (Fisher 2001; Holroyd
and Momani 2012; Katz 1999). Holroyd and Momani (2012) argue that Japan’s
relationship with the Fund has been tumultuous, particularly since the Asian Financial
Crisis. Despite prior discord with the Fund, Japan was willing to continue its stakeholder
and financier role during the global financial crisis that began in 2008.
The Asian Financial Crisis occurred in the late 1990s. Asian countries,
policymakers, and scholars have been dissatisfied by the Fund’s response to the regional
crisis. Feldstein (1998) argues the Fund failed to advocate for measures to correct the
balance of payment problems East Asian economies were experiencing. The Fund
focused on domestic structural reforms instead of balance of payment policies. The Fund
applied the same reforms used in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Feldstein
1998). Japan’s frustration over the Fund’s response to the AFC and the U.S. and Asian
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) response to the crisis motivated Japan to propose
an Asian Monetary Fund (Rapkin 2001). During a World Bank and IMF meeting, Japan
proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund with pledges of 100 billion from Japan
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and other Asian countries. The U.S. and other Asian countries discouraged the proposal
for fear of a potential threat to American hegemony in the region (Lincoln 2004). This
regional facility would have the power to assign and distribute pre-committed financial
packages to its members in the case of financial emergencies (Rapkin 2001). The AMF
would be a regional alternative to the Fund. This idea was quickly castigated by the Fund
and the U.S. Treasury department. Japan had an interest in creating the AMF. First, Japan
was highly exposed to regional financial contagion because of strong economic ties to
Thailand. Second, Japan was the largest source of FDI into Thailand. Third, the AMF
proposal was generated because of financial preference divergence between the U.S. and
Japan and the U.S. domination of the Fund (Lipscy 2003).
During the global financial crisis of the 2008-2009 Japan demonstrated global
leadership in responding to stabilize the global economy and financially assisting the
Fund with a 100 billion loan (Grimes 2009). Prime Minister Taro Aso pledged the
contribution as an interim measure before the G20 summit in Washington as a symbol of
global leadership. The Fund was in dire financial straights as it only had 200 US billion
available to lend troubled member states (Holroyd and Momani 2012).
What took scholars by surprised is that Japan allocated the 100 billion dollar loan
to the Fund without preconditions or increase in quota (Holroyd and Momani 2012). This
was a politically conscious move by Japan due to the zero-sum game approach to quota
reallocation in the Fund. Three reasons account for Japan’s contribution to the Fund.
First, Japan’s foreign policy has an element of responsibility to the international political
economy. Second, Japanese policymakers prefer to utilize the Fund as a scapegoat for
domestic reform policies. Policymakers can blame the Fund for the domestic economic,
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political, or social problems that may develop due to structural reforms. Lastly, Japan’s
contribution is viewed as a safe investment that will not create costly domestic political
cleavages (Holroyd and Momani 2012). Japan’s ongoing role in the Fund since the 1980s
has been one of a major stakeholder by providing financing to the Fund in times of need.
During this time, Japan implemented a strategy of passivity while taking advantage of the
Fund’s economic weakness when it could. Japan gradually raised its profile, increased its
voting share, and changed its rank order of the Fund to the number two position. While
Japan was growing in influence this was not the same for emerging economies like the
BRICS and Japan’s growing influence caused discord among the over-represented
European countries.
European Over-Representation
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, the Fund increased its
membership to an almost universal level. The Executive Board was expanded to
accommodate 24 Executive Directors. For most observers, is undeniable that Europe is
over-represented on the Executive Board. The two main issues regarding European overrepresentation are the assignment of Executive Board seats and voting weights (Truman
2006).
As a result of the Ninth General Quota Review major shareholders accommodated
Japan’s increased quota. Little was done, however, to diminish European overrepresentation. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom held on to their appointed
seats on the Executive Board (Rapkin, et al. 1997). During 1999, European countries
occupied eight of the 24 seats on the Executive Board. During this time, U.S. Treasury
Secretary Robert Rubin attempted to reshuffle the Fund’s governing bodies to reflect the
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changing dynamics of the international economy. Germany’s Finance Minister quickly
opposed the U.S. proposition (The Irish Times 1999).
During the late 1990s, European countries convened at the Vienna European
Council to establish a strategy for Europe’s future role in monitoring international
monetary and economic policy within the G7 and the International Monetary Fund (Bini
Smaghi 2004). As a result, a sophisticated informal practiced has allowed the European
countries to speak with one voice, influencing the decision-making process and
representation of the European community on the Fund’s Executive Board.
The sophisticated informal mechanism consists of the European Central Bank,
European Council of Ministers, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) (high
ranking G7 officials from finance ministries and central banks), the Sub-Committee
International Monetary Fund (SCIMF), and the European Countries Representatives in
the IMF (EURIMF) (Bini Smaghi 2004). When issues affecting the European Union are
debated in the Fund, the chair representing the Euro-group (EURIMF) makes the
argument on behalf of all participating countries. Cooperation has been focused on
monetary and exchange rate policies and Euro area issues (Bini Smaghi 2004).
In January of 1999 two arrangements were made for the European countries on
the Executive Board: the creation of an EU observer and the EURIMF committee. A
representative of the European Central Bank was allowed resident observer status during
Executive Board meetings; this observer has no voting rights (Bini Smaghi 2004; Wessel
and Blockmans 2013). The observer serves as a liaison and advisor to the Executive
Directors, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), and the Council of EU Finance
Ministers (Ecofin) (Bini Smaghi 2004; Wessel and Blockmans 2013). The Econfin is a
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permanent committee which is made up of all Fund Executive Directors who represent
European Union members (Wessel and Blockmans 2013). The EURIMF was established
to present a unified European position on the Executive Board and to further the
representation of the EU on the Executive Board (Bini Smaghi 2004; Wessel and
Blockmans 2013). Also, the EURIMF selects a permanent chair for a two year period, the
chair establishes a working relationship with the Fund management and staff with the
intention of influencing the Fund’s agenda and lobbying European Union positions (Bini
Smaghi 2004). This relationship is based on an informal practice, cooperation, and an adhoc process. European over-representation has been a central issue of study for many
scholars. The methodology used to measure European over-representation has included
consideration of variables like trade openness, exchange reserves, and GDP.
Buira (2005) utilized world GDP and population variables compared to those of
the U.S. to determine the case for European over-representation in the Fund. On the
Board of Governors the European Union with a total of 25 countries had 31.9 percent of
votes while only accounting for 31.1 percent of world GDP and 7.2 percent of the
world’s population. The U.S. accounted for 17.1 percent voting weight, 29.3 percent of
world GDP, and 4.6 percent of the world’s population (Buira 2005). The 25 European
countries had a six percent advantage in GDP compared to the United States, but had 86
percent more voting weight than the U.S. (Buira 2005). The Euro zone-12 countries
accounted for 22.9 percent voting weight, 22.9 percent of world GDP, and 4.9 percent of
the world’s population. In sum, the Eurozone accounts for 33 percent more voting power
than the U.S. Based on these measures the European Union is obviously overrepresented.
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During 2005, 25 European Union member states influenced the election of ten of
the 24 Fund Executive Director seats (Truman 2006). Out of the ten seats the European
Union helped elect six Executive Directors and eight alternates Executive Directors were
European nationals. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom appoint their own
director (Buira 2005). Overall, eight Executive Directors are appointed and 16 are elected
by constituencies of member states. During this period, 19 Executive Directors were
elected to represent four constituencies (the Nordic, Belgium, Dutch, and Italian), the
four constituencies totaled 37 countries (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). Countries like
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands can ensure their country officials are elected to
represent their constituencies. These three Executive Directors represent other European
and non-European members. For example, Italy represents Albania, Greece, Malta,
Portugal, San Marino, and Timor-Leste. Although Timor-Leste is not a European country
the votes for members belonging to the constituency are aggregated (Buira 2005). In
other words, directors must cast votes as a bloc and constituencies cannot split votes.
Currently, single country constituencies are held by the U.S., Japan, Germany, United
Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (Bini Smaghi 2004).
The above indicates that constituencies on the Executive Board are important for
decision-making, there are no formal rules governing how constituencies coalesce. States
change constituencies to obtain more influence within the Fund (Woods and Lombardi
2006). During the early 2000s, Poland left the constituency represented by Italy and
joined the constituency chaired by Switzerland in order to keep the position of Alternate
Executive Director (Woods and Lombardi 2006). Constituencies with the largest
collective votes include Belgium with ten members and an aggregate of 5.15 percent total
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voting power. The Netherlands and its constituency representing 12 members account for
4.86 percent of the total votes (Woods and Lombardi 2006).
Constituencies serve an important function in the Executive Board. In the Fund
there is a clear distinction between interests of the rich and poor countries, industrialized
and less developed, and creditor and debtor countries (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005).
For the most part, constituencies are formed on criteria like GDP, geographical terms,
and creditor/debtor status of the country. In the Fund there are ten constituencies with
homogeneous interest and six mixed constituencies. Developing countries will benefit
from the influence of mixed constituencies because they tend to be more powerful than
constituencies that are constructed of developing countries only (Mahieu, Ooms, and
Rottier 2005). The reason for this has to do with the fact that influence is greater with
mixed constituencies because they have established relationships due to their mediator
role between powerful and weak states.
Consensus rather than formal voting is the tradition of the Executive Board
resulting in disproportionate European influence on the board (Truman 2006). During this
time, ten European countries accounted for 44.35 percent of the voting share. It should be
noted that the U.S. also has unprecedented power on the Executive Board. The U.S. had
the largest quota and 17.08 percent of the votes. Therefore, the U.S. has veto power
regarding proposals that require 85 percent majority of weighted votes (Truman 2006). In
the Fund more than 75 percent of the members are not directly represented on the
Executive Board, or in senior management positions (Woods 2006).
In contrast, Bini Smaghi (2004) argues the current institutional design of the Fund
undermines the effectiveness of the 15 European Union countries that are divided into
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nine different constituencies. European countries give different priorities to different
issues and some issues can best be solved at the national level in lieu of the European
Union level. European Union influence is limited at the Fund. Having a single EU
constituency does not necessarily imply that the EU would have stronger influence on
Fund policies. On the other hand, emerging economies, Japan, and the U.S. have
expressed concerns over European Union over-representation in the Fund (Bini Smaghi
2004; Truman 2006).
Frieden (2004) argues a single EU seat is great in theory, but in reality it is a
controversial and complex issue. This would require the EU countries to collectively
agree on common policy and bargaining position regarding EU international issues.
Frieden puts it best: “Adopting a common international EU policy is analogous to
adopting a common internal EU policy” (Frieden 2004, 262). The principle of
subsidiarity will be a prevalent factor in determining the costs and benefits associated
with the increased bargaining power and cost associated with compromise resulting from
heterogeneous interest.
Two factors often highlighted the debate over the EU single seat issue at the
Fund. First, the Euro is the official currency of the European Union, a common interest
rate and exchange rate policy apply to European members, therefore, one single seat
should apply to the EU (Buira 2005). The second issue is the institutional strengthening
of European cooperation for economic policies (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). The
implementation of a single EU seat would alter the institutional design and governance of
the Fund (Strand and Rapkin 2005).
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The creation of a single EU seat is like an international can of worms. It has the
potential to increase the polarization of Fund governance because it would place two
major shareholders as Fund decision-makers. The U.S. and the European Union would be
able to each veto many decisions (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). An alliance between
the major shareholders may aggravate the polarization problem between creditor/debtor
states. Also, a single EU seat would have implications for constituencies; non EU
member countries would be forced to seek new constituencies (Bini Smaghi 2005).
Currently, based on the Articles of Agreement, the Fund is located in the country that is
the major shareholder. If European countries merged their quotas in the Fund, such a
merger could require the Fund be relocated to Europe (Bini Smaghi 2005). Conversely, a
single seat could provide for a more equitable distribution of voting shares and Executive
Board chairs for emerging economies and developing countries (Mahieu, Ooms, and
Rottier 2005).
The establishment of a single EU seat would require a recalculation of quota and
voting shares for the new EU constituency and the recalculation of quota and voting
shares to other members (Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005; Bini Smaghi 2005). It is
highly unlikely that major shareholders would allow the combined EU seat to keep the
aggregated total of votes. During the early 2000s, the aggregated quota and voting share
for the EU-25 countries was calculated at 38.44. The actual quota was 32.16, and
percentage of votes was 31.92. For the United States, the calculated quota was 17.11, the
actual quota 17.38, and percentage of votes was 17.11. Lastly, Japan’s calculated quota
was measured at 10.12, the actual quota was 6.23 and the percentage of votes was 3.14
(Bini Smaghi 2005).
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A single EU seat would also effect the composition of the Executive Board. Five
Fund members each appoint an Executive Director: U.S., Japan, Germany, France, and
the UK. A single EU seat would open two Executive Board seats to emerging economies.
All EU countries would remain Fund members, but Europe would speak as one voice and
have one vote. The single EU seat would contribute financially to the Fund according the
recalculated quota. Also, voting share would be based on the recalculated quota (Mahieu,
Ooms, and Rottier 2005). Former Fund official Ariel Buira advocates that country
representation on the Executive Board should consist of an equal number of directors
representing developing countries and industrial countries. Europe is the perfect
candidate for a reduction in chairs; the European countries could be well served by two or
three chairs. No Executive Director, according to Buira, should represent more than 12 to
15 countries and staff working for Executive Director offices should reflect the member
countries of the constituency (Buira 2005).
Another factor in Europe’s disproportionate influence is the selection of the
Managing Director. Historically the Fund Director has been from a European country.
This is an important position because the Director serves as the chair and chief executive
officer of the Fund. During 2007, the German Delegation formally nominated Dominique
Strauss-Kahn; the future Managing Director traveled the globe in order to lobby member
countries to support his candidacy. After the resignation of Strauss-Kahn the European
Union rallied behind French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde for the position. She
also traveled the global seeking support from emerging economies like Brazil, China, and
India (Alderman and Bowley 2011). Lagarde supporters argued that a European was the
best candidate to deal with the ongoing European economic crisis. Some international
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observers argue this was a weak argument. If the latter were the case then a Latin
American would have been the best candidate to deal with the Latin American debt crisis
or an Asian for dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis (Batista 2010). Other candidates
for the Managing Director seat were Agustin Carstens form Mexico and Stanley Fisher,
the governor of Israel’s central bank (Gjelten 2011).
Emerging economies have argued European influence in the Fund is explicitly
biased. During the European crisis, the Fund distributed large amounts of financial
resources to European member states. Greece was allotted 30 billion Euros, 26 billion
Euros for Portugal, 24 times its quota, 22.5 billion for Ireland, which is 23 times its quota
(Henning and Khan 2011). International observers have declared the Fund conditionality
associated with the European financial facilities to be less severe then those imposed on
Asian countries during the Asian Financial Crisis. For Asian countries this is a result of
European over-representation in the Fund’s governance (Henning and Khan 2011). For
example, during the Asian Financial Crisis loan conditionality for these countries was
more qualitatively and quantitatively strict. Fund loans to European countries
incorporated fewer policy requirements and structural reforms than cases in Latin
America (Broome 2010).
In March of 2008, the Reform of Quota and Voice in the International Monetary
Fund was approved by the Board of Governors. This reform process required the
amendment of the Article of Agreement and for member states to ratify the package of
reforms (IMF 2011). In November of 2008 global leaders gathered in Washington to
discuss the current international financial architecture. The French advocated for policy
regulations to limit the dangers of unbridled global capitalism and French President
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Sarkozy was lobbying for allies to support the French position. The United Kingdom
argued for a new Bretton Woods system. The Chinese delegation pursued a quid pro quo
strategy, more influence for China for more capital contributions to the Fund. Conditions
were tied to the Chinese approach. This issue presented discord in the short term for the
global leaders (Davis 2008).
The 2008 quotas were followed by further reforms in 2010 with the completion of
14th General Review of Quotas. The 2010 reform package implemented a doubling of
quotas, six percent of quotas shares to emerging market and developing countries, and
protects the voting share of the poorest member states. Equally as important was to make
the BRICS among the ten largest shareholders (IMF 2011). In addition to the ten largest
shareholders, the largest European countries (France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom) kept their positions among the top 11 shareholders (IMF 2010).
When implementation of the 2010 Governance and Quota Reform package is
complete, the European Union will still be over-represented. According to the post 2010
reform package the 27 European countries will account for 29.4 percent of the voting
share. This is a clear case of rich developed countries versus emerging economies for
decision-making influence in the Fund. This has been a contentious issue for Fund
emerging economies, particularly the BRICS. Economic growth has allowed the BRICS
to become global stakeholders. Today, they seek to influence the institutional design and
governance of the Fund.
BRICS Challenges for Representation
Throughout the Fund’s history membership has continued to increase. Brazil
joined the Fund in 1946. India joined the Fund in 1945. The Russian Federation became a
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member in 1992 and China rejoined in 1980. The BRICS abbreviation stands for Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Many of these countries do not share national
commonalities, but share the common trait of exceptional growth. The six largest
emerging economies are Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Russian
Federation (Das 2010). China is the largest and has the most influence in the global
economy. For this section of the chapter BRICS refers to the emerging market economies
of South Africa, China, India, Brazil, and the Russia Federation. Historically, there was
confusion about the BRICs and BRICS. In the BRICs acronym African countries were
not included. When the term BRICS is utilized this includes South African emerging
markets (The Economist 2013). Together, in 2009, the BRICs accounted for a GDP in
terms of PPP of 15 percent. By 2010, GDP growth exceeded 25 percent (The BRICS
Report 2012; Das 2010). The BRICS account for more than 40 percent of the world
population (The BRICS Report 2012).
Starting in the 2000s, the Fund faced three crises in general: legitimacy,
relevance, and budgetary finance (Truman 2008). The Fund has two institutional
challenges with the BRICS and other developing countries. One is the legitimacy issue.
The second is the issue of European over-representation and how this affects the
representation of the BRICS and low-income countries and the governance of the Fund
(Truman 2006). The representation problem and the economic development of Fund
members have created an environment of industrialized versus developing member states
(Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier 2005). The first two issues have caused much discord among
the Fund and BRICS member states. The third issue focuses on how the legitimacy crisis
has depleted the financial resources of the Fund.
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Case in point, as described above, other member states made financial
contributions directly to the Fund during the global recession of 2007-2008. However,
China, Brazil, India, and Russia refused to contribute directly to the Fund. China, Russia,
India, South Korea, and Brazil contributed through a new Special Drawing Rights bond
system (Holroyd and Momani 2012). The bond fund was preferred by the BRICS because
they would be able to recuperate their money, it was more flexibility, and easier to
reserve if conditions changed. Also the bonds would be available on the secondary
market (Davis 2009).
Many of the BRICS had financial transactions with the Fund since the early
1980s. Much of the discord between the Fund and the Asian economies was centered on
the Asian Financial Crisis. Many Asian countries resented the Fund for not properly
responding to the AFC (Katz 1999; Holroyd and Momani 2012). The resentment
resonated with Latin American countries. Brazil and Argentina quickly paid off loans due
to the Fund and promised to seek future financial assistance elsewhere (Lynch 2006). For
example, in 2003 outstanding loans financed by quota subscriptions totaled 98.9 billion
(Truman 2008). By December of 2005 the total for outstanding loans was 43.2 billion. As
of September 30, 2008 outstanding loans totaled 11.5 billion and 21 out of 23 member
states had repaid their loans in full (Truman 2008).
As a result of the Fund’s response to the AFC, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
was established by the ASEAN plus three (Japan, China, South Korea) to facilitate
economic cooperation and self-help programs for regional members (Chey 2009). The
CMI is an informal institution and less ambitious than the proposed Asian Monetary
Fund. CMI provides liquidity assistance to its members and is a form of self-insurance,
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however, the Fund has some informal influence over the CMI (Chey 2009). For the 13
founding countries monetary cooperation, transparency and building a stronger region
were fundamental to the CMI (Washington Post 2000). Several founding members of the
CMI belong to the BRICS and other emerging economies like the Philippines, Indonesia,
Thailand, and Vietnam. The four mentioned countries account for a total of 2.09 percent
voting share and 52,946 thousand votes in the Fund (IMF 2013).
Arrangements like the CMI and other regional institutions have not gone
unnoticed by the Fund. From 1999 to 2009 Fund members continued voiced their
opposition to the conditionality of the new financing vehicles (Truman 2008). Fund
members utilized bilateral loans and regional lenders for loans. These arrangements
reduced the use of lending facilities in the Fund. Some observers claim bilateralism and
regionalism, if not administered by the Fund could weaken the international financial
system (Truman 2008). As a consequence of resentment and unfair loan conditionality
Asian countries are not discouraged from utilizing the Asian regional arrangements for
solving future financial problems. The lack of legitimacy in global and regional
arrangements will make the Asian countries rule makers rather than rule takers (Sohn
2005).
For Asian countries legitimacy is focused on three issues: inclusiveness, rulegovernance, and fair returns (Sohn 2005). The BRICs have encountered legitimacy
problems with the Fund on the account that the European Union has failed to recognize
the importance of equal representation at the Fund and failed to be responsive to Asian
regional economic concerns. This has been an area of much discord within the Fund.
During the 2012 Fund meeting in Tokyo, the most obvious issue creating discomfort was
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the lack of implementation of the governance and quota reforms agreed to in 2010. The
topic of concern was the continued over-representation of the Euro area economies that
share a common currency (Gros et al. 2012). Prior to the Tokyo meeting, at the G20
summit, the BRICS settled on a 70 billion dollar loan package for the ongoing financial
crisis. European and US officials requested that emerging powers behave like responsible
stakeholder during the time of need. In other words, emerging economies needed to
financially contribute to the Fund. As a result of the continued lack of willingness to
allow emerging economies a stronger voice in the Fund, the emerging economies
proposed the creation of a BRICS Development Bank (Gros et al. 2012).
In June 2013, Russia pledged to use its influence of the G-20 presidency in 2014
to reorganize the institutional design of the Fund, in particular reforming the voting
system to enhance the role of the BRICS (Rianovosti 2013). During this same time, the
BRICS countries established a charter for a new development bank. The bank intends to
facilitate loans for infrastructure development, modern day port facilities, and reliable
power and rail services (Reuters 2013). This is an effort by emerging economic powers to
establish institutions and forums that are an alternative to Western-dominated
international financial institutions. Some international observers believe this is a direct
challenge to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Polgreen 2013).
However, Gros et al (2012) argue this is highly unlikely because the proposed 100 billion
dollars for the reserve fund of the BRICS Development Bank is little compared to the
established 780 billion reserve fund of the IMF. The development bank will be
established with a 100 billion reserve fund. China will be the largest contributor with 41
billion. India, Brazil, and Russia will each contribute 18 billion and South Africa will
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contribute five billion (BBC News 2013). Although, the development bank proposal is
impressive in theory the practical applications may present challenges to the BRICS
Development Bank. Symbolically, this represents a move away from the Washington
Consensus to the Beijing Consensus. A number of questions remain unanswered. Where
will the Bank be located? What will be the governance structure and criteria that will
determine what projects are funded (Institute of Development Studies 2013).
Challenges derived from underlying political and economic differences between
the BRICS can present obstacles to economic cooperation. For example, India is a
democracy and China is a one-party state based on autocratic rule (O’Neill 2013).
Historically, Indian and Chinese tensions have influenced military and security decisions,
economic and diplomatic relationships (Malik 2012). In 1962, a short lived war occurred
over a Himalayan border dispute, followed by brief conflicts in 1967 and 1987. Recent
attempts to settle the border issue have been futile (Karackattu 2013; Malik 2012). In
2010, the Chinese government issued a communication that a border settlement would
take a very long time. Recently the Chinese government provoked the Indian authorities
by sending military troops into the mountains of Ladakh, about 30 Chinese troops erected
overnight sleeping tents. Ultimately, Indian military officials protested the Chinese
actions (Harris 2013).
The energy rich South China Sea has been an area of dispute among many Asian
governments. India is located outside the South China Sea. However, India operates
inside the South China Sea via naval deployments. India has interest in oil exploration,
and growing strategic military cooperation with other South East Asian countries (Scott
2013). Recent disagreements between Vietnam and China regarding maritime navigation
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have caused the ASEAN countries to use the U.S. Japan, and India as counterweights to
China’s power (Hong 2013). In 2011, China and India entered into a dispute over the
Indian state oil company exploration with Vietnam. China claimed this was a violation of
Chinese sovereignty. China’s concerns are that future maritime exploration for natural
resources by foreign governments will become a bargaining tool for future negotiations
over the South China (Page and Wright 2011). India is not the only country that China
has had border disputes with. Russia and China have different political and economic
interests. The latter has the potential to create challenges in the newly formed BRICS
Development Bank.
As trade has expanded Russia-China relations have improved. Beginning in the
1960s the relationship of the two countries was plagued with animosity. Russia and China
do not share common cultures and territorial disputes date back to the 18th century
(Dobriansky 2000). In 2001 both countries signed the Sino-Russian Treaty on Good
Neighbor, Friendship, and Cooperation (Wishnick 2001). This alliance was due to mutual
benefit and an attempt to diminish the global power of the U.S. post- Cold War and
influence a multipolar international system (Wishnick 2001). However, this relationship
was quickly strained by new challenges relating to different economic and political
policies, legacies of mistrust, and changing domestic and international environments
(Wishnick 2001).
Today, China is a rising power with a growing export driven economy. Russia has
a stagnate petro economy with little potential export growth. Russia sells military
hardware to Southeast Asia countries that claim territorial sovereignty in the South China
Sea, including selling sophisticated attack submarines to Vietnam (Mankoff 2013). This
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issue is creating much discord between Russia and China. Ongoing mistrust between
India and China is also a continuing problem. In 2010, a four day conference was held
between high ranking officials due to ongoing territorial disputes, a hotline between
leaders of both countries was established to encourage communication over the issue
(Ridge 2010). The ongoing history of mistrust and animosity between China, India, and
Russia may be too big of a challenge for the BRICS Development Bank to overcome.
Equally important, what role will Brazil and South Africa have in the BRICS
Development Bank?
Brazil is considered to be a major player among emerging economies. In the 21st
century global political economy Brazil and China have entered into a strategic
partnership (Gouvea and Montoya 2013). The BRICS have changed the economic
landscape of financial globalization. Moreover, China has become a major recipient of
foreign direct investment, from 3.5 billion in 1990 to 106 billion in 2011. During the first
decade of the 21st century Brazil became China’s largest trading partner in Latin America
(Cardoso 2012). In 2006, Brazil exported 11 million tons of coffee beans to China (Ding
2008). In 2010 China invested nearly US 12 billion in the Brazilian economy.
China has engaged Latin America with diplomatic and economic efforts. This has
created opportunities and challenges in the region. China and Brazil have participated in
trade negotiations, have been active stakeholders in global climate concerns, and worked
collectively in the IMF, G20, and WTO (Gouvea and Montoya 2013). Despite the
challenges that China and Brazil confront much of their relationship has been categorized
by a comprehensive partnership that focuses on trade and prosperity. For example, areas
of partnership include trade, energy, mining, finance, agriculture, information
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technology, and innovation (Haibib 2010). Consequently, in 2009 China became Brazil’s
largest trading partner surpassing the U.S. and the European Union. However, both
countries have had serious challenges over trade, investment, finance and political
concerns. First, tensions have evolved over what Brazil considers Chinese neo-colonialist
strategies. Brazilian political leader have claimed that China is pursuing a “North-South”
paradigm instead of a “South-South” economic paradigm and fear that China is acting as
Western powers did in accumulating natural resources (Cardoso 2013; Gouvea and
Montoya 2013). This has impacted bilateral trade relations (Cardoso 2013). A second
contentious issue is commercial competition between Latin America and Africa.
A political challenge at the United Nations in 2005 effected relations between
China and Brazil. The failure of China to support Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council created a political challenge for both countries. Also,
during the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference and Copenhagen Summit
there was discord regarding climate negotiations (Cardoso 2013; Gouvea and Montoya
2013).
Based on the strategic alliance between Brazil and China, Brazil may have a
stabilizing role in the BRICS Development Bank. Brazil has too much invested to simply
be a spoiler in the emerging economies reform agenda and BRICS Development Bank.
Moreover, China’s need for natural resources may benefit Brazil in the long term and
China has much to lose if Brazil is not part of the development bank. China’s has the
second largest economy, four times larger than India and Russia and about 16 times
larger than South Africa (Fletcher 2011). Will South Africa fall into the periphery-core
model of the past as a member of the BRICS development Bank?
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The relation the Fund has to the BRICS Development Bank may be difficult to
categorize. However, significant differences appear to be prevalent with both institutions.
For example, the BRICS Development Bank has been created as a counterpart to
orthodox neoliberalism and promotes development by developing countries (Institute of
Development Studies 2013). Another difference will be to promote greater cooperation
between developing countries and to create arrangements on a global scale. The most
important difference will be that the BRICS Development Bank will not have a link to
the Fund (Institute of Development Studies 2013).
Conclusion
The Fund has experienced unprecedented changes with the ascension of Japan, the
continued over-representation of the European Union, and the rise of the BRICS and
other emerging economies. These three factors have forced the Fund to be more
transparent, effective, and accountable. It is fair to mention that Japan has been a major
contributor and financier to the Fund. Japan has earned a stakeholder role, the second
position in the hierarchy of the Fund, and has been a trailblazer for attempting to break
the strong hold of European representation on the Executive Board. The European Union
has maintained a strangle hold on the Executive Board of the Fund and is not likely to
relinquish the over-represented position without intense discord. The failure to
implemented 2008 and 2010 reforms is a prime example of how difficult it will be for
emerging economies to obtain fair representation on the Executive Board and adequate
voting shares. A reallocation of voting seats will be difficult to obtain because it will be
hard for European countries to agree to a single foreign policy that is representative of
their national interests in the international area. The BRICS with their economic power
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will have to attempt to influence and promote financial regionalism and multilateralism
as a counterweight to the Fund. Wade (2011) argues the rise of multilateralism is made
possible by several factors. The first factor is the decline the G7 share of world GDP. In
2000 the G7 accounted for 72 percent of global GDP. In 2011 the percentage share
declined to 53 percent. The second factor is China’s rise is another important factor
contributing to multilateralism. The third factor is monetary policy because today the
major financial capitals in the world pay attention to China’s monetary policy. The fourth
factor is developing and transnational countries contribute more to global output.
Between 2000 and 2009, global output by these countries rose by 10 percentage points
and when measured by purchasing power parity there was an increase of 40 to 50 percent.
The fifth factor is south to south trade. From 1997 to 2009 Asian exporters decreased
from 46 to 36 percent to the U.S., the EU, and Japan. The sixth factor is the EU is
becoming more cohesive and the Euro is becoming the second international reserve
currency and this creates challenges for the international economic governance system
(Wade 2011). Equally important, if the BRICS want more decision-making power in the
Fund they will have to follow the Japanese model for obtaining a higher position in the
hierarchy of the Fund. A strategic plan based on a cohesiveness approach to obtaining
more influence will be fundamental to the BRICS. Also, the BRICS, at times, must be
passive rule takers, and aggressive players utilizing economic leverage to alter the
institutional design of the Fund toward their favor.
However, the U.S. position should not be over looked in terms of European overrepresentation and accommodations for the BRICS. For example, during the G20 meeting
in November 2010, the U.S. informed the G20 that they would not support the
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continuation of the twenty-four seat Executive Board in the Fund. This forced Europe to
relinquish two. After ongoing diplomatic negotiations the U.S. agreed to approve the 24
seat Board. However, European representation on the Executive Board still diminished
(Wade 2011). Consequently, this is a prime example of power politics and an attempt to
retain U.S. veto power within the Fund.
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CHAPTER 6
PRE-SINGAPORE, POST SINGAPORE, AND THE 14TH GQR
Chapter six will begin by analyzing the Fund’s internal governance and reform
initiatives. The first section will include a brief review of cases from prior chapters to
provide a rationale for the idea that quota shares and internal governance should be
commensurate with a country’s economic strength. The next section will analyze data on
quota reform from the pre-Singapore, post-Singapore, and 14th GQR time frames. World
Bank country and lending group data will be utilized to classify Fund members into
different income groups and examine quota allocations. This section will present
descriptive data comparing low-income, middle-income, upper middle-income and highincome countries regarding quota allocation and GDP. Additionally, a brief comparison
of the EU and the BRICS focusing on the voting power disparity due to the 14th GQR
will be discussed. The following section will present data for the BRICS, G8, and G20,
comparing the quotas before recent reforms and to UN contribution percentage and
population variables to determine over or under-representation in the Fund. The chapter
will conclude with a second section discussing possible reforms to the Fund.
Internal Governance and Reform
The Fund has evolved in order to address the changing global political economy.
Along the way, the Fund has garnered many critics. International financial elites,
government policy makers, and average citizens have expressed rebuke for the Fund. The
case for Fund reform has been made and is long overdue. Many governments in the
international financial architecture have been dissatisfied with their relative positions in
the Fund’s hierarchy and have made a push to reform the Fund. Three issues have
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repeatedly promoted reform initiatives: the legitimacy crisis, under-representation that
often encourages a rich versus poor states environment, and loan conditionality
requirements. The under-represented problem experienced by emerging market
economies has encouraged debate regarding European over-representation and the proper
roles for emerging market economies and developing countries (Rapkin and Strand
2006). Many of these countries have experienced impressive growth and argue their
economic contributions to the global economy are not reflected in their quota shares.
Also, small economies argue their small quota do not give them a voice in the Fund.
However, research conducted by Rapkin and Strand (2006) concludes that low-income
countries are over-represented in the Fund when comparing their GDP shares to their
quotas.
The main concern in the quota share debate has focused on the distribution of
power within the Fund. Developing emerging market countries must have their economic
strength reflect their voting weight to make the Fund a legitimate and effective
international institution (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004). The global political
economy of the first half of the 20th century has changed. The Fund has the capacity to
strengthen economic cooperation, enhance economic security, and promote globalization
that will benefit different regions and groups (Kelkar, Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow
2005).
The global political economy has changed due to seven factors. The first factor is
the globalization of new technology. New technology enhances production and increases
economic interaction. The second factor is the increase in private capital flows. When
private capital flow is disrupted there is a potential to create economic shocks (Kelkar,
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Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 2005). The third factor is the shifting of global
demographic balances. Advanced economies are not producing working age populations
as fast as developing economies. As a result, capital flows will go where younger
populations exist. The fourth factor is the political influence of emerging market
economies. The fifth factor is the increasing relative economic strength of Asia in the
global economy. Three of the four largest economies are Japan, China, and India (Kelkar,
Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 2005). The sixth factor is the growing regionalism in
Asian and Europe in reaction to members’ dissatisfaction with the Fund. The seventh
factor is international institutions and governments are promoting greater transparency
and accountability in global governance. Based on the changing forces of the global
economy the Fund should promote reform initiatives beginning with the distribution of
more institutional power to developing and emerging market economies (Kelkar,
Chaudhry, and Vanduzer-Snow 2005).
Much of the current reform process has been due to the rise of China and India,
which today are major global economies but are under-represented in the Fund (Kenen
2007). Also, the Fund’s current governance model is complicated and does not allow for
the Fund to focus on its original mandates of managing the international monetary system
and the promotion of a stable and cooperative global economy (Kenen 2007).
As mentioned in the previous cases of discord, the issue has been concentrated on
quota allocation and the shift in the balance of power. Japan’s rise to the second position
at the Fund was not automatic; it was a very political process. Initially, the U.S. was in
opposition to a Japanese quota increase. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany
opposed Japan’s bid for a larger quota. Japan publically declared in a Fund Executive
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Board meeting that continued opposition to a larger quota share for Japan may present
opposition at home for Fund financial contributions (IMF 1988a). Eventually, Japan
moved from 4.7 percent to 6.1 percent and obtained the second position at the Fund.
China’s negotiations with the Fund over a quota that would reflect its economic
weight in the global economy was an important factor when it joined the Fund (Boughton
2001; Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990). China’s strategic plan for entry into the Fund
reflects the importance of quota allocation. Beginning in the early 1970s China began a
diplomatic effort to seek membership in the Fund. During 1980 China utilized diplomatic
efforts to influence the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend an increase in quota share.
Ultimately, China obtained 2.82 percent of votes (Jacobsen and Okensberg 1990).
The most current cases of discord have revolved around the BRICS. The BRICS’
economic weight in the global economy is not commensurate with the quota share and
decision making power at the Fund. As a result, the BRICS have started to implement a
strategy for a BRICS Development Bank. However, there is much debate as to how
successful the development bank will be because major shareholders have heterogeneous
policy preferences that prevent cohesiveness among major shareholders.
Bryant argues (2008) a member’s voting share in the Fund is the key factor
determining its relative political influence at the Fund. When the Fund was created the
quota formula was designed by the U.S. Treasury to produce a politically predetermined
result. Political motives are at the heart of the quota system
Analysis for Various Country Groups
The 2010 reform package was approved by the Board of Governors in December
of 2010. Four key components make up the reform package. The first reform is a
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doubling of the Fund quotas. This will be the largest quota increase in the Fund’s history.
The last time a quota increase was adopted was in 1998 with the 11th GQR. The second
reform is a shifting of six percent of quota share to emerging markets of six percent. This
will increase their voting power and their relative financial commitment to the Fund. The
third reform is to create an all elected Executive Board. The fourth reform is reducing the
representation of advanced countries on the Executive Board. Currently, 10 seats are held
by European countries (IMF 2013).
The pending 14th GQR will be important to determine the legitimacy of Fund
reforms. In the Fund’s Singapore meeting in 2006, the Managing Director proposed and
the Directors approved a two-stage process for the reallocation of quotas. During the first
stage of quota reforms, China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey each received immediate
small ad hoc increases (Kenen 2007). Their prior quotas never reflected their relative
economic strength. The second stage of negotiations was held in mid-2008. The Fund
would adopt a new formula for quota calculation. The revised quota formula accounts for
a GDP measure that is a blended measure compromised of 60 percent market exchange
rate GDP and 40 percent PPP GDP. The second variable is economic openness. This
measures the average total of current payments and receipts for goods and services. This
factor accounts for 30 percent of the formula. The third variable is economic variability.
This measures the receipts for net capital flows for a three year period. This factor
accounts for 15 percent. The fourth variable is international reserves and accounts for five
percent of quotas. This measures the foreign exchanges, SDR holdings, the reserve
position in the Fund and gold holdings. The new formula is intended to be simple and
more transparent then the previous formula (IMF 2013).
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All quota data information for this section will utilize Fund variables. GDP is
considered the most important variable calculating quota shares because GDP is the most
comprehensive measure of economic size (Chen 2013). The data are drawn from the
Fund, UN, and World Bank. The data will be used to demonstrate the relationship
between quota reform and Fund legitimacy. The pre-Singapore data dates back to 2006.
The post-Singapore data accounts for the 2008 quota and voice reform changes and basic
votes calculated at 5.502 percent of total votes. The 14th GQR data accounts for the 2010
reforms that will reflect new quota and voting shares that will be effective upon the
acceptance of 85 percent of the Fund members (IMF 2013). In sum, quotas at three time
periods are examined.
Table 1 represents 33 low-income countries as categorized by the World Bank.
During the pre-Singapore period, the aggregate quota shares for the 33 countries totaled
1.7 percent of the total quota shares. During the post 2008 reform period, the same 33
countries accounted for 1.6 percent of the aggregate quota shares. When the 14th GQR is
adopted the 33 countries will account for an aggregate share of 1.6 percent of the total
Fund shares. Low-income countries are defined as countries with gross national income
(GNI) of less than 1,035 U.S. dollars (World Bank 2013). Some of the low-income
countries include Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Burundi (See table 1).
For Burundi the pre-Singapore quota share was 0.036 percent. For post-Singapore
and the pending 14th GQR quota share did not change from 0.032. Burundi has a
population of 9.850 million people with a GDP of 2.472 billion (World Bank 2013).
Burundi’s GDP global percentage is 0.005; its PPP is measured at 160 US dollars, and is
considered a Sub-Saharan African developing country. Afghanistan’s pre-Singapore
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quota share was 0.076 percent and the quota share for the post-Singapore and 14th GQR
stayed the same at 0.068 percent. Afghanistan’s population is measured at 29.87 million
and has a GDP of 18.03 billion. Afghanistan accounts for 0.03 percent of global GDP
with a PPP of 330 US dollars and is considered a South Asian developing country (World
Bank 2013).
Table 2 presents quotas for lower middle income countries. For the pre-Singapore
period aggregate quota share of 46 countries accounted for 6.7 percent of all quotas. The
post-Singapore 2008 quota reforms decreased the aggregate total to 6.1 percent. The
pending 14th GQR will further decrease the aggregate quota share to 5.7 percent of
overall Fund shares.
Lower middle income countries are defined as countries with gross national
income (GNI) between 1,036-4,085 US dollars (World Bank 2013). Based on the factors
for the pending 14th GQR the 46 lower middle-income countries have an aggregate GDP
60/40 blend of 4.9 percent of global GDP. Hypothetically, if GDP was the benchmark
factor determining quota shares then the lower middle income countries are overrepresented in quota shares. For example, Honduras has a GDP of 0.033. During the preSingapore period Honduras had a quota share of 0.061 percent. During the postSingapore time period the quota share decreased to 0.054 percent and during the pending
14th GQR the percentage quota share decreases to 0.052 percent (see table 2).
Table 3 presents data on the upper middle-income countries with gross national
income of 4,086-12,615 (World Bank 2013). This group of countries includes developing
and transition countries that often utilize Fund resources (Strand and Rapkin 2005). The
aggregate quota share for the 52 countries during the pre-Singapore period was 16.7
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percent. For the post-Singapore 2008 period the aggregate shares increased to 17.9
percent. For the pending 14th GQR aggregate quota shares will increase to 20.48. Quota
shares for this country group have increased as a result of recent reforms.
According to the World Bank country and lending group data, China, Brazil, and
South Africa are members of the upper middle-income country group. These three
countries account for a majority of the quota shares and GDP within this country group.
Together, China, Brazil, and South Africa account for 15.40 percent GDP and 9.34
percent of the quota share for this group. After the 14th GQR the voting share of the three
countries will be 8.90 percent (IMF 2013).
Table 4 displays quotas for high-income countries. These countries have a larger
percentage of the aggregate quota share. High income countries have a gross national
income of over 12,616 US dollars (World Bank 2013). For the pre- Singapore period high
income countries had an aggregate quota share of 72.13 percent. During the postSingapore 2008 reforms these countries experienced a decrease in their quota share to
71.08 percent. After the pending 14th GQR the aggregate quota share will be 68.38
percent of the Fund shares. Many high income countries have smaller quota shares than
their GDP shares justify. If economic variables utilized under the Fund formula are the
only factors determining the quota share then high income countries are over-represented
in the Fund.
The five largest shareholders of the Fund are also ranked among the high income
country group. France, the U.K. the U.S., Germany, and Japan represent a combined total
of 37.80 quota share. Once the 14th GQR is implemented this will translate into 35.90
voting share. 24 of the 28 European Union members are ranked within the high income
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country group. Regarding the 14th GQR and the U.S. share, the U.S. would not suffer a
major defeat by giving up a small percentage of its quota share because it still retains veto
power with 17.40 percent voting quota share. Based on the GDP figures the U.S. is
under-represented with a GDP blend of 21.50 percent. The U.S. is allowing its quota
share to fall in order to distribute a more equitable quota share to emerging market
economies.
Scholars and policymakers argue the European Union has been over-represented
in the Fund. Table 5 includes the 28 countries that hold membership in the European
Union and Fund. The data show that during the pre-Singapore period, the EU accounted
for an aggregate quota share of 37.82 percent. During the post 2008 reform period the EU
accounted for 36.80 percent of quota shares. For the 14th GQR the EU will account for an
aggregate share of 35.22 percent of quotas (IMF 2013).
The EU members with the largest quota shares are Germany, France, U.K. Italy,
Netherlands, and Spain. After the 14th GQR these countries will have an aggregate quota
share of 16.7. The quota share translates into 20.04 percent of total votes (IMF 2013). If
these countries coalesce around a particular issue to form a voting bloc it gives them veto
power in the Fund over certain issues. The Netherlands and Spain represent other
countries in their constituency. Vote splitting for constituency groups is not permitted in
the Fund and this will slightly increase the EU’s voting power. This indicates that some
Fund Directors are better able to represent their constituencies because of the voting
power and the voice of the constituency (Lombardi and Woods 2008). Constituencies
with small voting shares can hardly influence the decision making processes of the Fund.
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Table 6 displays data for the BRICS. A total of five countries are analyzed.
During the pre-Singapore period Brazil accounted for 1.42 percent, Russia accounted for
2.78 percent, India 1.95 percent, China 2.98 percent and South Africa for 0.874 percent.
The aggregate total for the BRICS is 10.00 percent of Fund quota shares. Today, based
on the post-Singapore 2008 quota and voice reforms these countries account for an
aggregate quota share of 11.49 percent. Upon implementation of the 14th GQR the
aggregate quota share for the BRICS will be 14.79 percent. The 14th GQR will provide
the BRICS with a voting share of 14.10. This sum is not sufficient to form a voting bloc
for veto power. Major decisions require an 85 percent majority. In other words, if there is
an issue that does not benefit the BRICS, this potential voting bloc would have to lobby
another constituency to align itself with the BRICS in order to be able to prevent the
passage of the proposed decision. The U.S. does not need to lobby other member states
because in the current quota share it has 17.69 percent of the quota share and will have
17.40 percent if the 14th GQR is approved.
The 14th GQR reforms will continue the disparity between voting share and
economic strength. Table 7 shows the voting shares on the Executive Board for Brazil,
China, India, Germany, France, and the U.K. Table 7 examines the voting share for the
three European advanced countries that have an appointed Executive Director compared
with the advanced market economies that are supposed to obtain a significant vote share
increase. During the post 2008 reform period Brazil, China, and India had an aggregate
voting share of 7.87 percent on the Executive Board. The European countries like
Germany, France, and the U.K. had a voting share of 14.36 percent on the Executive
Board. For the 14th GQR Brazil, China, and India will have a voting share of 10.90
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percent. The three European countries will have an aggregate voting share of 13.35
percent. However, the aggregate GDP for Brazil, China and India will account for 18.40
percent. The aggregate GDP for the three European countries will account for 11.80
percent of global GDP. This is a clear disparity in voting power on Executive Board and
economic strength of a country (see table 7). The 14th GQR does not improve the
governance model of the Fund because the quota share is not commensurate with the
economic power of Brazil, India, and China. Virmani (2011) argues that China and India
have been major contributors to global economic output. Since 2007, India has been the
second largest contributor to global growth surpassing the European zone and in 2010
India surpassed China by a third in global growth.
The latter is directly in contradiction to the reforms that Kelkar, Chaudhry, and
Vanduzer-Snow (2005, 47) have advocated. These scholars put it best by stating, “In our
view, veto power determined by different coalitions of states would encourage
cooperation. EU countries and a collation of states would encourage cooperation. EU
countries and a collation of Japan, China, and India ought to have veto power. Similarly,
a coalition of Asian, Africa, and Latin America would enjoy a veto.” The BRICS have
accumulated a larger percentage of quotas than before, but the prevalent question still
remains: do the BRICS have a quota share commensurate with their economic positions
in the global economy?
Based on the GDP variable for the 14th GQR the BRICS are under-represented in
quota shares and as a result in vote shares. Aggregate GDP for the BRICS accounted for
21.70 percent of global GDP (IMF 2013). In the case of China its GDP was 11.65
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percent. However, the quota share assigned is 6.39 percent. This will give China a vote
share of 6.06 percent and will make it the third largest member in the Fund.
The 14th GQR will not impose a drastic change on the Executive Board. The U.S.
will remain the largest holder of quotas and votes and have de facto veto power. Japan
will remain in the number two position with a GDP of 7.50 percent and quota share of
6.40 percent with a voting share of 6.10 percent. China will move up to the third position
with 11.65 percent GDP contribution and a quota share of 6.39 percent with a voting
share of 6.06 percent. Germany will be placed in the fourth position with a quota share of
5.50 percent and a voting share of 5.30 percent. France and the U.K. would have the
same quota share of 4.20 percent and vote share of 4 percent. Based on the current
reforms there are 20 shareholders that have the largest quota shares. Once the 14th GQR
is implemented 19 of the current largest quota shareholders will still be among the largest
shareholders. The only change will be that Turkey replaces Venezuela. During the post2008 period Turkey had 0.61 percent quota share. For the 14th GQR Turkey will have
0.97 percent quota share. The six percent shift in quotas to emerging markets will not
change the current top 20 country positions dramatically. Put differently, Malta with a
post-2008 quota share of 0.043 will not see a two percent increase.
Implementing the 14th GQR may take longer than anticipated. During the October
2013 Fund meeting foreign officials expressed frustration over the lack of progress
toward approving the 2010 reform package. The Indian finance minister, P.
Chidambaram, stated, “Why does this problem remain with us in meeting after meeting.
Also, there is no clarity, even after the passage of a year, as to when this will be finally
achieved” (The New York Times 2013). Unfortunately, as of October 2013 the U.S.
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Congress has failed to take up the reform issue. As of September 12, 2013 141 members
have approved the proposed amendment on reforms of the Executive Board. Countries
such as France, Germany, the U.K, Brazil, India, and China have approved the reform
amendments. The 14th GQR reforms on quota share increase have been approved by 152
countries (IMF 2013).
Economic and Population Measures for the G8, EU, and BRICS
This section will present data comparing contributions to international institutions
that provide public goods and to global population percentages. For the comparisons in
this section the financial contributions to the U.N. and population numbers from the
World Bank will be utilized. Contributions to global public goods determine the
willingness of countries to participate in the international system. Population is another
factor that some observers have suggested be included in the calculation of quotas.
Affluent OECD countries are experiencing a population aging problem.
Populations are on average becoming older. The 65 and older groups will increase in
numbers surpassing the working age (15-64) group. Younger generations will account for
a smaller portion of the work force (Eberstadt 2006). The aging problem will have direct
consequences for economic institutions and macroeconomic performance (Eberstadt
2006). Possible problems due to population aging are: increased healthcare expenditures,
labor force pressures, and savings levels. These and other factors can pose adverse
challenges for productivity and economic growth (Eberstadt 2006). Emerging economies
are not immune from this problem. For example, India has two aging problems: one
problem is the increase in youth over the next 20 years. The other problem is the fertility
rate has dropped by more than two-fifths over the past three decades (Eberstadt 2006).
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There is much debate about the legitimacy of the population and aging problem in
the industrialized world. Population variables will be hard to implement as part of the
quota formula because this would automatically give certain developing and emerging
economies a sharp increase in quota shares. The problem of funding the increased quota
share will also become problematic for developing and emerging market economies
(Strand and Rapkin 2005).
Members should support the Fund according to the size of their economies. For
example, a larger economy will use more resources and has a greater structural and
systemic impact if a financial crisis occurs (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004, 737).
Financial contagion and the negative spillover effects are not limited to regions or
specific international actors. A country’s investment in the economic global system is
reflected in part in its GDP. Hence, the willingness to contribute to global public goods
based on its GDP is one important measure for determining Fund quota shares (Kelkar,
Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004).
Table 8 displays the BRICS quota share for the years analyzed. The quota share
for the pre-Singapore period is 10.00. The post-2008 period accounts for an aggregate
quota share of 11.40. Based on the pending 14th GQR the aggregate amount is 14.70
percent. When global population percentages are utilized among the BRICS, China
surpass all other countries with a percentage share of 18.90 for global population. India
moves up to the second position with 17.30 percent. Brazil occupies the third position
with 2.70 percent. Russia moves to the fourth position and South Africa remains in the
fifth position (see table 8 and graph 1).
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Based on UN contribution China remains at the number one position among
BRICS with 3.10 percent of global contributions. Brazil moves into the second place.
Russia occupies the third position, India the fourth position, and South Africa remains in
fifth. The aggregate GDP share is 21.70, population share for the BRICS accounts for
41.80 percent of global population, and total UN contributions of 7.10 percent (see table
8 and graph 2).
Table 9 shows the G8 quotas with economic and population measures for preSingapore, post-Singapore and the 14th GQR time period. The measures utilized for this
data analysis will be the percentage of a country’s UN contribution and the population
percentage compared to global population. For the pre-Singapore period, the aggregate
quota sum for the G8 countries accounts for 48.80 percent. The post-2008 period
accounts for 47.70 percent and the 14th GQR aggregate quota share is 46.00 percent.
If the percentage of global population is the dominant variable used among the G8
for the 14th GQR quota allocation, the U.S. would remain at number one among the G8
countries with 4.40 percent. Russia would move up to number two from its current
number seven position for all time periods. Japan would move down to the number three
position. Germany would move down to number four. The number five position would
belong to France. By Germany moving into the number two position these would slightly
re-shift the balance of power among the G8 (see graph 3).
When the percentage of UN contributions is utilized as the dominant variable for
the 14th GQR quota allocation the U.S. will remain the number one position with 23.90
percent of UN Contributions. The U.K will move up to number four passing France (see
graph 4). Italy will remain at its original position in number six. Canada will move into
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number seven supplanting Russia into the last position. Aggregate GDP for the G8
accounts for 48.70 percent, aggregate population share accounts for 12.50 percent, and
aggregate UN contributions account for 66.00 percent.
The G20 countries are displayed in table 10. The aggregate pre-Singapore quota
share for the G20 accounts for 86.30 percent of all quota shares. The post 2008 reforms
account for 78.80 percent and the pending 14th GQR account for 81.1 percent. Utilizing
the population data as the main variable for quota reallocation China will surpass the U.S.
to the number one position. China has a population share of 18.90 percent. India will
supplant Japan and occupy the number two position at the Fund. The U.S. will remain in
the top five positions with a population share of 4.40 percent. Indonesia will move up to
fourth place from the 15th slot within the G20. Brazil will move up to the fifth position
with 2.70 percent of the world’s population.
Based on the population numbers the Executive Board would fundamentally
change. Germany, Franc, the U.K. would be supplanted from the Executive Board.
However, these same three countries along with Italy forming a voting bloc would have a
combined quota share of 17.10 percent; this would be enough to form a constituency and
veto major decisions. China and India would also have combined veto power. Based on
the population variable the Fund headquarters would have to be moved from Washington,
D.C. to Asia.
Table 10 also displays the quota share if the UN contribution variable were the
factor determining quota allocation. The U.S. would remain at the number one position
with 23.90 percent contribution. Japan would remain at the number two position due to
its 12.20 percent contribution. Germany would remain at number three with 7.80 percent.
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The U.K. would supplant France to occupy the fourth position with 6.40 percent and
France would occupy the fifth position with 5.90 percent. The Executive Board would
remain similar to today and Europe would continue to be over represented on the
Executive Board. The BRICS would account for a total quota share of 6.80 percent.
Based on the BRICS UN contribution they would be over represented in quota share.
Although the BRICS UN contribution is impressive it is still far behind the U.S. and the
European Union’s total UN contribution of 12.9 percent (see table 10).
Twenty First Century Fund Reforms
Reforming the governance model and institutional design of the Fund will be a
daunting task that will require amending the Articles of Agreement and ratification by 85
percent of the membership (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004; Strand and Rapkin
2005). Fundamental reforms must be implemented for the Fund to be an effective
international organization. Proponents of governance and quota reforms advocate for a
balanced approach to Fund reform initiatives; this includes that creditor states must be
given a stakeholder position in future reforms. Also, the quota formula should be more
transparent and easier to understand. Expanding the Executive Board has been suggested
as a possible reform. Amending the regulations for access to Fund loans is a reform that
will create greater equality among Fund members. The last reform is the possibility of a
variable to measure contributions to world growth.
Reform proponents must acknowledge the important role of creditor states. When
creditor states have a majority of decision making power in the Fund this creates
confidence in the system (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004). Also, proponents must
support a balanced approach that will benefit major shareholders as well as emerging and
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developing countries (Dervis and Ozer 2005). Developing countries account for one-third
of global trade. In 1992 developing countries GDP was estimated at 31.86. By 2001,
GDP was estimated at 37.56 percent. During the same nine-year period the European
countries GDP performances has declined from 34.20 to 29.04 percent (Kelkar, Yadav,
and Chaudhry 2004).
Reform initiatives for the Fund must be rooted in principles, transparency, and
democratic procedures to enhance legitimacy and effective global governance. Economic
and political agreements have been embedded in the quota system, which is reflected in
the governance structure. Reforms must maintain quota formulas that are simple to
calculate and transparent. The second requirement is that creditors in financial institutions
must have a decisive voice in the institution. Lastly, any proposed reforms must accept
the veto power of the largest shareholder, the U.S. (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004;
Rapkin and Strand 2006). The latter is based on the Fund’s formal and informal
governance model. An 85 percent majority vote is required for major decisions and the
U.S. has the potential to prevent major decision with 17.40 percent shares. Member states
do not bring proposals up for votes that have not been approved by the U.S. (Woods
2006).
Fund reforms must be fundamentally different than the current quota regime.
Quotas should be the sole factor deciding access to resources. Currently, quotas
determine the contribution of member states in the Fund. Quotas determine how much
money a member state can borrow and how much voting power the state assumes
(Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004; Strand 2014). Quota reforms should remove the
direct correlation between quota shares and the amount to be borrowed. Access to
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facilities reserves should not be based on the 300 percent rule of a member’s quota
because this may not be sufficient for resolving a macroeconomic structural problem
(Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004). Access to loans should be based on need with
safety restrictions imposed and access to resources based on gross financing. In the past,
the Contingent Credit Line and Supplemental Reserve Facility implied that distribution of
loans was based on need not quota. Also, Fund members would have a sense of equality
if the quota formula were not utilized because the current quota system creates a divide
between rich and poor countries (Kelkar, Yadav, and Chaudhry 2004).
Expanding the Executive Board has been a controversial proposal. This would
include the expansion of the Board to include representation for developing countries.
This approach would be more viable, but obtaining consensus may become more
difficult. Another proposal would be to limit the number of countries in a constituency
group; this would allow for more effective representation by the Executive Director
(Rapkin and Strand 2005).
As mentioned previously The Fund has embarked on a reform package that will
improve governance. Beginning in 2008, the Fund embraced quota reform by reaching an
agreement to increase the quotas of 54 member countries. China will see an increase of
over 50 percent, South Korea will see a quota share increase of 106 percent, Turkey will
increase by 51 percent, and Mexico will see an increase of 40 percent (IMF 2013).
The second major reform proposal was approved in 2010. According to
International Monetary Fund data this reform package is historical because it will shift
decision-making power to emerging market and developing countries. The top ten
shareholders will represent the top ten economies in the international monetary system.
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These countries will be the U.S. Japan, France, Germany, the U.K. Italy, Brazil, Russia,
India, and China (IMF 2013).
The proposed reforms will provide 110 countries with a quota increase and will
preserve the voting share of the poorest developing countries in the Fund. This will result
in more than six percent in quota share to emerging and developing countries. Also,
industrialized European economies will hold only two seats on the Executive Board and
all Executive Directors will be elected (IMF 2013). The 14th GQR will double the current
quotas to SDR 476.8 billion from SDR 238.4. Historically, the amendment process is not
without discord and is often time consuming.
As of October 2013, as previously stated, the U.S. Congress has not approved the
proposed quota and governance reforms. The U.S. is the largest shareholder and no
country on the Executive Board will bring forward a proposal without U.S. approval. The
U.S. has taken advantage of the formal governance structure of the Fund. Only large
member states at the Fund have their own Executive Directors. The U.S. has the largest
vote and has the opportunity to influence all decision it deems necessary (Woods and
Lombardi 2006). The U.S. is strategically positioned at the Fund and Executive Board to
maximize influence. The proposed reforms and the 14th GQR will not be implemented
without U.S. approval. This is important because the U.S. is the only member states with
the capacity to veto decisions requiring the 85 percent majority rule (Woods and
Lombardi 2006).
Conclusion
The pending reforms and the 14th GQR have not diminished the disparity between
the top ten economies in the international monetary system and their influence in the
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Fund. Based on the data provided by the Fund for the pending 14th GQR the BRICS
remain under-represented in terms of GDP and voting share when compared to the U.S.,
Japan, France, Germany, the U.K., and Italy (see table 10). The BRICS account for an
aggregate 18.4 percent GDP that result in a total 14th GQR quota share of 11.5 percent.
This will yield a combined voting share of 10.03 percent (IMF 2013).
Whether the reform process has gone far enough to diminish the disparity gap
between rich and poor countries and the ongoing legitimacy problem is yet to be seen.
Two pending reforms that cause concern are the all elected Executive Board and reducing
the advanced European economies on the Executive Board. These reforms are
problematic because there are no formal rules as to how members create constituencies.
For example, if the EU members form one constituency, this will provide them with a
quota share of 35.22 percent. Another hypothetical scenario that needs to be examined is
the possibility of retribution for developing countries. If the European Union Executive
Director candidate is not supported by small economies will this cause discord amongst
members. It appears ongoing reforms have a number of unanswered questions that have
the potential to create new problems. In sum, the Fund has not done enough to distribute
quota shares to emerging market economies and reform governance in the Fund.
Economic variables are not sufficient to replace the power politics ingrained in the
institutional design of the Fund.
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Table 1: Quota Shares for Low Income Countries

Country

PrePost
Singapore 2008

14th
GQR

GDP
Blend

Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
Burundi
Benin
Guinea-Bissau
Central African Rep.
Chad
Ethiopia
Congo, Rep. of
Rwanda
Nepal
Malawi
Gambia, The
Mali
Haiti
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Sudan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Comoros
Eritrea
Kyrgyz Republic
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Total N=33

0.076
0.250
0.041
0.036
0.029
0.007
0.026
0.026
0.063
0.040
0.037
0.033
0.032
0.015
0.044
0.038
0.127
0.060
0.057
0.053
0.049
0.038

0.068
0.224
0.037
0.032
0.026
0.006
0.023
0.029
0.063
0.034
0.034
0.033
0.029
0.013
0.039
0.034
0.114
0.054
0.051
0.048
0.043
0.034
0.052
0.036
0.083
0.031
0.076
0.148
0.004
0.008
0.037
0.045
0.025
1.610

0.003
0.238
0.028
0.005
0.014
0.002
0.004
0.018
0.074
0.025
0.012
0.035
0.012
0.003
0.018
0.013
0.067
0.002
0.019
0.022
0.006
0.001
0.024
0.013
0.055
0.006
0.039
0.001
0.001
0.004
0.012
0.011
0.020
0.852

na
0.041
0.093
0.034
0.084
0.165
0.004
0.007
0.042
0.050
0.028
1.730

0.068
0.224
0.037
0.032
0.026
0.006
0.023
0.028
0.056
0.035
0.034
0.030
0.029
0.013
0.039
0.034
0.114
0.054
0.051
0.048
0.043
0.034
0.052
0.036
0.083
0.031
0.076
0.148
0.004
0.008
0.037
0.045
0.025
1.600
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Table 2: Quota Shares for Lower Middle Income Countries
Country

Pre-Singapore

Post- 2008

14th GQR

GDP Blend

Armenia
Bhutan
Bolivia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo, Rep. of
Cote dlvoure
Djibouti
Egypt
El Salvador
Georgia
Ghana
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Indonesia
Kenya
Kiribati
Kosovo
Lao P.D.R.
Lesotho
Mauritania
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Philippines
Sao Tome &
Principe
Swaziland
Senegal
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syrian Arab Rep.
Timor-Leste
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Total N=46

0.043
0.003
0.080
0.087
0.004
0.040
0.152
0.007
0.442
0.080
0.070
0.173
0.098
0.043
0.061
0.973
0.127
0.003
n/a
0.025
0.016
0.030
0.003
0.058
0.024
0.275
0.061
0.820
0.484
0.062
0.047
0.412
0.004

0.039
0.004
0.072
0.078
0.005
0.035
0.136
0.007
0.396
0.072
0.063
0.155
0.088
0.038
0.054
0.872
0.114
0.002
0.025
0.022
0.015
0.027
0.002
0.052
0.021
0.247
0.055
0.735
0.433
0.055
0.042
0.427
0.003

0.027
0.004
0.050
0.058
0.005
0.034
0.136
0.007
0.427
0.060
0.044
0.155
0.090
0.038
0.052
0.974
0.114
0.002
0.017
0.022
0.015
0.027
0.002
0.036
0.015
0.187
0.055
0.515
0.426
0.055
0.042
0.428
0.003

0.018
0.004
0.045
0.048
0.003
0.020
0.041
0.002
0.481
0.044
0.024
0.067
0.078
0.005
0.033
1.222
0.067
<0.001
0.012
0.015
0.004
0.007
0.001
0.012
0.012
0.172
0.016
0.386
0.430
0.018
0.038
0.385
<0.001

0.024
0.076
0.005
0.193
0.147
0.137
0.004
0.642
0.129
0.008
0.154
0.114
0.229
6.667

0.021
0.068
0.004
0.173
0.132
0.135
0.005
0.575
0.116
0.007
0.193
0.102
0.205
6.127

0.016
0.086
0.004
0.121
0.132
0.145
0.005
0.422
0.116
0.005
0.242
0.102
0.205
5.723

0.007
0.025
0.002
0.105
0.118
0.282
0.009
0.299
0.084
0.001
0.253
0.066
0.010
4.972
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Table 5: Quota Shares for EU Members
Country

Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Poland
Bulgaria
Austria
Ireland
Denmark
Greece
Finland
Czech Republic
Portugal
Hungary
Romania
Luxembourg
Slovakia
Croatia
Slovenia
Lithuania
Latvia
Cyprus
Estonia
Malta
U.K.
Spain
Total, N =28

PrePostSingapore 2008
Reform
6.086
6.107
5.024
4.502
3.301
3.305
2.415
2.164
2.155
1.931
1.121
1.004
0.640
0.708
0.300
0.268
0.876
0.886
0.392
0.527
0.769
0.793
0.385
0.462
0.591
0.530
0.383
0.420
0.406
0.432
0.486
0.435
0.482
0.432
0.131
0.176
0.167
0.179
0.171
0.153
0.108
0.115
0.067
0.077
0.059
0.060
0.065
0.066
0.031
0.039
0.048
0.043
5.024
4.502
1.426
1.687
37.82
36.80
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14th
GRQ
5.583
4.225
3.159
1.831
1.344
0.929
0.859
0.188
0.824
0.723
0.721
0.509
0.505
0.457
0.432
0.407
0.380
0.277
0.210
0.150
0.123
0.093
0.070
0.064
0.051
0.035
4.225
1.999
35.22

Table 6: Quota and Voting Shares for the BRICS
Country

GDP Openness Variability Reserves PrePostBlend
Singapore 2008

14th
GQR
Quota
share

14th
GQR
Voting
Share

Brazil
Russia
India
China
South Africa

3.134
2.681
3.680
11.65
0.618

1.142
2.106
1.793
8.534
0.498

1.502
2.822
1.607
5.882
0.333

3.382
4.803
2.900
32.20
0.439

1.420
2.782
1.945
2.980
0.874

1.782
2.493
2.441
3.994
0.783

2.315
2.705
2.749
6.390
0.640

2.217
2.586
2.627
6.068
0.634

Total, N = 5

21.76

14.07

12.14

43.72

10.00

11.49

14.79

14.13
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Table 7: Country Comparison for Voting Shares
Country

GDP
Blend

Pre-Singapore Vote
Share

Post-2008 Vote
share

14th GQR Vote
Share

China
Brazil
India

11.65
3.134
3.680

2.928
1.402
1.916

3.651
1.782
2.441

6.068
2.217
2.627

Sub-Total
N=3
Germany
France
U.K.

18.46

6.246

7.874

10.91

4.811
3.663
3.369

5.968
4.929
4.929

5.800
4.284
4.284

5.306
4.022
4.022

Sub-Total
N=3

11.84

15.82

14.36

13.35
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Table 8: BRICS Population and UN Contributions
Country

GDP
Blend

PreSingapore

Post2008

14th
GQR

Pop. %
Share

UN
%

China
Brazil
Russia
India
South Africa
Total, N=5

11.65
3.134
2.681
3.680
0.618
21.76

2.980
1.420
2.782
1.945
0.874
10.00

3.994
1.782
2.493
2.441
0.783
11.49

6.390
2.315
2.705
2.749
0.640
14.79

18.96
2.790
2.016
17.36
0.719
41.85

3.118
1.575
1.566
0.522
0.376
7.157
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Figure 1: Population Percentages for the BRICS
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Figure 2: UN Contributions for the BRICS
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South
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Table 9: G8 Population and UN Contributions
Country

GDP

U.S.
Japan
Germany
U.K.
France
Italy
Canada
Russia
Total, N=8

21.57
7.512
4.811
3.369
3.663
2.977
2.185
2.681
48.77

PreSingapore
Q. Share %
17.38
6.228
6.086
5.024
5.024
3.301
2.980
2.782
48.81

Post-2008

14th
GQR

Pop. %
Share

UN %

17.66
6.553
6.107
4.502
4.502
3.305
2.670
2.493
47.79

17.40
6.461
5.583
4.225
4.225
3.159
2.311
2.705
46.07

4.408
1.791
1.150
0.888
0.923
0.855
0.490
2.016
12.52

23.91
12.25
7.838
6.456
5.986
4.887
3.135
1.566
66.03
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Figure 3: G8 Population Share

G8 Population Share
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Figure 4: G8 UN Contribution Share
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Table 10: G20 Population and UN Contribution
Country

GDP
Blend

PrePost-2008
Singapore Reform

14th GQR

Population %
Share

UN %

China
India
U.S.
Indonesia
EU
Brazil
Russia
Japan
Mexico
Germany
Turkey
France
U.K.
Italy
South Africa
Korea, Rep.
Argentina
Canada
Saudi
Arabia
Australia

11.65
3.680
21.57
1.222
9.358
3.134
2.681
7.512
1.814
4.811
1.195
3.663
3.369
2.977
0.618
1.725
0.705
2.185
0.786

2.980
1.945
17.38
0.973
13.67
1.420
2.782
6.228
1.210
6.086
0.451
5.024
5.024
3.301
0.874
0.764
0.990
2.980
3.268

3.994
2.441
17.66
0.872
13.58
1.782
2.493
6.553
1.520
6.107
0.610
4.502
4.502
3.305
0.783
1.411
0.888
2.670
2.929

6.390
2.749
17.39
0.974
13.18
2.315
2.705
6.461
1.868
5.583
0.977
4.225
4.225
3.159
0.640
1.799
0.668
2.311
2.095

18.96
17.36
4.408
3.466
3.332
2.790
2.016
1.791
1.697
1.150
1.039
0.923
0.888
0.855
0.719
0.702
0.577
0.490
0.397

3.118
0.522
23.90
0.233
12.90
1.575
1.566
12.24
2.303
7.838
0.603
5.986
6.456
4.887
0.376
2.209
0.281
3.135
0.811

1.643

1.514

1.357

1.378

0.319

1.890

Total, N=20

86.30

78.86

79.96

81.10

63.89

92.85
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the main aspects of the previous discussion to
understand how the International Monetary Fund's institutional design has evolved over
time and what steps need to be taken to ensure the Fund continues to fulfill its original
mandate of overseeing the international monetary system. This thesis demonstrates
power politics matters at every stage and level of Fund institutional design.
The Fund has two fundamental challenges. The first challenge is for the Fund to
overcome the legitimacy crisis. The second challenge is for major shareholders to
acknowledge the changing international monetary system. This acknowledgement must
be inclusive of emerging markets and other developing economies. More than ever,
emerging market economies are demanding Fund representation commensurate with their
global economic strength.
The current legitimacy problem is rooted in the Fund's history. Recently, the
legitimacy problem has been aggravated by the lack of reform implementation for equal
representation for emerging economies. In the past, the Latin American debt crisis and
the Asian Financial crisis created much resentment for the Fund. As mentioned in the
previous chapters the Fund failed to respond adequately to macroeconomic and liquidity
problems by applying the one size fit all approach.
This thesis examined the Fund's history and how global politics shaped the
institutional design of the Fund. The original mandate was drafted by the U.S. and United
Kingdom with the goal of establishing a post WW II international monetary system and
encourages international trade. Bryant (2008) argues the Fund was originally established
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to be political in nature. Dervis and Ozer (2005) argue the Bretton Woods system has
been remarkably durable. The Fund has evolved over time and produced solutions to deal
with ongoing problems of the time. For example, the creation of the SDR system was a
response to the dollar not keeping up with the global need for liquidity.
Chapter two focused on the Bretton Woods System and how the architects of the
system ingrained political factors into the institutional design of the Fund. The Bretton
Woods System and the International Monetary Fund responded to changes in the
international monetary system. For example, the creation of financial facilities and how
the Fund took the lead in creating a new role for itself with assisting developing countries
during global financial turbulence (Vreeland 2007). During this time the Fund became
the de facto lender of last resort and embraced the role of policy advisor.
This chapter examined the historical analysis of Latin America and Fund
conditionality. Also, it highlighted the Washington Consensus doctrine and the role it
played in Latin America and future international financial crises. As Meltzer (1998)
argues Latin American countries became indebted to the Fund due to high interest loans
provided by private capital markets and Fund conditionality. Ultimately, other regions
would also experience the frustration Latin American economies experienced due to the
Fund’s involvement.
The Asian Financial Crisis was highlighted in the chapter. The Asian Financial
Crisis of the 1990s is important to the Fund’s history because it explains the Fund’s one
size fits all approach to be fundamentally flawed in addressing international financial
problems. This section examined a number of Asian countries and the policies advocated
by the Fund. The end result was the Fund’s conditionality failed to produce positive
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financial solutions for the Asia region. As a result of the two regional cases highlighted in
this chapter, the Fund’s legitimacy problem became a serious ongoing challenge for the
institutional design and governance of the Fund.
Chapter three focused on governance and the institutional design of the Fund.
Areas of concern in the chapter included technical aspects like the Articles of Agreement,
the quota and subscription power of the Fund, the weighted voting system, decisionmaking bodies, and formal and informal governance of the Fund. The quota share is
correlated to the relative size of the country’s economy; this determines voting shares, the
amount of money available for borrowing, and SDRs. Also, important to Fund
governance is the surveillance and conditionality powers the Fund has over member
states.
Chapter three highlighted the formal and informal governance practices of the
Fund to demonstrate the how power politics can override macroeconomic variables for
loan approval and other important decisions for major shareholders of the Fund.
Considerable time was dedicated to this section as it is most important for international
organization scholars to understand the influence of formal and informal governance to
decision making outcomes. Also, attention was given to studies conducted by Thacker
(1999) Dreher, Strum, and Vreeland (2009), and Dreher and Vreeland (2011) regarding
voting patterns of countries at the United Nations and how those votes correlated to
favorable or unfavorable loan conditions.
Scholars like Stone (2002, 2008, 2011) and Thacker (1999) argue the Fund
utilized non-economic variables to distribute loans for member states and that informal
governance is part of the institutional design of the Fund. The formal rules of governance
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solidify the power of major shareholders, particularly, the U.S. The ongoing legitimacy
and resentment problem regarding loan conditionality dates back to the early 1980s
during the crisis management role (Broome 2010).
Chapter four provided the reader with two case studies of power adjustment at the
Fund. China’s membership is an example of the Fund’s ability to adjust to changes in the
global political economy. After the modernization reforms in China, the Fund witnessed
the membership of the most populated country. In 1983, China's admittance into the Fund
would alter the future structure of the international monetary system. This case study
examined internal Fund documents to detail the discord over quota allocations and the
issue of China’s representation.
The second case study for the chapter examined Russia joining at the end of the
Cold War. The major shift for the Fund came when the road was paved for 14 regional
countries to gain membership in the Fund. As a result, this made the Fund a nearly
universal international organization. Russia's quota allocation also changed the Fund's
institutional design. Russia obtained a seat on the powerful Executive Board with no
obligations to represent a constituency. Overall, Russia’s quota allocation resulted from
informal governance and power politics at its best. More importantly, the Russia case
study is an example of America unprecedented formal and informal influence at the
Fund. Put differently, Russian membership was not a reality in the Fund until the U.S.
allowed Russia to become a member.
Chapter five examined the institutional design post-Cold War with the emphasis
on Japan, Europe, and the BRICS. Japan’s role in the Fund has been one of financier,
supporter, and power players within the institutional design of the Fund. This case
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examines Japan’s ascension through the hierarchy of the Fund. From the moments of
passivity as rule takers to expecting a quota share commensurate with its global economic
position. Japan also had a role in establishing the idea of multilateralism with the support
of an Asian Monetary Fund.
This chapter addressed the problem of European over-representation and the
institutional cleavages this has created between rich and poor states. Additionally, the
European case study offers a glimpse of the power politics and informal governance at
the Fund. For example, the European Council of Ministers and European Countries
Representative in the Fund (EURIMF) have influence when speaking on issues that effect
all participating countries (Bini Smaghi 2004). One issue that has been highly
controversial is the issue of the Managing Director selection process. The selection
process is a reflection of the implicit and explicit power political agenda manipulated by
the EU.
Reform proposals have highlighted the debate over European over-representation
in the Fund. The challenge for the European Union resides in how to simplify the
complex and controversial issue of collectivity. If the EU renounces Executive Board
seats, will this create polarization within the Fund? EU members will need to organize to
obtain more voting power for their national interest. This may create an environment that
is strictly political and confrontational in lieu of an environment that is supposed to be
cooperative in nature. Also, this chapter examines the continued opposition to the
European over-representation by the BRICS. The BRICS recognized the growing power
of their economies and contributions to global economic growth. As a response in part to
the growing representation issue at the Fund the BRICS have proposed a BRICS
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Development Bank. However, much debate has been raised about the potential success of
the proposed development bank.
Chapter six dealt with the descriptive data regarding quota and voting shares. The
time periods examined were the pre-Singapore, Post-Singapore, and 14th GQR to make
the observation between quota shares and the legitimacy of proposed reforms.
GDP was utilized as a standard measure to determine quota shares for the different
country groups. Different income levels and groups of countries were examined including
the EU, G8, and G20. Emerging economies like the BRICS were also examined to assess
whether their quota shares are commensurate to their economic strength. Based on the
data presented industrialized countries continue to be over-represented in the Fund. The
main conclusion of this chapter was that the Fund did not go far enough to solve the
problem of the ongoing legitimacy debate and a more equitable representation for
emerging market economies. More importantly, the recent reforms send the implicit
message that the Fund is not accountable to less powerful members. The findings in this
thesis support the current theoretical literature that argue informal influence and
governance in the Fund are more important than economic variables for the
implementation of major decisions, loan conditionality, and decision making processes.
The work highlighted by Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Vreeland (2011) provide
examples of informal influence. The pending 14th GQR provides the most recent
evidence that equality and burden sharing is not a major consideration of the major
shareholders in the Fund. Table 1 indicates that low income countries are overrepresented in quota allocation based on the aggregate GDP blend. Total GDP blend is
0.852 percent and the pending reforms will provide low income countries with 1.810
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aggregate quota share. Table 7 compares voting shares for the three most powerful
BRICS and the three European countries who are major shareholders in the Fund. China,
Brazil, and India have an aggregate GDP blend of 18.46 which will result in a potential
voting share of 10.91 percent of total Fund votes. Germany, France, and the U.K. account
for a total GDP blend of 11.84 percent. This will result in a potential voting share of
13.35 percent. The evidence indicates that low income countries are over-represented
with little potential to increase their GDP to significant levels that will move them into
major shareholder status. The BRICS are under-represented with a GDP blend that
justifies a larger quota share.
The previously mentioned reforms are responses to unprecedented economic
times. The divide between rich states and poor states has been rarely so prevalent. Wade
(2011) argues the industrialized economies are incorporating emerging economic actors
into an industrialized Westernized concept of globalization. However, emerging
economies are demanding more representation with little strategy and loyalty for their
preferences. Perhaps, the case study of Japan’s strategic ascension in the Fund will serve
as a model for emerging and developing countries who seek a greater shift in the balance
of power.
Ultimately, the 2010 reforms were a sign that developed economies, particularly
the U.S. and EU members are not eager to cede decision-making influence to emerging
market and developing countries. There is no denying the influence of formal and
informal decision making processes and power politics within the institutional design of
the Fund. The institutional design of the Fund will adjust to confront the challenges of a
changing international political economy. However, adjustments in the Fund’s
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institutional design will reflect the legacy of John Maynard Keynes and Henry Dexter
White that is rooted in power politics, institutional rules, and informal governance.
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APPENDIX A: TABLE 3: UPPER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
Country

Pre-Singapore Post 2008 14th GQR GDP Blend

Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belize
Bosnia & Her.
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Fiji
Gabon
Grenada
Hungary
Iran
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Maldives
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Mexico
Montenegro
Namibia
Palau
Panama
Peru
Romania
Samoa
Serbia
Seychelles
South Africa
St. Lucia

0.587
0.134
0.990
0.075
0.181
0.008
0.079
0.029
1.420
0.300
2.980
0.362
0.077
0.004
0.102
0.141
0.033
0.072
0.005
0.486
0.700
0.556
0.128
0.080
0.171
0.095
0.526
0.695
0.038
0.020
0.048
1.210
0.013
0.064
0.002
0.097
0.299
0.482
0.005
0.219
0.004
0.874
0.007

0.526
0.132
0.888
0.067
0.162
0.009
0.071
0.037
1.782
0.268
3.994
0.325
0.078
0.003
0.092
0.146
0.029
0.065
0.005
0.435
0.682
0.498
0.115
0.071
0.179
0.112
0.471
0.744
0.041
0.025
0.043
1.520
0.012
0.057
0.002
0.087
0.268
0.432
0.005
0.196
0.005
0.783
0.006
163

0.411
0.120
0.668
0.082
0.143
0.010
0.056
0.041
2.315
0.188
6.390
0.429
0.077
0.003
0.100
0.146
0.021
0.045
0.003
0.407
0.748
0.349
0.080
0.072
0.243
0.133
0.330
0.762
0.004
0.001
0.030
1.868
0.013
0.040
0.001
0.079
0.280
0.380
0.003
0.137
0.005
0.640
0.004

0.293
0.143
0.705
0.099
0.121
0.003
0.035
0.028
3.134
0.100
11.65
0.507
0.061
<0.001
0.095
0.119
0.005
0.026
0.020
0.226
0.900
0.214
0.026
0.044
0.245
0.067
0.100
0.465
0.003
<0.001
0.019
1.814
0.008
0.018
0.004
0.050
0.294
0.304
<0.001
0.079
0.002
0.618
0.002

St. Vincent
Suriname
Thailand
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Venezuela
Total, N=52

0.004
0.043
0.506
0.003
0.134
0.451
0.035
n/a
1.244
16.76

0.003
0.039
0.604
0.003
0.120
0.610
0.041
0.008
1.115
17.95
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0.003
0.027
0.673
0.003
0.114
0.977
0.050
0.005
0.780
20.48

<0.001
0.007
0.605
0.008
0.096
1.195
0.043
<0.001
0.522
25.10

APPENDIX B: TABLE 4: HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES

Country
Antigua and
Barbuda
Australia
Austria
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Brunei
Canada
Chile
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Equatorial Guinea
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Oman
Poland
Portugal
Qatar

PrePostSingapore 2008
0.006
1.514
0.876
0.061
0.063
0.032
2.155
0.036
02.98
0.401
0.171
0.065
0.383
0.769
0.031
0.015
0.591
5.024
6.086
0.385
0.055
0.392
0.434
3.301
6.228
0.764
0.646
0.059
0.067
0.131
0.048
2.415
0.419
0.782
0.091
0.064
0.406
0.123
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0.006
1.357
0.886
0.055
0.074
0.028
1.931
0.032
02.67
0.359
0.153
0.066
0.42
0.793
0.039
0.022
0.053
4.502
6.107
0.462
0.049
0.527
0.445
3.305
6.553
1.411
0.635
0.006
0.077
0.176
0.043
2.164
0.375
0.079
0.099
0.708
0.432
0.127

14th
GQR
0.004
1.378
0.824
0.038
0.083
0.002
1.344
0.032
2.311
0.366
0.015
0.064
0.457
0.721
0.051
0.033
0.505
4.225
5.583
0.509
0.067
0.723
0.403
3.159
6.461
1.080
0.579
0.007
0.093
0.277
0.035
1.831
0.262
0.787
0.114
0.859
0.432
0.154

GDP
Blend
0.002
1.643
0.553
0.013
0.038
0.008
0.675
0.023
2.185
0.351
0.100
0.035
0.342
0.041
0.033
0.025
0.333
3.663
4.811
0.451
0.019
0.304
0.327
2.977
7.512
1.725
0.327
0.043
0.068
0.073
0.014
1.128
0.196
0.545
0.100
0.839
0.354
0.207

Russia
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
St. Kitts
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
U.A.E.
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Total, N= 53

2.782
0.008
3.268
0.404
0.167
0.108
1.426
0.004
1.121
1.618
0.157
0.286
5.024
17.38
0.143
72.54
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2.493
0.009
2.929
0.059
0.179
0.115
1.687
0.004
1.004
1.450
0.141
0.315
4.502
17.66
0.129
71.68

2.705
0.001
2.095
0.816
0.210
0.123
1.999
0.003
0.929
1.021
0.098
0.485
4.225
17.39
00.09
69.20

2.681
0.003
0.786
0.367
0.150
0.077
2.107
0.001
0.639
0.725
0.034
0.421
3.369
21.57
0.062
65.45
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